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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected state and 
federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither comprehensive in breadth, as 
several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues within individual cases are omitted. 
Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an authoritative guide; rather, they are intended 
to alert the Alaska legal community to judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries 
are grouped by subject matter. Within each subject, the summaries are organized alphabetically. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court 
In Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court,1 the court of appeals held the Public 
Defender Agency or the Office of Public Advocacy must pay for an indigent defendant’s travel to 
the site of their trial, including the expenses of a parent accompanying a minor who is unable to 
travel alone, if the defendant is (1) not in custody and (2) unable to afford transportation to trial. 
J.B., a minor defendant represented by the Public Defender Agency, lives in Marshall and lacked 
the funds to travel with a parent to Bethel to appear at his trial. The superior court ordered the 
Public Defender Agency to pay for J.B. and his parent’s travel. The Agency appealed, arguing that 
either the Division of Juvenile Justice or the Court System should be responsible those expenses. 
The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s order, reasoning that the case presented a 
question of administration best decided by deferring substantially to the state agencies responsible 
for administering the Public Defender Agency’s authorizing statute. The court referenced two 
Alaska Attorney General opinions issued in 1977 and 1978 respectively, declaring that the Public 
Defender Agency is responsible for the transportation costs of indigent defendants, including 
juveniles. The court of appeals reasoned that these opinions supported the Division of Juvenile 
Justice’s argument that travel expenses are a necessary “service” or “facility” of representation, 
required to be paid by the Public Defender Agency according to its authorizing statute. The court 
also relied on a Department of Administration regulation that the court interpreted as accepting the 
Attorney General’s opinion. Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that 
the Public Defender Agency must pay the transportation expenses of an indigent defendant, not in 
custody, who cannot afford to travel to their trial. The Agency must also pay for the expenses of a 
parent accompanying a minor defendant who cannot travel alone. 
 
Corkery v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Corkery v. Municipality of Anchorage,2 the supreme court held that section 21.15.010 of the 
Anchorage Municipality Code (AMC) requires property owners to substantially satisfy each one 
of its seven standards to obtain a zoning variance.  In 1965, the Corkerys’ lot was zoned so that, at 
maximum, 30% of the surface could be covered by a structure.  However, in 1983 a prior owner 
expanded the house beyond this limit without a variance.  In 2013, when rot was found in a wall, 
the Corkerys applied for a permit to rebuild that section of the home.  The Municipality issued a 
permit conditioned on the Corkerys first obtaining a zoning variance for the exceeded limit.  
However, the zoning board denied the Corkerys’ application for a variance because it found three 
of seven requirements for a variance were not met.  On appeal the Corkery’s argued that the code 
only required applicants “substantially” meet the seven criteria as a whole, and by meeting four of 
them they had done so. The Supreme Court disagreed.  The court reasoned that though the code’s 
requirement that an application “substantially meet[] the . . . standards” could be read as the 
Corkerys argued, it was more natural to read it to require applicants substantially meet each of the 
seven standards individually.  The court explained that this reading was supported by the individual 
listing of each factor, that two of them operated interdependently, and that a separate portion of 
the municipal code (which should be interpreted to create a harmonious whole) implied that in 
reviewing an application the board must find each of the seven criteria to be substantially satisfied.  
                                                            
1 413 P.3d 1221 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018). 
2 426 P.3d 1078 (Alaska 2018). 
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The court concluded that the word “substantially” was not made superfluous by this interpretation 
as it meant applicants need not satisfy each factor in full. Affirming the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that section 21.15.010 of the AMC requires property owners to substantially 
satisfy each one of its seven standards to obtain a zoning variance. 
 
Eberhart v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n 
In Eberhart v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n,3 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that Section 
15.13.145 of the Alaska Statutes prohibits the use of both a public entity’s cash and its non-
monetary resources for the purpose of influencing a state or municipal election of a state or 
municipal candidate.  AS 15.13.145(a)(4) prohibits elected officials from using “money held by 
the entity [they work for] to influence the outcome of the election of a candidate to a state or 
municipal office.”  Eberhart allegedly used his city email address during his mayoral campaign to 
email the city clerk to request all of the ordinances and resolutions that he and his opponent had 
sponsored.  APOC opened an investigation and concluded that most of Eberhart’s emails were 
permissible under AS 15.13.145; however, it identified Eberhart’s email exchange with the clerk 
as a possible violation.  APOC imposed a $37.50 fine because the cost of sending the emails to the 
clerk was de minimus and did not cause significant public harm; Eberhart appealed. The Supreme 
Court of Alaska found that the phrase “to influence the outcome of the election” does not require 
proof of actual influence as the word “to” can be understood to mean “for the purpose of.”  Further, 
the court found that it was reasonable for APOC to interpret the term “money” to include property 
and assets including the city’s email system.  The court explained that it was unlikely that the 
legislature intended to ban public cash from being used to influence a candidate while allowing 
public non-monetary resources to be used for the same purpose.  Affirming the superior court’s 
decision, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that that AS 15.13.145 prohibits the use of both a 
public entity’s cash and its non-monetary resources for the purpose of influencing the outcome of 
the election of a state or municipal candidate. 
 
Griswold v. Homer City Council 
In Griswold v. Homer City Council,4 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the attorney-client and 
work-product privileges are state law exceptions to section 40.25.120 of the Alaska Statutes (the 
Alaska Public Records Act), and that communications between members of quasi-judicial bodies 
and their supporting staff are protected by deliberative process privilege.  After a decision by the 
Homer Board of Adjustment, Frank Griswold submitted two public records requests, the first for 
communications between the Board and its advisor, attorney Holly Wells, and the second for the 
Board’s invoices from the law firms Birch Horton and Levesque.  The Board refused to provide 
the communications citing deliberative process and attorney-client privilege, and though it 
provided some invoice information it withheld much of it again citing attorney-client privilege.  
Griswold appealed arguing that the communications were not privileged because Wells was a 
neutral advisor, not an advocate for the board, and that attorney-client privilege simply did not 
apply to the invoices.  The supreme court disagreed.  The court initially explained that the Alaska 
Public Records Act gives the public the right to inspect public documents unless required to be 
kept confidential by federal or state law, including by the common-law.  The court noted that it 
had previously held that the deliberative process privilege was such a common-law exception, and 
                                                            
3 426 P.3d 890 (Alaska 2018). 
4 428 P.3d 180 (Alaska 2018). 
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it reasoned that the long history and public interest behind the attorney-client and work-product 
privileges required recognizing them as such too. The court then determined that the deliberative 
process privilege applied to the communications, because they “occurred before the decision was 
issued and contain[ed] give-and-take on the wording of the decision.” It explained that compelling 
the disclosure of these materials would chill the deliberative process, undermining public trust and 
dissuading frank discussion amongst city staff.  As for the invoices, the supreme court refrained 
from ruling on the substance of the materials, but rather, identified a procedural error in the 
superior court’s determination of whether the materials were privileged under the attorney-client 
and work-product privileges. Affirming the privilege of the communications and remanding for 
reconsideration on the status of the invoices, the supreme court held that the attorney-client and 
work-product privileges are state law exceptions to the Public Records Act, and that 
communications between members of quasi-judicial bodies and their supporting staff are protected 
by deliberative process privilege. 
 
Nicolos v. N. Slope Borough 
In Nicolos v. N. Slope Borough,5 the supreme court held that an administrative agency’s decision 
regarding a state employee’s discharge is independently reviewed by the supreme court; deference 
is given to the agency’s factual findings, but questions of law outside the agency’s special expertise 
are subject to a “substitution of judgment standard.”  Tom Donovan Nicolos worked for the North 
Slope Borough Department of Public Works (the Borough) when he began having thoughts of 
harming himself and others which he characterized as “unwelcome.”  After informing his 
supervisor of his thoughts, Nicolos was put on leave and eventually the Borough terminated him.  
Nicolos appealed to the Borough Personnel Board, which concluded there was just cause for 
discharge.  Nicolos then appealed to the superior court, which reversed the Board’s findings in 
part, but ultimately affirmed the termination.  Applying an “independent review” standard, the 
supreme court affirmed the Borough Personnel Board’s decision.  The court explained that this 
standard applies to appeals from administrative agency decisions.  It elaborated that under it, while 
no deference is shown to superior court rulings, three different standards of review apply to agency 
conclusions depending on the context.  The court said that first agency’s findings of fact are 
accepted when supported by “substantial evidence,” and defined this as “such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Second, the court 
explained that questions of law involving “agency expertise or the determination of fundamental 
policies within the scope of the agency’s statutory functions”, are subject to a “reasonable basis 
test.”  Finally,  the court added that an agency interpretation of law beyond its special area of 
expertise is shown no deference under the “substitution of judgment standard.” Applying the 
substitution of judgment standard, the court found that an employee may be punished under the 
Borough’s personnel rule against threats when a reasonable person could interpret the employee’s 
actions as conveying intent to cause physical harm.  Under this interpretation, and accepting the 
Board’s factual findings as true, the court concluded the Board’s finding that Nicolos’s statements 
were punishable threats was supported by substantial evidence.   Affirming the Board on all issues, 
the supreme court held that an administrative agency’s decision regarding a state employee’s 
discharge is independently reviewed by the supreme court; deference is given to the agency’s 
factual findings, but questions of law outside the agency’s special expertise are subject to a 
“substitution of judgment standard. 
                                                            
5 424 P.3d 318 (Alaska 2018). 
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Odom v. State Division of Corporations 
In Odom v. State Division of Corporations,6 the supreme court held that a Medical Board’s 
decision to impose sanctions must be supported by sufficiently substantial evidence that the 
doctor’s actions demonstrated professional incompetence. Odom was accused of providing 
substandard care to his patient by administering excessive thyroid hormone treatment and by 
proscribing phentermine to a patient with cardiomyopathy (a heart condition). An administrative 
law judge held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that no disciplinary sanction was warranted 
because the Licensing Division had failed to prove that Odom’s actions fell below the standard of 
care. However, the Medical Board voted unanimously to reject the administrative judge’s decision 
and revoke Odom’s Alaska medical license. Odom appealed and the superior court vacated the 
decision and remanded the matter to the Board to consider Odom’s late-filed opposition that it had 
initially failed to consider. The Board reaffirmed its decision and the superior court affirmed the 
Board’s decision. Odom appealed, claiming that the Medical Board lacked substantial evidence to 
support its decision. The supreme court held that the Board must prove by sufficient evidence, 
assuming a preponderance standard applied, that the doctor demonstrated professional 
incompetence by lacking the sufficient knowledge, skills, or professional judgment to a degree 
likely to endanger the health of the patient. Further, the court noted the legislature expressly 
warned against basing a finding of professional incompetence solely on a doctor’s unconventional 
or experimental practices in the absence of demonstrable physical harm to the patient. Reversing 
the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that a Medical Board’s decision to sanction 
must be sufficiently be supported by substantial evidence that the doctor’s actions demonstrated 
professional incompetence. 
 
Pease-Madore v. State Dep’t of Corrections 
In Pease-Madore v. Alaska Dep’t of Corrections7, the supreme court held that a prisoner’s 
procedural due process rights in a disciplinary hearing are satisfied by the use of incident reports 
as evidence and audio recordings as documentation of that hearing. Pease-Madore was disciplined 
for making threats of bodily harm and creating a disturbance; the superior court affirmed these 
disciplinary actions.  Pease-Madore filed three appeals arguing that the Alaska Constitution’s due 
process requirement for a “verbatim record of the [disciplinary] proceedings” from McGinnis v. 
Stevens,8 was in addition to, rather than in place of, the requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell.9  In 
Wolff, the United States Supreme Court held federal procedural due process in prisoner 
disciplinary hearings requires “a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on 
and the reasons” for disciplinary action.10 Pease-Madore argued that a verbatim record alone, as 
required by McGinnis, failed to satisfy Wolff. The supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the 
McGinnis standard is “a more protective requirement that can satisfy the written statement 
requirement.” The court elaborated that if the recording includes information about the evidence 
relied upon in the disciplinary action, and the reasons for how a decision was reached, then a 
verbatim record better fulfills the goals served by requiring a written statement. Finally, the 
supreme court also held that an incident report can serve as part of the evidentiary basis for a prison 
                                                            
6 421 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2018). 
7 414 P.3d 671 (Alaska 2018). 
8 570 P.2d 735 (Alaska 1977). 
9 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
10 414 P.3d at 673.  
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disciplinary decision. According to 22 AAC 05.455(a), if a prisoner does not request the presence 
of the facility staff member who wrote the disciplinary record, the report may be used as evidence 
by the disciplinary tribunal to make a decision. The supreme court explained that in cases such as 
this one, where the staff member is present, nothing precludes the report from being considered as 
evidence. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s ruling that audio 
recordings of disciplinary hearings as required under McGinnis satisfy the procedural due process 
requirement for a written record, and that a prisoner’s incident reports can serve as the basis of a 
disciplinary decision even if the staff member who wrote that report is present. 
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BUSINESS LAW 
 
Cox v. Estate of Cooper 
In Cox v. Estate of Cooper,11 the supreme court held that Alaska’s usury statute12 does not limit 
the maximum interest rate parties may specify on loans with a principal amount greater than 
$25,000.13  The Coopers loaned Cox $325,000 at an interest rate of 20% to be paid back in six 
months.  Seven years later, after extensions and an interest rate reduction to 8%, the loan trustee 
gave notice of default and began foreclosure proceedings on Cox’s home which had been put up 
as collateral.  At the time Cox still owed $315,500 in principal and nearly $145,000 in accrued 
interest, roughly $98,000 of which stemmed from the original 20% interest rate.  Cox filed a 
complaint, arguing that subsection (a) of the usury statute, which sets the “state interest rate” of 
loans at 10.5%, applies to all loans that do not fall under subsection (b).  He noted that subsection 
(b) does not apply to loans with a principal amount in excess of $25,000 and so concluded that the 
Coopers’ 20% interest rate violated the usury statute.  On rehearing the superior court disagreed, 
finding that the legislative history indicated that the 10.5% state interest rate only applied when 
parties had not specified a rate on their own.  The supreme court affirmed.  It reasoned that the 
simplest reading of the statute indicates that subsection (b) governs all loans with express interest 
rates.  The court noted that its own precedents had assumed as much, and after a thorough review 
of the legislative history it concluded that the legislative history supported this result as well.  
Applying this interpretation, the court concluded that subsection (b) of the usury statute governed 
the loan to Cox as it contained an express interest rate, and that therefore there was no statutory 
limit on the permissible interest rate as the principal amount exceeded $25,000.  Affirming the 
superior court’s conclusion that the loan did not violate the usury law, the supreme court held that 
Alaska’s usury statute does not limit the maximum interest rate parties may specify on loans with 
a principal among greater than $25,000. 
 
Hooks v. Alaska United States Federal Credit Union 
In Hooks v. Alaska United States Federal Credit Union14, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed 
the superior court’s ruling that discredited both the “vapor money” and “unlawful money” theories 
as attempts to nullify a mortgage agreement. Hooks obtained a loan from Homestate Mortgage 
Company LLC (Homestate) to refinance an existing loan, which was secured by his property and 
a promissory note. Homestate then sold the promissory note and the beneficial interest in the deed 
to Alaska USA Federal Credit Union (Alaska USA). In 2015, Hooks defaulted on the loan and 
Alaska USA referred the defaulted loan and deed of the trust for foreclosure through Alaska’s 
statutory nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosure process, resulting in its sale to Dennis Albert. Hooks 
sued, contending that his property could not be foreclosed on because the National Bank Act did 
not authorize Homestate to lend credit meaning issuing the loan was beyond its power. Hooks also 
claimed that the promissory note he gave was the equivalent of money that was created by his 
signature. As a result, Hooks argued that by giving the bank a promissory note in exchange for 
credit, he was defrauded into giving something of value to the bank for something which is 
worthless, in violation of the National Bank Act. The Supreme Court of Alaska rejected these 
                                                            
11 426 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2018). 
12 Alaska Stat. § 45.45.010 (2016). 
13 426 P.3d at 1041. 
14 413 P.3d 1192 (Alaska 2018) 
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arguments and stated, “the vapor money and unlawful money theories have been repeatedly 
rejected by every court to consider the issue.” The Court held that the transfer of money to a third 
party, or what Hooks describes as mere “credit” can serve as a valid basis for an enforceable loan. 
Lastly, the Supreme Court of Alaska dismissed Hooks’ claim that the deed was invalid and stated 
conveyances of interests of land and deeds of trust do not have to be signed by the lender in order 
to be valid. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s ruling that the 
“vapor money” and “unlawful money” theories are not legitimate arguments to negate a loan, and 
a deed does not need to be signed by the lender in order to be a valid conveyance. 
 
Pederson v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. 
In Pederson v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp.,15 the supreme court held that Alaska law permits 
corporations to unilaterally demand a reasonable confidentiality agreement when shareholders 
request copies of the shareholder list. Pederson requested a shareholder list from Arctic Slop Reg’l 
Corp. (ASRC). ASRC agreed under the condition that Pederson sign a confidentiality agreement, 
but after obtaining the list Pederson refused to comply with the agreement or to return the list 
stating that the agreement was unenforceable. ASRC brought suit against Pederson for breach of 
contract, seeking injunctive relief for the return of its confidential information and a declaratory 
judgment permitting ASRC to withhold confidential information from Pederson for two years. The 
trial court ruled in favor of ASRC and Pederson appealed, claiming that the confidentiality 
agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law because the information was not confidential. The 
supreme court recognized that section 10.06.413 of the Alaska Statutes requires corporations to 
provide a shareholder list for shareholder inspection at corporate offices twenty days before 
shareholder meetings, but it does not require providing shareholders with their own copies of the 
list. Therefore, the supreme court reasoned that shareholders seeking personal copies of the list 
must submit their requests under section 10.06.430 of the Alaska Statuttes, which permits a 
corporation to request a confidentiality agreement “as a prerequisite to distributing otherwise-
inspectable documents.” Vacating the superior court’s declaratory judgments as moot but 
otherwise affirming the decision, the court held Alaska law permits corporations to unilaterally 
demand a reasonable confidentiality agreement when shareholders request copies of the 
shareholder list. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
15 421 P.3d 58 (Alaska 2018). 
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CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
Brooks Range Petroleum Corp. v. Shearer 
In Brooks Range Petroleum Corp. v. Shearer,16 the supreme court held that the proper venue for 
tort claims is where the harmful force of the tort first took effect, and that proper venue for contract 
claims is where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. While weighing 
a full-time employment offer from British Petroleum, Shearer was covering as a drilling consultant 
for the Brooks Range Petroleum Corp. (“BRPC”) near Nuiqsut in the Second Judicial District. A 
BRPC executive approached him with an employment offer, verbally guaranteeing ten years of 
job security. The contract was signed in Anchorage in the Third Judicial District, where Shearer 
performed most of his work. When he was terminated three-and-a-half years later, Shearer sued 
BRPC for breach of contract and tort claims, serving the complaint in the Third Judicial District 
in Anchorage but filing the suit in the Second Judicial District.  Denying BRPC’s motion to dismiss 
for improper venue or alternatively to transfer venue to Anchorage, the lower court found that 
Shearer’s contract claims arose in Anchorage, but his tort claims arose in the Second Judicial 
District, and that public concerns of the local community near Nuiqsut weighed in favor of 
maintaining venue in the Second district.  The supreme court reversed the lower court, reasoning 
first that the tort claims actually arose in the Third Judicial District because the “harmful force” of 
the alleged misrepresentation happened when Shearer was terminated in Anchorage.  The court 
further explained that the Second Judicial District was not a proper venue for the breach of contract 
claim, because contract claims “arise[] where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the 
claim occurred” and no part of the alleged breach occurred in the Second Judicial District.  
Reversing and remanding for a transfer of venue to the Third Judicial District, the supreme court 
held that the proper venue for tort claims is where the harmful force of the tort first took effect, 
and that proper venue for contract claims is where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the 
claim occurred. 
 
City of Kodiak v. Kodiak Public Broadcasting Corp. 
In City of Kodiak v. Kodiak Public Broadcasting Corp.,17 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that 
courts may not award full attorneys’ fees under section 09.60.0101 of the Alaska Statutes unless a 
claimant raises a constitutional issue in their complaint or similar claim for relief.  In September 
2015, the Kodiak Police Department reportedly used excessive force in detaining an autistic 
suspect.  Following the incident, radio station Kodiak Public Broadcasting Corporation (KMXT) 
requested the release of relevant public records pursuant to the Alaska Public Records Act.  When 
the City refused, KMXT filed a complaint seeking to compel the disclosure of a list of withheld 
records, three chest camera videos, and all records that were not exempt.  On December 22, the 
superior court ordered the immediate release of the three camera chest videos, prompting the City 
to release all relevant public records.  KMXT subsequently sought full attorneys’ fees pursuant to 
section 09.60.0101 of the Alaska Statutes arguing that it had asserted a constitutional claim when 
seeking public records because Alaska courts had “characterized a citizen’s access to public 
records as a fundamental [constitutional] right.”  The superior court apparently agreed, issuing a 
declaratory judgment for KMXT and granting the station’s request without explanation. On appeal, 
the supreme court determined that KMXT had “prevailed entirely on statutory grounds.”  The court 
                                                            
16 425 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2018). 
17 426 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2018). 
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noted that KMXT had not explicitly raised constitutional issues until its motion for attorneys’ fees.  
Reasoning from precedent, the court explained that for a claimant to assert a constitutional right 
under section 09.60.010 of the Alaska Statutes, they must raise that right in the complaint or similar 
claim for relief.  As the superior court had never even been asked to rule on whether the Alaska 
Public Record’s Acts grant of a right to public records derives for the constitution, the court 
concluded that KMXT had failed to raise a constitutional complaint.  Reversing and remanding 
for a calculation of partial attorneys’ fees under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82, the supreme 
course held that courts may not award full attorneys’ fees under section 09.60.0101 of the Alaska 
Statutes unless a claimant raises a constitutional issue in their complaint or similar claim for relief. 
 
Fink v. Anchorage 
In Fink v. Anchorage,18 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that in directly reviewing a municipal 
assembly’s decision to levy a special assessment, a court will defer to the Assembly’s expertise 
and only reverse upon proof of fraud or arbitrariness.  Decades after an earthquake destroyed the 
neighborhood of Turnagain Heights, lot owners petitioned the Municipality of Anchorage for 
utility projects to improve the neighborhood.  The owners approved the Municipality’s cost 
estimates, and the Assembly accordingly created three special assessment districts to raise the 
funds necessary for the improvements.  The Municipality then consolidated the projects with an 
unrelated fourth project for “maximum cost and schedule efficiencies,” ultimately shifting roughly 
$1,000,000 in costs for the fourth project onto owners of properties in the special assessment 
districts.  Benefits from this fourth project flowed to properties within the special assessment 
districts and to other properties beyond them.  Fink and other owners filed an appeal in superior 
court arguing that they were improperly forced to bear disproportionate costs of the fourth project 
considering the wider dispersion of benefits.  The superior court ruled that the Assembly needed 
to conduct an adjudicatory hearing on the matter, and following the hearing the Assembly affirmed 
its earlier allocation of the costs.  Unsatisfied, the property owners renewed their appeal.  In 
reviewing the Assembly’s decision, the Supreme Court attached a deferential “presumption of 
correctness” to special assessments levied by an assembly.  The court explained that overcoming 
such a presumption requires a showing the Assembly “acted fraudulently or arbitrarily in 
determining the assessment amounts.” Affirming the judgment of the superior court, the supreme 
court held that a presumption of correctness attaches to special assessments of a municipal 
assembly, and that this can only be overcome by a showing of fraud or arbitrariness. 
 
Gross v. Wilson 
In Gross v. Wilson,19 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a properly challenged erroneous 
judgment is not void unless the deciding court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or violated due 
process.  In the final divorce agreement between Robert Gross and Dawn Wilson, Gross agreed to 
regularly pay Wilson half of the value of his monthly United States Coast Guard (USCG) 
retirement and disability pay.  A little over a year later, Gross unilaterally reduced the monthly 
payments of $888.22 by $170, claiming his disability pay was indivisible under the Uniformed 
Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA).  Wilson moved to enforce the agreement and 
Gross countered with his own motion to set aside the agreement as it allegedly violated the 
USFSPA.  The superior court granted Wilson’s motion and denied Gross’s on the theory that the 
                                                            
18 424 P.3d 338 (Alaska 2018). 
19 424 P.3d 390 (Alaska 2018). 
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superior court was merely enforcing a contractual agreement to pay a set amount regardless of the 
source of the funds rather than impermissibly dividing military disability pay as marital property.  
Further the superior court found that Gross had no procedural basis for bringing his motion well 
past the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by Alaska Civil Rule 60(b).  Gross appealed the 
superior court’s ruling but made no mention of its finding on the Rule 60(b) issue.  On appeal, the 
supreme court explained that a Rule 60(b) motion is the only way to get relief from a final judgment 
on a property division.  It elaborated that such a motion must be based on one of six specified 
reasons, and that Gross could only be based his motion on Rule 60(b)(4), an argument that the 
judgment was void for violating USFSPA. Without deciding the issue, the court recognized that 
Gross had a potentially valid argument that the superior court’s judgment was erroneous for 
violating USFSPA.  However, the court refused to find the judgment void.  The court explained 
that while an erroneous divorce decree is voidable if properly challenged, the judgment itself is 
not void unless the deciding court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or violated due process.  
Finding that Gross had alleged neither defect, the supreme court affirmed holding that a properly 
challenged erroneous judgment is not void unless the deciding court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction or violated due process.  
 
Lum v. Koles 
In Lum v. Koles,20 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that in opposing a motion for summary 
judgment, a plaintiff may overcome the defense of qualified immunity, under section 
09.65.070(d)(2) of the Alaska Statutes, when the record contains at least some objective evidence 
capable of supporting an inference of malice.  Qualified immunity grants municipal employees 
immunity from a suit for damages when performing a discretionary function in good faith.  Daniel 
Lum, a resident of North Slope Borough, had accused police officers of corruption, and had 
multiple altercations with Officer Grimes in particular.  On September 18, 2007, Grimes and a 
fellow officer, Gutierrez, were dispatched to the Lums’ home to complete a welfare check when a 
neighbor reported a domestic dispute.  The officers claimed they heard shouting in the residence 
but their audio-tapes did not pick this up and the Lums disputed this claim.  When Grimes and 
Gutierrez knocked on the door, the Lums’ children allowed them in and were apparently not 
distressed.  Neither officer identified themselves or their purpose for entering.  They eventually 
discovered the Lums, with their baby, arguing in the bathroom.  A dispute between the officers 
and Daniel culminated with Grimes pepper-spraying and cuffing Daniel, some of the spray hit 
Daniel’s wife Polly and their infant.  The Lums sued for invasion of privacy and trespass.  The 
superior court dismissed both claims on summary judgment, reasoning that the officers were 
protected by qualified immunity; the Lums appealed.  The Supreme Court of Alaska disagreed.  It 
explained that qualified immunity only protects officers acting in good faith; therefore, a plaintiff 
can overcome it by showing officers acted corruptly, maliciously, or in bad faith.  The court 
continued that because summary judgment is not granted unless no genuine issue of material fact 
exists, and because the record is taken in the best light for the non-movant, demonstrating malice 
is a low bar at that stage of proceedings.  The court concluded that the Lums met this bar as a jury 
could reasonably find the officers had entered the residence in bad faith without an actual belief 
that an emergency existed.  Reversing the superior court’s decision, the court held that in opposing 
a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff may overcome the defense of qualified immunity when 
the record contains at least some objective evidence capable of supporting an inference of malice. 
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Olivera v. Rude-Olivera 
In Olivera v. Rude-Olivera,21 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that (1) “a party who fails to make 
required pretrial disclosures ‘without substantial justification’ may not . . . use that information as 
evidence at trial, ‘unless such failure is harmless,’” and (2) a party is entitled to recover enhanced 
attorney’s fees if the other party has acted in bad faith throughout the case.  Ronalda Rude-Olivera 
was the primary breadwinner during her marriage to Anthony Olivera. The couple sold their home 
in Alaska to move to California for Anthony’s supposed cancer treatment, with Ronalda 
occasionally returning to Alaska for work. However, after convincing Ronalda to quitclaim her 
interest in the property to him in order to avoid foreclosure, Anthony then had his girlfriend take 
over payments for the property. During the divorce proceedings, Anthony repeatedly delayed the 
trial and attempted to damage Ronalda’s reputation at work. Though Anthony sought a missing 
tax return from his ex-wife, the supreme court determined that it was not essential to the case and 
that Ronalda had thus complied with the discovery requirements. In awarding enhanced attorney’s 
fees, the lower court first noted that it would not have ordinarily awarded such fees in the “absence 
of vexatious conduct” given her stronger financial position. However, it then found that Anthony’s 
conduct throughout the proceeding exhibited bad faith and awarded a “modest” fee. The Supreme 
Court affirmed concluding the lower court had followed the required process to award enhanced 
attorney’s fees. Accordingly, it held that a harmless failure to disclose information is excusable, 
and enhanced attorney’s fees may be awarded if the other party has acted in bad faith. 
 
Strong v. Williams 
In Strong v. Williams,22 the supreme court held that despite pre-trial dismissal with prejudice of a 
landowner’s settled claims against his neighbors, res judicata and collateral estoppel do not 
preclude subsequent claims against a municipality on the same underlying facts.  Since 1974, John 
Strong has owned property in Anchorage; since the 1980s, the property has experienced significant 
flooding as a result of a neighbor’s access road, which the Municipality was made aware of in 
1993.  In 2010, Strong sued James and Suzie Williams, two neighbors, for trespass and nuisance 
and sought a court order to abate the flooding.  He ultimately released the claims in exchange for 
compensation and a promise to upgrade the road, filing a stipulation in July 2012 dismissing all 
claims with prejudice.  In 2015, Strong filed another suit, this time including the Municipality of 
Anchorage, seeking compensatory damages and the removal of the road.  The superior court 
granted a subsequent motion to dismiss by the Municipality on the basis of collateral estoppel and 
res judicata.  The supreme court held that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applied 
because the Municipality was not in privity to the original suit and the issues at hand were not 
actually litigated prior to the settlement.  The court explained that in order to trigger res judicata, 
there must be (1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) from a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in 
a dispute between the same parties about the same cause of action.  It found that the third prong 
was not satisfied.  The court continued explaining that in order to trigger collateral estoppel, the 
issue must have previously been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment.  
The court found that this requirement had not been met as settlement of the prior claims prevented 
actual litigation from occurring, and the stipulation did not explicitly preclude other litigation.  
Reversing, the supreme court held that despite pre-trial dismissal with prejudice of a landowner’s 
                                                            
21 411 P.3d 587 (Alaska 2018). 
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settled claims against his neighbors, res judicata and collateral estoppel do not preclude subsequent 
claims against a municipality on the same underlying facts. 
 
Toni 1 Trust, by Tangwall v. Wacker 
In Toni 1 Trust, by Tangwall v. Wacker,23 the supreme court held that section 34.40.110(k) of the 
Alaska Statutes cannot deprive either federal or other states’ courts of jurisdiction over fraudulent 
transfer actions. In 2007, a Montana court issued multiple default judgments against Tangwall and 
his family, leading them to transfer property to a trust created under Alaska law. Bertran Tangwall 
subsequently filed for bankruptcy in Alaska which placed her interest in the trust under a federal 
bankruptcy court. Fraudulent transfer actions were successfully brought against the Tangwalls in 
both a Montana court and in federal bankruptcy court. Tangwall then filed a complaint in Alaska 
state court, arguing that section 34.40.110(k) of the Alaska Statutes provides Alaska courts with 
exclusive jurisdiction regarding such fraudulent transfer actions making the judgments against the 
Tangwall’s void. Citing Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. George,24 the supreme court 
found uncompelling the argument that the Full Faith and Credit Clause compels states to follow 
another state’s law asserting exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of whether the other state’s law 
created the cause of action.25 Citing Marshall v. Marshall,26 the supreme court held that a state 
court cannot limit federal jurisdiction even when the issue arises under that state’s law.27 
Furthermore, if this was not the case, the supreme court found it likely that the Supremacy Clause 
would prevent section 34.40.110 of the Alaska Statutes from restricting the federal bankruptcy 
court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s judgment 
dismissing Tangwall’s complaint, holding that 34.40.110 of the Alaska Statutes cannot provide 
exclusive jurisdiction to Alaska state courts over fraudulent transfer actions. 
 
Whalen v. Whalen 
In Whalen v. Whalen,28 the supreme court held that to obtain a new long-term domestic violence 
protective order a person must allege a new violent incident that has not previously served as the 
basis for such a protective order, using incidents that served as the basis for a prior order would 
violate res judicata.  Sarah Whalen had received multiple domestic violence protective orders 
against her husband Sean Whalen.  Sarah petitioned to extend an existing protective order, but the 
superior court denied, explaining that Sarah would have to file for a new protective order.  Sarah 
petitioned for a new protective order, but the superior court again denied, explaining that Sarah 
could not use incidents of domestic violence that served as the basis of her previous order to obtain 
a new one.  The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the superior court, reasoning that res judicata 
extinguishes previous claims of domestic violence for which a domestic violence protective order 
has already been granted.  It explained that while domestic violence is cyclical the statutory scheme 
requires a new incident to justify a new order.  Affirming the lower court’s opinion, the supreme 
court held that to obtain a new long-term domestic violence protective order a person must allege 
                                                            
23 413 P.3d 1199 (Alaska 2018). 
24 233 U.S. 354 (1914). 
25 413 P.3d at 1203–04. 
26 547 U.S. 293 (2006). 
27 413 P.3d at 1206. 
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a new violent incident that has not previously served as the basis for such a protective order, using 
incidents that served as the basis for a prior order would violate res judicata. 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Graham v. Durr 
In Graham v. Durr,29 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a defendant may, in a civil proceeding, 
assert his right against self-incrimination while the defendant’s direct appeal of his sentence is 
pending.  In August 2013, Stacey Graham struck and killed two pedestrians while driving under 
the influence.  In May 2014, the victims’ families filed suit against Graham.  In February 2015, 
Graham plead guilty and was sentenced to 32 years imprisonment.  One month later, Graham 
appealed his sentence, not his conviction, and around the same time he was served with a number 
of discovery requests in connection with the civil lawsuit.  Graham refused to answer some of the 
questions in these requests (and questions in similar requests from his former employer a year 
later), asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Graham’s former 
employer and the victims’ families moved to compel Graham to respond to these discovery 
requests and to prevent Graham from asserting his privilege.  They argued that the privilege only 
applies when there is a risk that one’s testimony could increase criminal penalties and that because 
Alaska does not allow sentences imposed during resentencing to exceed the original sentence, 
Graham could not assert the privilege.  The superior court granted this motion to compel.  On 
appeal, the supreme court reversed.  It explained the standard for whether a defendant can assert 
the privilege against self-incrimination is whether the testimony “could expose him to a real and 
substantial hazard of incrimination.”  The court reasoned that though Graham could not face a 
“greater punishment,” than his initial sentence, he could still face adverse consequences if 
compelled to testify thereby facing “greater punishment” than “if he were permitted to invoke the 
privilege.”  Reversing and remanding, the court held that defendants can assert their privilege 
against self-incrimination in a civil proceeding on the basis of a pending appeal of a criminal 
sentence. 
 
Huber v. State Dep’t of Corrections 
In Huber v. State Dep’t of Corrections,30 the supreme court held that, with the possible exception 
of very simple cases, a hearing officer in a prison disciplinary proceeding must include the basis 
for their decision in writing or through a recording in order to satisfy due process.  Huber was an 
inmate at the Goose Creek Correctional Center who was cited for a disciplinary violation.  A 
hearing officer subsequently found him guilty without stating any reasoning.  The superior court 
upheld the hearing officer’s decision, finding that Huber had waived his due process argument by 
failing to raise it in the prison appeal process, and finding that Huber failed to show he had been 
prejudiced by the lack of written findings.  On appeal, the supreme court reversed, first determining 
that Huber did forfeit his due process claim by failing to raise it because he was not advised that 
failing to raise it could result in forfeiture and he lacked legal help in filing his appeal.  The court 
further reasoned that because the hearing officer’s written decision and the recording of the hearing 
included no reasoning supporting the finding of guilt, it was impossible for a reviewing body to 
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properly review the decision.  The court noted that review may be possible without a statement of 
reasoning in a very simple case when there is both no room to debate the basis for an officer’s 
finding of guilt, and the officer’s reasoning can be reliably inferred.  The court concluded this was 
not such a case.  Reversing the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that, with the 
possible exception of very simple cases, a hearing officer in a prison disciplinary proceeding must 
include the basis for their decision in writing or through a recording in order to satisfy due 
process.31  
 
Kowalski v. State 
In Kowalski v. State,32 the court of appeals held that retroactive application of Alaska Evidence 
Rule 404(b)(4) did not violate the ex post facto clauses of the Alaska Constitution or the United 
States Constitution.  In 1996, investigators declined to charge Kowalski for the death of his 
girlfriend Perry, whom by his account he accidentally shot and killed with a shotgun while 
traveling in Alaska.  In 2008, Kowalski shot and killed his girlfriend Morin in Montana.  Although 
Kowalski claimed that Morin’s death was accidental, he later pleaded no contest to mitigated 
deliberate homicide.  After the Montana shooting, Alaska reopened the investigation of Perry’s 
1996 death, and Kowalski was indicted and convicted of second-degree murder.  At trial the state 
presented evidence of the Montana shooting pursuant to Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(4) which 
makes evidence of other crime of domestic violence admissible in the prosecution of a crime of 
domestic violence.  On appeal, Kowalski argued that retroactively applying Rule 404(b)(4), which 
was enacted one year after Perry’s death in 1997, violated the ex post facto clauses of the Alaska 
and United States constitutions.  The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that the clauses do not apply to Rule 404(b)(4) as it is an ordinary rule of evidence which 
only governs admissibility.  The court distinguished Rule 404(b)(4) from rules of evidence that 
alter the type or quantum of evidence legally required, contrasting it with the Texas statute the 
United States Supreme Court refused to apply retroactively in Carmell v. Texas.33  Affirming the 
lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that retroactive application of Alaska Evidence 
Rule 404(b)(4) did not violate the ex post facto clauses of either the Alaska Constitution or the 
United States Constitution.34  
 
Simmons v. State Dep’t of Corrections 
In Simmons v. State Dep’t of Corrections,35 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that though AS 
11.56.760 has a retroactive requirement that persons convicted of certain crimes provide a DNA 
sample, it is not an ex post facto law under the Constitution of Alaska.  David Simmons was found 
guilty of four felonies in September of 1995.  As part of his mandatory parole in February 2014, 
he was asked to provide a DNA sample, he refused.  The Department of Corrections subsequently 
found him guilty of violating AS 11.56.760, which makes it a class C felony for people convicted 
of certain crimes to refuse to provide a DNA sample to an officer upon request.  AS 11.56.760 
went into effect on January 1, 1996, and in 2003 its requirements were made retroactively 
applicable to all convictions “that occurred before July 1, 2003 if the person was incarcerated or 
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33 529 U.S. 513. 
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35 426 P. 3d 1011 (Alaska 2018). 
16 
 
was under supervised probation or parole for the offenses on or after July 1, 2003.”   
Acknowledging that the law applied to him, Simmons appealed, ultimately arguing to the supreme 
court that the retroactive application of AS 11.56.760 as applied to him violated Alaska’s ex post 
facto clause because he was convicted in 1995 before the law ever went into effect.  The Supreme 
Court of Alaska held that the DNA sample requirement does not fit the definition of an ex post 
facto law: “any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent 
when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; or 
which deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time 
when the act was committed.”   The court used the “intent-effects” test to determine whether the 
statute imposed a punishment, thereby violating the ex post facto clause of the Alaskan 
Constitution.  Under this test, a court first determines if the legislature intended the law to act as a 
punishment.  If yes then the law violates the clause, but if the answer is no, the court analyzes the 
effects of the statute according to seven factors to determine whether the statute serves an 
alternative purpose or if it violates the clause by effectively operating as a punitive measure.36  
After analyzing the seven factors the court concluded the DNA registry was not punitive.  In 
particular, it noted the registry has a “valid regulatory purpose” to aid law enforcement in 
enhancing public safety, its requirements are less burdensome than the Alaska Sex Offender 
Registry Act (ASORA), and the means of collecting the DNA—a mouth swab—is minimally 
intrusive.  Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that though AS 11.56.760 has a 
retroactive requirement that persons convicted of certain crimes provide a DNA is retroactive, it 
is not an ex post facto law under the Constitution of Alaska. 
 
Smith v. State 
In Smith v. State,37 the Alaska court of appeals held that to determine if two crimes constitute a 
single offense for double jeopardy purposes “a court must compare the different statutory 
provisions as applied to the facts of the case.” Smith, along with three other men broke into 
Benjamin Gall and Amanda Swafford’s apartment while they were sleeping, struck Gall in the 
face and head, and stole items from the apartment. Smith was tried with two others (the fourth was 
never captured) and found guilty of first-degree robbery, first-degree burglary, second-degree 
assault, and second-degree theft. At sentencing, the court merged the robbery and theft verdicts 
into a single conviction and rejected Smith’s proposed mitigating factor. Smith argued on appeal 
that under the double jeopardy clause of the Alaska Constitution,38 he could not lawfully receive 
separate convictions for the first-degree robbery and the second-degree assault since the two 
constituted the “same offense.”39 The court of appeals analyzed the elements of each statutory 
provision and held that although robbery requires the additional element of “intent to prevent or 
                                                            
36 See id. at 1017 (explaining the seven factors as 1. “Whether the sanction involves an 
affirmative disability or restraint”; 2. “Whether it has historically been regarded as punishment”; 
3. “Whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; 4. “Whether its operation will 
promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence”; 5. “Whether the 
behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; 6. “Whether an alternative punishment to which 
it may be rationally connected is assignable for it”; and 7. “Whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.”). 
37 426 P.3d 1162 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018).  
38 Alaska Const. art. I, § 9. 
39 426 P.3d at 1164–65. 
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overcome resist[a]nce to the taking or retention of property,” the differences between that and the 
assault charge “were not substantial enough to justify multiple convictions” since the threat of 
immediate harm from the robbery was the same threat of fear of imminent serious physical injury 
that constituted the assault. The Court also rejected the State’s contention that the jury’s separate 
special verdict indicated Smith was convicted for each crime on the basis of separate and distinct 
acts. The court of appeals remanded for merger of the judgments of first-degree robbery and 
second-degree assault, holding that Alaska’s double jeopardy clause did not permit separate 
convictions when the charges were based on the same underlying conduct as the elements of the 
two offenses are too similar.40 
 
Walker v. State Dep’t of Corrections 
In Walker v. State Dep’t of Corrections,41 the supreme court held (1) a prisoner has a due process 
right to call witnesses in a disciplinary hearing and (2) a prisoner does not waive this right by 
failing to raise it during the administrative appeals process. In October 2013, Walker, an inmate, 
began work developing an outline of topics he thought would be helpful for new inmates. In 
August 2014, Baumgartner, a department of corrections (DOC) employee, met discovered that 
though Walker was being paid, he had not worked since November 2013. According to 
Baumgartner, Walker claimed he informed four staff members of the mistake, though he could 
only name two, and he had sent a “Request for Interview Form” to contact officers. Soon after this 
meeting, Baumgartner conducted an investigation and found none of Walker’s claims to be true. 
Based on this, the DOC charged Walker with “stealing government property” and providing “false 
statements” to a staff member.” Walker requested three witnesses at his hearing, but the presiding 
officer denied this request and found Walker guilty, ordering restitution of $316. Walker appealed 
to the superintendent, but his appeal was denied. Walker then appealed to the superior court 
presenting an additional claim that the DOC violated his due process rights by not allowing him 
to call witnesses in his defense. The superior court denied Walker’s appeal, determining that “some 
evidence” supported the guilty finding and that Walker waived his right to assert a due process 
violation when he failed to raise it in his administrative appeal to the superintendent.  The supreme 
court reversed reasoning that prisoners often lack the time and expertise to effectively present and 
preserve constitutional claims as they have no right to legal assistance and limited resources in 
preparing their appeals.  Further, it explained that Walker’s due process rights had been violated 
because while a hearing officer may decline to call witnesses, the officer must document reasons 
for this declination and this had not occurred. Reversing and remanding the matter for a new 
hearing, the supreme court held (1) a prisoner has a due process right to call witnesses in his 
defense for disciplinary hearings and (2) a prisoner does not waive his due process right to call 
witnesses by failing to raise it during the administrative appeals process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
40  See id. at 1166. (noting that because Smith’s sentence for the assault was completely 
concurrent to his sentence for robbery, resentencing was not necessary).   
41  421 P.3d 74 (Alaska 2018). 
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CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Ladick v. State 
In Ladick v. State,42 the court of appeals held that when the government prosecutes defendants for 
breath-test refusal it must prove a causal connection between the arrest and the act of driving or 
operating a motor vehicle. After a state trooper discovered Ladick intoxicated while sitting in a 
parked car in a power line easement, Ladick was charged with DUI and breath-test refusal. Ladick 
testified that he had arrived at the easement approximately three hours before the trooper arrived, 
drank a six-pack, then did not drink for about two and a half hours. A jury found Ladick guilty of 
breath test refusal, but acquitted him of the DUI charge. On appeal, Ladick argued that the trial 
judge improperly prevented him from arguing that his act of driving was too remote from his arrest. 
The court of appeals disagreed, reasoning that the relevant inquiry should be on whether Ladick 
was driving or operating a motor vehicle during the incident which gave rise to his arrest, not on 
how much time had elapsed since that incident. The court further explained that regardless of when 
Ladick arrived at the scene, if there was probable cause to find that he was intoxicated while 
driving to the scene or while maintaining control of the vehicle at the scene, he had a duty to take 
a breath test. Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that when the 
government prosecutes defendants for breath-test refusal, the government must prove a causal 
connection between the arrest and the act of driving or operating. 
 
Luch v. State 
In Luch v. State,43 the court of appeals held that a married person is not entitled to a heat of passion 
defense based on the discovery of adultery unless the married person has personal knowledge of 
such adultery. In 2010, Luch overheard his wife, Jocelyn, talking with another man on the 
telephone. This began a period of great tension in their marriage. A couple months later, after Luch 
was unable to locate Jocelyn at a race, Luch shot and killed Jocelyn in their home during an 
altercation in which Luch had accused Jocelyn of seeing another man. On appeal, Luch argued 
that the trial judge erred in refusing to give a jury instruction on the heat of passion defense. The 
court of appeals affirmed the trial judge’s decision, reasoning that Luch was not subjected to 
serious provocation as required under the statute. The court explained that discovering one’s 
spouse in the very act of adultery was sufficient to constitute serious provocation at common law. 
However, the court explained that discovery must be based on personal knowledge because 
Alaska’s statutory definition of serious provocation disqualifies hearsay reports or mere 
suspicions. There was no evidence that Luch had personal knowledge or even a reasonable belief 
that Jocelyn was having an affair. Affirming the judgement of the lower court, the court of appeals 
held that a married person is not entitled to a heat of passion defense based on the discovery of 
adultery unless the married person has personal knowledge of such adultery. 
 
Patterson v. Walker 
In Patterson v. Walker,44 the supreme court held that prisoners may not use a civil suit for damages 
to attack the validity of their criminal convictions or sentences.  After trial, Patterson was convicted 
of seven counts of possession of child pornography.  Two years later, Patterson filed a 121-page 
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civil complaint alleging that various state actors had directly harmed Patterson and had violated 
his Constitutional Rights.  The superior court approved the State’s motion to dismiss, concluding 
that Patterson had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  The supreme court 
affirmed the ruling of the superior court on different grounds, holding that a judgment in favor of 
Patterson would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.  The court reasoned that 
allowing civil actions that would necessarily invalidate the plaintiff’s criminal convictions would 
create the potential for two resolutions emerging from the same incident.  It concluded that because 
of this danger, and the fact that civil suits are a poor vehicle for challenging the validity of a 
criminal conviction or sentence, such suits should only be allowed after the conviction or sentence 
has been set aside in a criminal proceeding.  In affirming the superior court, the supreme court held 
that prisoners may not use a civil suit for damages to attack the validity of their criminal 
convictions or sentences. 
 
Pfister v. State 
In Pfister v. State,45 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that a surviving felony accomplice may be 
prosecuted for manslaughter when a fellow accomplice is killed by the victim or responding police 
officers.  Brian Albert Pfister and two accomplices broke into the home of a marijuana grower and 
robbed him. Pfister waited outside while his accomplices entered the home and demanded the 
grower’s money. The grower led the accomplices to a safe where he had a hidden handgun; he 
used it to shoot and kill both accomplices. Pfister ran away but was later arrested and convicted 
of, inter alia, two counts of manslaughter for causing the deaths of his two accomplices. Based on 
Alaska’s restrictive definition of felony-murder, Pfister argued he could not be convicted of 
felony-murder. The court of appeals said that under Alaska’s felony-murder statute, “a person 
cannot be convicted of felony-murder based on the death of one of the other participants in the 
felony.” Analyzing the development of the felony-murder rule and misdemeanor manslaughter, 
the court concluded that manslaughter has traditionally been “a residual category of unlawful 
homicide,” encompassing any unlawful killing that does not constitute murder. Thus, the court 
explained that unlike felony-murder manslaughter makes up a much broader category of crime, 
but also requires proof of mens rea regarding the possibility that the defendant’s conduct could 
result in death. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court and held that a 
defendant could be prosecuted for manslaughter but not felony-murder for the death of an 
accomplice at the hands of the victim or the police. 
 
State v. Doe 
In State v. Doe,46 the supreme court held individuals convicted out-of-state may only be required 
to register in Alaska as sex offenders if their conviction was under an out-of-state law “similar” to 
an Alaskan law.  Two cases consolidated on appeal presented similar facts.  In the first, John Doe 
I plead guilty to “communicating with a minor for immoral purposes” in violation of Washington 
law, and was required to register in Washington as a sex offender.  When Doe I planned to travel 
to Alaska, he petitioned the Alaska DPS Offender Registry to see if he would have to register there.  
He was told that he would have to register in Alaska for life.  The Alaska superior court granted 
him relief, which DPS appealed.  John Doe II was convicted of “annoying or molesting a child 
under 18” in violation of California law and was sentenced to register as a sex offender there.  Prior 
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to sentencing, Doe II moved to Alaska and did not register.  Subsequently, DPS determined that 
Doe II’s conviction resembled an Alaskan offense sufficiently so that he had to register as a sex 
offender.  Doe II appealed to the superior court, which affirmed DPS’s decision.  Doe II appealed, 
and the two cases were joined.  The supreme court said the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act 
(ASORA) requires individuals convicted of sex offenses to register as a sex offender, and “sex 
offense” is defined to include convictions under “a similar law of another jurisdiction.”  The court 
explained that it determines whether a conviction was under a similar law by comparing the law’s 
elements to the most comparable Alaskan sex offense, rather than comparing the underlying facts 
of the offense to the Alaskan statute.  It elaborated that where an individual convicted under a more 
restrictive out-of-state statute could also be convicted under an Alaskan statute the laws are 
automatically considered similar.  However, the court cautioned that just because an individual 
could not be convicted under an Alaskan statute does not mean the compared laws are dissimilar.  
The court broadly interpreted laws to be “similar” when their elements are only categorically alike; 
it clarified that the elements need not be identical or even substantially similar to qualify as 
“similar.”  Despite this low standard, the court found both the Washington and the California laws, 
while at a very general level like the relevant Alaska offenses, to be significantly different from 
and considerably broader than the purportedly “similar” Alaskan laws.  Therefore, the supreme 
court affirmed the superior court in Doe I’s case, and reversed and remanded the superior court’s 
decision in Doe II’s case, holding that individuals convicted out-of-state may only be required to 
register in Alaska as sex offenders if their conviction was under an out-of-state law “similar” to an 
Alaskan law. 
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
Anderson v. State 
In Anderson v. State,47 the court of appeals held that an intimate relationship between a minor and 
a high school music teacher indicted on sexual abuse constituted a crime of domestic violence, 
therefore qualifying for a statutory exception to spousal immunity from adverse testimony.  A 
music teacher allegedly engaged in sexual relations on school grounds with a 15-year-old student 
for several months in 2014.  Following grand jury indictment of the teacher for multiple counts of 
sexual assault, the State indicated that it intended to call the teacher’s wife as a witness, specifically 
in regard to admissions the teacher made to her about his acts.  The wife asserted spousal immunity 
under Alaska Evidence Rule 505(b).  The state responded that Rule 505(b)’s exception for a crime 
of domestic violence applied to this case.  The lower court ruled for the state, concluding that under 
section 18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes, the relationship between the student and teacher made 
the student a household member, and so the crime was one of domestic violence.  On appeal, the 
wife argued that domestic violence should be given its everyday meaning centered around a 
familial relationship, and that the student and her husband could not be in a recognized relationship 
because the student was not old enough to consent.  The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling.  It reasoned that the statute’s plain language evidenced an intent to define anyone dating, 
or engaged in a sexual relationship, to be a household member regardless of the legality of this 
relationship.  The court explained that the legislature intended to broaden legal protection to 
victims.  It noted however that this language did not create an “any child” exception to the 
privilege, and that only the legislature could broaden the exception to that degree. The court 
concluded that the sexual or romantic relationship between the student and teacher, made the 
student a household member, and so the sexual assault was a crime of domestic violence, and 
spousal privilege was inapplicable.  Affirming the ruling of the lower court, the court of appeals 
held that an intimate relationship between a minor and a high school music teacher indicted on 
sexual abuse constituted a crime of domestic violence, which fell under exemptions to spousal 
immunity from adverse testimony. 
 
Alvarez-Perdomo v. State 
In Alvarez-Perdomo v. State,48 the court of appeals held that defendants must clearly and 
unequivocally state their desire to testify before a judge directs them to take the stand.  Alvarez-
Perdomo was convicted of first-degree assault for shooting his mother.  At trial, Alvarez-
Perdomo’s attorney announced that he did not intend to present a defense case, which triggered 
the judge’s obligation to personally question Alvarez-Perdomo on his decision not to testify.  After 
several attempts to clarify whether Alvarez-Perdomo wanted to testify, the judge pressed him and 
Alvarez-Perdomo said, “It seems so.  I don’t know.  I am not a lawyer.”  The judge then directed 
Alvarez-Perdomo to take the stand and testify.  Alvarez-Perdomo later appealed his conviction, 
arguing that the trial judge forced him to testify at trial, thus violating his constitutional right 
against self-incrimination. Accepting Alvarez-Perdomo’s argument, the appellate court 
nonetheless affirmed.  It explained that under the Lavigne rule, whenever the attorney representing 
a criminal defendant announces that the defense intends to rest without presenting the defendant’s 
testimony, the trial judge must personally address the defendant to make sure the defendant 
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understands that they have the right to testify, and that the decision whether to testify rests solely 
with the defendant, regardless of their defense attorney’s advice or wishes.  When a judge asks a 
defendant whether they wish to testify and the defendant offers only equivocal responses, a judge 
must order the trial to proceed without the defendant’s testimony, rather than risk the prospect of 
forcing a defendant to testify.  Because Alvarez-Perdomo did not clearly state his desire to testify, 
the trial judge committed constitutional error by coercing Alvarez-Perdomo to take the stand, but 
this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the other evidence supporting his 
conviction.  Thus, the court of appeals affirmed and held that defendants must clearly and 
unequivocally state their desire to testify before a judge directs them to take the stand. 
 
Alaska Dep’t of Public Safety v. Superior Court 
In Alaska Dep’t of Public Safety v. Superior Court,49 the Court of Appeals held that state courts 
may not order transportation of a prisoner between facilities absent extraordinary circumstances. 
While the underlying criminal action against William Hoogendorn was pending, the lower court 
granted a motion requesting the Department of Corrections move Hoogendorn to a different 
facility for psychological evaluation. Upon reconsideration, the lower court determined the 
Department of Corrections was not responsible for transporting prisoners between facilities and 
instead directed the Department of Public Safety to move the prisoner. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals determined that the lower court lacked statutory to direct transportation because (1) the 
first subsection at issue was inapplicable and (2) courts have “extremely limited” authority to 
interfere with the Departments’ internal workings. The Court of Appeals reserved courts’ authority 
to interfere for “extraordinary circumstances,” which were absent in the case at hand. 
Circumstances that could qualify might include a threat to a defendant’s physical safety or due 
process rights, but not merely an attempt to cut costs. Reversing the lower court’s decision, the 
Court of Appeals held that courts may not exceed their authority by ordering transportation of 
prisoners. 
 
Beier v. State 
In Beier v. State50, the court of appeals held that the Anchorage superior court’s standing order, 
limiting the time for filing peremptory challenges, was unenforceable because it conflicted with 
the provisions of Criminal Rule 25(d) and does not fall within the Superior Court’s authority under 
Criminal Rule 53. Beier was notified at a Tuesday trial call that Anchorage superior court Judge 
Kevin Saxby was assigned to preside over his case. Beier’s attorney filed a preemptory challenge 
under Rule 25(d) the following Monday. However, the superior court ruled that Beier’s attorney 
did not file his challenge in time according to a standing order of the Anchorage superior court, 
which required challenges to be filed within a day and a half. The State argued that the Anchorage 
standing order is lawful according to Alaska Criminal Rule 53, which gives the courts the authority 
to relax or dispense with criminal rules “in any case where it shall be manifest to the court that a 
strict adherence to them will work injustice.” The State contended the standing order is governed 
by Rule 53 in order to promote court efficiency and prevent undue delay such as issues relating to 
witness availability. On appeal, the court held Criminal Rule 53 does not apply to this situation. 
The court reasoned that the Anchorage superior court’s standing order is a rule of local practice, 
and is actually governed by Administrative Rule 46. However, Rule 46(b) precludes the standing 
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order because no local order can be administered if it conflicts with the Alaskan statutes or the 
rules of the court. Ultimately, the court reversed the superior court’s denial of Beier’s peremptory 
challenge of Judge Saxby and should have followed Criminal Rule 25(d), which allows each party 
to file its preemptory challenge within five days.  This case may be subject to correction if 
rehearing is sought and granted 
 
Brown v. State 
In Brown v. State,51 the supreme court held that a claim that appellate counsel had a conflict of 
interest, and a request to disqualify an appellate judge, should be raised as part of a post-conviction 
relief petition rather than in an immediate appeal to the supreme court. Brown petitioned the 
supreme-court for a hearing after the court of appeals upheld Brown’s convictions for sexual abuse 
of a minor and incest. The supreme court denied Brown’s request and affirmed the decision of the 
court of appeals. The supreme court agreed with the state that Brown’s claims could be 
incorporated into a post-conviction relief application, and reasoned that Brown’s claims would be 
difficult to review without a trial court record. Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held 
that an assertion of conflict of interest against appellate counsel and a request for disqualification 
for a judge should be made as part of a post-conviction relief petition rather than as a hearing 
before the supreme court. 
 
Cardenas v. State 
In Cardenas v. State,52 the court of appeals held that the single-purpose container exception to the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to gun cases if the incriminating nature of their contents is not 
immediately apparent.  Jesus Cardenas was pulled over for reckless driving and, in the course of 
that traffic stop, informed the officer that he had a gun in a case on the backseat.  The case was 
fully zipped closed and out of Jesus’s reach.  The officer took the gun case back to his car, where 
he searched through several of its small compartments and found cocaine before searching the 
primary compartment which contained Jesus’s gun.  This officer to called in backup and fully 
searched the vehicle, uncovering more cocaine and methamphetamines.  Cardenas moved to 
suppress the evidence as the result of an unlawful seizure.  The motion was denied, and he was 
convicted on several drug and weapons-related offenses.  The court of appeals found that although 
the gun case may have been lawfully seized, neither officer safety nor the single-purpose container 
exception justified the officer’s warrantless search of the container.  The court agreed with the 
state that the United States Supreme Court’s single-purpose container exceptions established that 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for containers whose contents can be inferred from 
their appearance, including gun cases.  However, it interpreted the exception to only apply when 
the “incriminating nature of the container’s contents is immediately apparent.”  The court 
explained that in this case there was nothing obviously unlawful about Cardenas’s possession, so 
the fact that there was clearly a gun inside the case did not automatically waive his expectation of 
privacy in the case’s contents.  The court also noted that there was no officer safety justification 
to the search as any potential danger dissipated once the officer removed the case from Cardenas’s 
car.  Finding the search to be improper, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the single-
purpose container exception to the Fourth Amendment does not apply to gun cases if the 
incriminating nature of their contents is not immediately apparent. 
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Charles v. State 
In Charles v. State,53 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that revoking a defendant’s probation for 
“good cause” does not necessarily depend on the defendant’s willful violation but on whether the 
corrective aims of probation can be achieved.  James Allen Charles Jr. was a repeat sex offender 
whose probation and parole had been revoked multiple times.  Charles struggled to meet his 
probation obligations, frequently arriving late to his appointments and testing positive for drug and 
alcohol use.  Consequently, the State petitioned to revoke Charles’s probation for missing a 
polygraph appointment.  Despite Charles’s “honest mistake,” the superior court found that Charles 
had failed to take reasonable steps to avoid missing his appointment.  Because his failure to attend 
had not been due to circumstances outside his control, the superior court determined the violation 
reflected “a larger pattern of noncompliance with his probation obligations and a failure to fully 
engage in treatment.”  On appeal, Charles argued that it was error to revoke his probation without 
a finding that he had “willfully” violated its terms.  The supreme court disagreed, explaining that 
the good cause required to revoke probation under section 12.55.110 of the Alaska Statutes does 
not necessarily require a willful violation.  However, the court also rejected the state’s argument 
that a defendant’s culpability was irrelevant.  Instead the court reasoned that it was one of three 
factors relevant to determining whether good cause exists: (1) the nature of the probation condition 
violated, (2) the mental state of the violator, and (3) the significance of the violation in terms of 
whether the defendant is “amenable to continued probation supervision.”  The court concluded 
that good cause exists when continuing the probationary status would “be at odds with the need to 
protect society and society’s interest in the probationer’s rehabilitation,” and that revocation of 
probation should only occur when it appears that the “‘corrective aims of probation cannot be 
achieved.’”  Applying this, the court concluded that the superior court’s finding of a pattern of 
noncompliance was sufficient to support its revocation of Charles’s probation.  Affirming, the 
court of appeals held that revoking a defendant’s probation for “good cause” does not necessarily 
depend on the defendant’s willful violation but on whether the corrective aims of probation can be 
achieved. 
 
Chinuhuk v. State 
In Chinuhuk v. State,54 the court of appeals held that felony sex offenders sentenced under § 
12.55.125(o) must serve out their probation, despite completing their term of imprisonment. 
Section 12.55.125(o) requires that courts suspend a specified amount of the imprisonment term of 
a defendant convicted of a sexual felony, and that the felon be placed on probation for a specified 
number of years after completing their term of imprisonment. The five felony sex offenders in this 
consolidated appeal violated probation. At their probation revocation hearings, they requested that 
the superior court impose their remaining suspended jail time and terminate their probations. The 
superior court refused to terminate their probations because § 12.55.125(o) declared that special 
terms of probation imposed under it could not be suspended or reduced. The felony sex offenders 
appealed, arguing there was no indication the legislature intended to alter the normal rule that 
probation must be accompanied by a suspended term of imprisonment. The court of appeals 
rejected this argument and found that the legislature intended to impose mandatory probation, 
which could not be suspended or refused, on all felony sex offenders. Furthermore, the legislature 
enacted § 11.56.759 one year after § 12.55.125(o), which ensured the mandatory probation term 
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remained enforceable even if a sex offender completed the entire term of imprisonment. Thus, the 
court of appeals affirmed and held that felony sex offenders sentenced under § 12.55.125(o) must 
serve out their probation, despite completing their term of imprisonment.  
 
Hamburg v. State 
In Hamburg v. State,55 the Court of Appeals held that the pre-2018 version of the Alaska bail 
statute, formerly section 12.30.011 of the Alaska Statutes, violated the constitutional provision 
requiring reasonable conditions of bail release be set for a defendant who has not yet been 
convicted.  Hamburg was charged with manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide as a result 
of the death of her two-year-old daughter.  Hamburg’s bail release eligibility was governed by the 
pre-2018 version of Alaska’s bail statute.  The statute declared that when a criminal defendant is 
charged with manslaughter, a rebuttable presumption exists that the defendant should not be 
released on bail.  Applying this presumption, the superior court issued a no-bail order.  Hamburg 
appealed arguing the order violated the Alaska Constitution’s bail provisions.  In response, the 
State argued that the statute could be constitutionally interpreted so that a defendant, who is 
presumed to not be releasable, bears the burden of demonstrating that certain bail conditions would 
ensure the defendant’s appearance at future proceedings and the safety of victims and the public.  
The Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that precedent and the Alaska Constitution guarantee 
a right to pre-conviction bail. The court concluded that both the statute violated this guarantee.  It 
further reasoned that an alternative interpretation of the statute, that would require a defendant 
offer up conditions of bail but place the burden of persuasion on the state, would also violate the 
constitution.  Directing the trial court to set bail conditions, the Court of Appeals held the pre-2018 
version of the Alaska bail statute violated the constitutional provision requiring reasonable 
conditions of bail release for a defendant who has not yet been convicted.  
 
Hess v. State 
In Hess v. State56 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a prosecutor’s unsupported improper 
statements during closing arguments constitute plain error if they meet all four prongs of the Adams 
v. State test.  In September 2011, Anchorage police were called to a reported assault of Patricia 
Hess by her son Christopher.  As part of the defense strategy, witnesses testified that Patricia forgot 
to take her medicine, exaggerated things, and was a danger to herself.  The prosecutor during his 
closing remarks responded to this by arguing that Patricia was being “vilified” as a former victim 
of sexual assault, and he speculated about her mental health and her family’s motives in testifying 
against her though evidence at trial had not gone into those subjects.   Hess did not object to any 
of these statements in closing argument.  On appeal, Hess argued for the first time that the 
prosecutor’s closing arguments were improper, and despite his failure to object at trial, he argued 
the statements constituted plain error.  The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed Hess’s claim using 
the four-part test for plain error review established in Adams v. State.  It explained that all four 
factors must be met to constitute plain error: “(1) there must be error, and the error must not have 
been the result of an intelligent waiver or a tactical decision to not object; (2) the error must be 
obvious, meaning it should be apparent to any competent judge or lawyer; (3) the error must affect 
substantial rights, meaning that it must pertain to the fundamental fairness of the proceeding; and 
(4) the error must be prejudicial.”  The court elaborated that, on the issue of prejudice, the state 
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has the burden of proving constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
for a non-constitutional error the defendant has the burden of proving there is a reasonable 
probability that it affected the outcome of the proceeding.  Ultimately, the court held that all four-
prongs of the Adams test were satisfied. It explained that first, Hess did not waive his objection 
and had not chosen to abstain from objecting for tactical reasons.  Second, the prosecutor’s 
argument lacked evidentiary support and “improperly denigrated the defense lawyer’s trial 
strategy.”  Third, Hess’ fundamental rights were impacted because the prosecutor’s statements 
created a high potential for unfair prejudice.  Fourth, the Court held that there was a reasonable 
probability that the prosecutor’s statements impacted the trial’s outcome, especially because 
“prejudicial comments made during closing arguments are more likely to be prejudicial and less 
likely to be mitigated by curative instructions.”  Reversing, the supreme court held that a 
prosecutor’s unsupported improper statements during closing arguments constitute plain error if 
they meet all four prongs of the Adams v. State test. 
 
Johnson v. State 
In Johnson v. State,57 the court of appeals held that a court must affirmatively assess probation 
conditions restricting familial association with special scrutiny. In 2012, during an altercation 
between Johnson and a man named Michael Plummer, Plummer was stabbed and killed by 
Johnson’s son Spencer. Johnson plead guilty to manslaughter, but the terms of his probation 
following his incarceration were left open to the court. It adopted a probation condition that 
prevented Johnson from knowingly associating with another felon, with exceptions for his wife 
(who had an unrelated felony conviction) and son so long as each party remained in compliance 
with his or her parole. On appeal, the state argued that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to 
hear Johnson’s appeal because Johnson agreed to his term of imprisonment in his plea bargain. 
The court distinguished Johnson’s term of imprisonment and his probation conditions, recognizing 
that Johnson appealed the latter and that accordingly the court had jurisdiction. The court found 
that Johnson’s probation conditions restricted his constitutional rights of familial association, and 
that the lower court needed to apply special scrutiny to these conditions. Concluding that nothing 
in the record supported a necessary restriction of association between Johnson and his wife, the 
court reversed that probation condition. As to the condition restricting association with his son, the 
court vacated and remanded, observing that the lower court did not subject the condition to special 
scrutiny and expressing concerns about the vague and broad operation of the condition in practice. 
Otherwise affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a court must 
affirmatively assess probation conditions restricting familial association with special scrutiny. 
 
Jordan v. State 
In Jordan v. State,58 the Supreme Court of Alaska held (1) that failure to instruct the jury on an 
essential element of a crime is a structural error and so is not susceptible to harmless error review, 
and (2) that a mental state as toward the weight of marijuana in a defendant’s possession is an 
essential element. Police found 15 marijuana plants on Jordan’s property. Possession of four or 
more ounces of marijuana is a felony. The police used a non-statutorily approved method to 
determine that the weight of the marijuana was in excess of four ounces. At trial, Jordan wanted 
to testify that he did not expect the amount of marijuana to be above four ounces when measured 
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by the statutory method. The trial judge denied the testimony and did not require the state to prove 
that Jordan knew the amount of marijuana in his possession. The court of appeals rejected the 
state’s argument that the criminal statute did not require proof of a mental state and held that it 
was error to exclude Jordan’s testimony, but it concluded that these errors were harmless and so it 
affirmed. Jordan petitioned for review arguing that the trial court’s errors were structural and not 
subject to harmless error review. Reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court found failure 
to instruct the jury as to a mental state was a structural error because it affected the framework of 
the trial rather than just the trial process.  Assuming that Jordan’s marijuana possession implicated 
his constitutional privacy rights, the supreme court explained that denying Jordan a jury instruction 
on his mental state “essentially direct[s] a verdict for the prosecution on one of the essential 
elements of the charge,” thereby altering the very framework of the case and infringing on Jordan’s 
right to a jury trial. The supreme court elaborated that this also constituted a structural error 
because applying harmless error review would create practical problem. Reversing and remanding, 
the supreme court held that (1) to fail to instruct the jury as to every essential element is structural 
error requiring automatic reversal, and (2) if possession of marijuana implicates a privacy right, a 
mental state toward the weight of that marijuana is an essential element. 
 
Lambert v. State 
In Lambert v. State59 the court of appeals held that the Osborn standard does not apply to 
applications for post-conviction DNA testing under section 12.73 of the Alaska Statutes.  In 1982, 
Ann Benolken and her husband were raped and killed in a double-homicide committed by two 
individuals.  Lambert was convicted of the murder of Ann while his alleged accomplice Telles was 
acquitted of both murders.  In 2010, the Alaska legislature enacted a post-conviction DNA testing 
statutory scheme, which allows defendants to seek DNA testing in support of a claim of factual 
innocence.  Lambert filed an application for DNA testing of the remaining physical evidence from 
his case, arguing that it could lead to the true perpetrators of the murder.  Applying Osborn, the 
superior court found that Lambert failed to show that DNA testing would conclusively establish 
his innocence and denied his application.  On appeal, Lambert argued that the superior court erred 
by holding him to a higher standard than the statute required.  The court of appeals agreed, 
explaining that section 12.73.020(7) of the Alaska Statutes only requires a defendant to show that 
DNA testing, if favorable, could indicate a “reasonable probability” that the petitioner is innocent.  
The court explained that the superior court erred in applying the Osborn standard for post-
conviction DNA testing, because Osborn supplied the standard that had to be met in the absence 
of a statutory right to post-conviction DNA testing.  The court concluded that since a statutory 
right now existed, the Osborn standard no longer applied.  However, the court noted that Lambert 
had failed to challenge other substantial evidence supporting his conviction, including his own 
testimony, and that the superior court did not err in concluding that Lambert failed to show that 
favorable DNA testing would raise a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would be 
different.  Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the result below while holding that the Osborn 
standard did not apply to applications for post-conviction DNA testing under section 12.73 of the 
Alaska Statutes. 
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Marshall v. State 
In Marshall v. State,60 the Court of Appeals of Alaska held that a defense counsel’s stipulation to 
an element of an offense is procedurally permissible, even without a personal waiver by the 
defendant, so long as the trial court instructs the jury on all of the elements of the offence, including 
the element covered by the stipulation.  Defendant Marshall was a convicted sex offender who was 
required to register.  Marshall complied with his registration requirements until June 2013, when 
he failed to submit his annual registration.  He was arrested and charged with second-degree failure 
to register as a sex offender.  A person commits the crime if he (1) is required to register; (2) knows 
that he is required to register; and (3) fails to file the annual or quarterly written verification.  At 
the beginning of trial, Marshall’s attorney offered to stipulate to the first element to prevent the 
jury from learning that Marshall’s underlying sex offense was for sexual abuse of a minor.  
Marshall himself did not personally waive the first element.  The trial court instructed the jury on 
all of the elements of the offense, including the element covered by the stipulation, and on the 
State’s burden to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury found Marshall guilty.  
Marshall appealed, arguing that the stipulation effectively removed an element of the charged 
offense from the jury’s consideration and it was therefore an error for the court to instruct the jury 
on the stipulation without first obtaining Marshall’s personal waiver of his right to a jury trial on 
that element.  The court of appeals disagreed.  It explained that in a jury trial, even when the parties 
reach a stipulation concerning an element of the offense, the stipulation must be presented to the 
jury.  It explained that the stipulation merely serves as evidence, and the jury must still make a 
determination as to the element of the crime it supports.  The court of appeals concluded that 
therefore the stipulation did not remove an element from the jury’s consideration, and so no 
personal waiver by the defendant was needed in this case.  Therefore, affirming the trial court’s 
decision, the court of appeals held that a defendant’s stipulation to an element of an offense is 
procedurally permissible, even without a personal waiver by the defendant, so long as the trial 
court instructs the jury on all of the elements of the offence, including the element covered by the 
stipulation. 
 
McGuire v. State 
In Mcguire v. State,61 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that when an officer has probable cause to 
arrest an individual for a drug offense, and has reason to believe that the individual might have 
other evidence of that offense on his person, the officer is authorized to conduct a pat-down search. 
During a traffic stop, McGuire was asked to step outside of his car because his insurance was 
invalid. McGuire informed Officer Butler that he had a pocketknife in his front right pocket. 
During the pat-down, but before locating the pocketknife, Butler found a marijuana pipe. Butler 
continued the pat-down, found the pocketknife, and then found more drug paraphernalia. McGuire 
was indicted on two counts of fourth-degree controlled substance misconduct and one count of 
sixth-degree controlled substance misconduct. Following his indictment, McGuire requested 
suppression of most of the evidence against him, claiming that Officer Butler violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights when Butler continued patting-down McGuire after finding the pocketknife. 
The trial court denied this request and McGuire was convicted of all three drug charges; he 
appealed. The court of appeals reasoned that that the discovery of the marijuana pipe before 
obtaining the pocketknife made it reasonable to suspect that McGuire may be carrying more 
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evidence of that crime. Affirming the superior court’s decision, the court of appeals held that when 
an officer has probable cause to arrest an individual for a drug offense, and has reason to believe 
that the individual might have other evidence of that offense on his person, the officer is authorized 
to conduct a pat-down search. 
 
Medina v. State 
In Medina v. State,62 the court of appeals held that probationers are able to seek credit for time 
spent in earlier court-ordered treatment programs for the purposes of subsequent probation 
revocation proceedings. After Medina violated his probation, the superior court ordered him to 
complete a residential treatment program. Although Medina successfully completed the program, 
he then violated his probation again the following year, causing the superior court to impose a 
portion of his previously suspended sentence. Medina requested credit for the time spent in the 
treatment program, but the State argued that Medina’s time in treatment was not served “in 
connection” with the later probation violation. The superior court agreed with the State, reasoning 
that granting credit for earlier programs would create a “reserve of credit” that could nullify the 
penalties of later probation violations. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that probation 
revocation proceedings are not independent of the original criminal proceedings, acting rather as 
continuations. Further, it concluded that worries about  reserve of credit were outweighed by 
constitutional concerns that defendants may serve sentences longer that originally imposed. 
Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that probationers are able to seek credit for 
time spent in earlier court-ordered treatment programs for the purposes of subsequent probation 
revocation proceedings. 
 
Osborne v. State 
In Osborne v. State,63 the court of appeals held that, to obtain a search warrant covering anyone 
arriving at a premises during the execution of the warrant, the police must affirmatively establish 
good reason to believe that any and all persons who arrive will likely be participants in the criminal 
activity investigated. In Osborne, the police executed an arrest warrant at the residence of a third 
party, Young. After discovering a number of drug related items throughout the residence, the 
police applied for a second warrant to search the premises. A boilerplate attachment to the warrant, 
listing items to be searched, contained a provision granting authority to search any person on the 
premises. But the warrant application did not reference this provision, nor did it explain the need 
for this grant of authority or why it might be justified. During the search, the defendant, Osborne, 
knocked on the door and he was then detained, questioned, and searched. The police discovered 
$8,390 in cash, 3.5 grams of methamphetamine, and a cell phone containing texts between Young 
and Osborne. Armed with this evidence, the police obtained a warrant to search Osborne’s house, 
where they seized drugs, money, and weapons. Osborne was later convicted of a number of drug 
and weapons offenses. Prior to the trial, Osborne’s attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
found during the search of Osborne and the search of his house. He argued that the initial search 
was unlawful because the police failed to establish probable cause granting them the authority to 
search any person who arrived on the premises, and that the evidence obtained during the second 
search was the fruit of the unlawful first search. The superior court rejected this argument, siding 
with the State, which argued that because the warrant established probable cause that illegal drugs 
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were sold out of the residence, there existed a logical inference that any and all persons who arrived 
on the premises during the search would also be buying or selling drugs. The court of appeals 
reversed the lower court, holding that to obtain a broad grant of search authority, the police must 
at least acknowledge they are asking for the right to search unknown persons and provide a 
showing of probable cause, typically by detailing the character of the premises, the nature of the 
illegal activity, the number and behavior of persons expected at the premises, whether some of 
these people are unconnected with the illegal conduct, and the precise area and time the illegal 
activity will take place. The court of appeals remanded the case for consideration of the State’s 
alternative argument that the police had independent, lawful reasons to detain and search Osborne. 
 
Pulusila v. State 
In Pulusila v. State,64 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that in interpreting a condition of probation, 
a court must consider (1) whether a particular interpretation would ensure public safety or foster 
the defendant’s rehabilitation, and (2) how a reasonable person in the defendant’s place would 
understand the probation condition. In September 2016, Pulusila was on felony probation. As part 
of his probation, Pulusila was prohibited from having (1) any ammunition or explosives in his 
“custody, residence, or vehicles” or (2) any drug paraphernalia in his “residence or . . . any vehicle 
under his control.” After borrowing another man’s truck, Pulusila was pulled over by the 
Anchorage police. The police searched the truck and found a small explosive device, ammunition 
for a firearm and a methamphetamine pipe. Based on this discovery, the State petitioned the 
superior court to revoke Pulusila’s probation. Pulusila asserted that the truck was borrowed and he 
was unaware of the discovered items; he argued that because he had no mental culpability his 
probation should not be suspended. The superior court rejected this argument, applied strict 
liability, and revoked Pulusila’s probation. The court of appeals reversed, explaining that a 
reasonable person in Pulusila’s circumstances would not understand the conditions of probation to 
allow revocation of probation for unknowing possession of prohibited items. The court further 
explained that because conditions of probation must be reasonably related to rehabilitating an 
offender or protecting the public, ambiguous conditions should be given a meaning to further those 
purposes. The court found there was no clear public benefit to using a strict liability standard. 
Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that in interpreting a condition of probation, a 
court must evaluate (1) whether a particular interpretation would ensure public safety or foster the 
defendant’s rehabilitation and (2) how a reasonable person in the defendant’s place would 
understand the probation condition.  
 
R.C. v. State 
In R.C. v. State,65 the court of appeals held that courts are authorized to consider a juvenile’s ability 
to pay when setting the amount of restitution.  In 2014, at the age of fifteen, R.C. and another 
juvenile started a damaging fire on an elementary school playground.  R.C. admitted guilt and was 
charged as a delinquent minor.  At the restitution proceedings, the State argued that R.C. and the 
other juvenile should be jointly and severely liable for the full amount of the damages caused by 
their actions, which would make R.C. (and his parents) personally liable for $159,161.71.  After 
acknowledging R.C.’s limited assets, the superior court adopted a payment schedule that addressed 
R.C.’s ability to pay, but that did not adjust the amount owed on that basis.  R.C. appealed this 
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ruling, arguing that he did not have the financial means to pay the restitution amount, and that the 
trial court should have considered this when determining the amount of restitution to be ordered.  
The court of appeals vacated and remanded the trial court’s decision, finding that R.C.’s argument 
was supported by the plain meaning and legislative intent of section 47.12.120(b)(4) of the Alaska 
Statutes.  The court of appeals distinguished restitution proceedings for adults, where ability to 
pay may not be considered, from those for minors by focusing on the statutory language requiring 
that restitution for minors be “suitable.” The court reasoned that this indicated financial 
information from the minor and the minor’s parents should be considered in setting the amount of 
restitution.  Moreover, the court of appeals asserted that both the legislative history of the statute 
and prior caselaw indicated that in the State of Alaska restitution is designed to not just be helpful 
to the victim, but to also aid in the rehabilitative process.  It explained that setting restitution for 
minors above what could possibly be paid would be detrimental to the rehabilitative process 
cutting against the purpose of the juvenile justice system.  Vacating and remanding the lower 
court’s decision, the court of appeals held that courts are authorized to consider a juvenile’s ability 
to pay when setting the amount of restitution. 
 
Silas v. State 
In Silas v. State66 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that revoking an individual’s probation requires 
a finding of good cause. Roy Silas was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor and 
served a term of active imprisonment followed by 10 years of probation with a 5-year suspended 
term of imprisonment. A condition of his probation was that he participate in a sex offender 
treatment program as directed by his probation officer, and that he not discontinue the program 
without approval from his probation officer. Silas participated in a program for more than a year, 
until he was arrested for the theft of a computer. Following his release, he attempted to reenter the 
program, but was terminated by the director for possessing pornographic videos, for failure to 
abide by a curfew, and for unwillingness to fully engage in treatment. At his subsequent revocation 
hearing, Silas contended that he did not “discontinue” his treatment, but rather that he was 
terminated against his will and therefore did not violate the terms of his probation. The superior 
court judge indicated that the reasons for Silas’s termination were irrelevant, and that his 
termination alone was sufficient to show good cause for revocation. The appellate court reversed 
and remanded, saying Pulusila v. State and Trumbly v. State  require “good cause” for revocation 
of probation, meaning the revoking court must find “the corrective aims of probation cannot be 
achieved,” and that “continuation of probationary status would be at odds with the need to protect 
society and society’s interest in the probationer’s rehabilitation.” Although the court stipulated that 
involuntary termination could in some instances lead to a finding of good cause for revocation, the 
lack of fact-finding in this case provided an insufficient record to resolve that question. The 
appellate court held that the superior court should have determined whether the circumstances of 
Silas’s termination from the program indicated that the probationary aims could not be met, or that 
the continuation of probation would be contrary to protection of society and to Silas’s 
rehabilitation. 
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State v. Arredondo 
In State v. Arredondo,67 the court of appeals held that (1) spousal communications must be 
intended to remain confidential in order to be subject to spousal privilege, and (2) a defendant 
waives marital communications privilege by using it to exclude information that he made 
necessary to avoid a distortion of the fact-finding process. Police found Arredondo’s vehicle 
abandoned next to a freeway exit. The primary issue at trial was whether Arredondo was the one 
who wrecked the vehicle. As evidence, the state called Arredondo’s mother-in-law, McDole, to 
testify about a conversation she had with her daughter, Jackie, about Arredondo shortly after the 
accident. Jackie told McDole that Arredondo woke Jackie up and asked for help. Soon after, Jackie 
arrived at the scene of the accident with a friend, but not Arredondo. At trial Arredondo attempted 
to excluded evidence of his conversation with Jackie so that he could argue that Jackie knew where 
the accident occurred because she caused it, not because Arredondo told her.  On appeal, 
Arredondo argued that he should be able to invoke the marital communications privilege to prevent 
a third party from testifying about a conversation with his wife. The court of appeals affirmed the 
lower court’s decision, reasoning that the marital communications privilege applies only to those 
spousal communications intended to remain confidential, and Arredondo’s request for help was a 
delegation of authority to Jackie to deal with third parties rather than a confidential 
communication. The court further reasoned that because Arredondo attempted to use marital 
privilege to exclude information that he made material to the fact-finding process by creating an 
information gap, he waived the marital communications privilege. Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the court of appeals held that (1) spousal communications must be intended to remain 
confidential in order to be subject to spousal privilege, and (2) a defendant waives marital 
communications privilege by using it to exclude information that he made necessary to avoid a 
distortion of the fact-finding process. 
 
State v. Baker 
In State v. Baker,68 the Court of Appeals held that criminal offenses arise out of the “same criminal 
episode” for purposes of calculating a defendant’s speedy trial rights only when there is a close 
elemental or evidentiary overlap between the charged offenses, or when the commission of one 
criminal offense has a causal connection to another.  Responding to a tip, an Alaska State Trooper 
observed Timothy Baker operating a vehicle and conducting what appeared to be a drug deal at a 
local gas station.  The trooper approached Baker and requested his identification at which point 
Baker ran, abandoning several small bags filled with a white powdery substance. After catching 
Baker, the trooper determined Baker’s driver’s license was revoked.  Baker was placed under arrest 
and charged with driving with a revoked license.  Baker was not charged with any drug-related 
crimes at that time.  Three months after the arrest Baker pled guilty to driving without a license.  
In the interim, the State uncovered evidence that Baker was engaged in drug distribution and 
confirmed that the white powder was in-fact cocaine.  Approximately four months after Baker’s 
initial arrest for driving with a revoked license, the State indicted him for possession of cocaine 
with intent to sell.  Baker moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the drug charge arose from 
“the same criminal episode” as his prior arrest and that therefore the speedy trial time for the drug 
charge started to run when he was charged for driving with a revoked license.  The superior court 
granted Baker’s motion to dismiss, finding that the two charges arose from the “same criminal 
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episode” because Baker’s act of driving helped facilitate the drug deal.  The court concluded that 
the 120 speedy trial time had already passed and so it dismissed the felony drug indictment.  The 
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that there was no evidentiary, 
elemental, or causal connection between the two otherwise separate criminal acts: driving without 
a license and possession of cocaine.  The appellate court explained that Baker’s driving played no 
essential part in the drug offense as he could have easily walked to the site of the drug deal.  It 
further noted that Baker’s driving was irrelevant to the drug offense for evidentiary purposes and 
that it was no essential element of the drug charge.  The appellate court concluded that because the 
only nexus between the two offenses was temporal and incidental the State could prosecute Baker 
for the crime of driving with a revoked license without triggering Baker’s right to a speedy trial 
on the drug offense.  Reversing the lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeals held that criminal 
offenses should be considered as arising out of the “same criminal episode” for purposes of 
calculating a defendant’s speedy trial rights only when there is a close elemental or evidentiary 
overlap between the charged offenses, or when the commission of one criminal offense has a causal 
connection to another. 
 
State v. Bell 
In State v. Bell,69 the court of appeals held that section 12.55.027(d) of the Alaska Statutes requires 
a defendant lose all credit toward their sentence for a period of release on bail subject to electronic 
monitoring if it ends because the defendant commits a new crime. In 2015, section 12.55.027(d) 
of the Alaska Statutes was amended to grant trial courts authority to count time on electronic 
monitoring while on bail release against a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment provided, 
amongst other conditions, that the defendant had not, “committed a criminal offense while under 
electronic monitoring.” Robert Daniel Bell was convicted of second and third-degree theft. While 
Bell was appealing his conviction he was granted bail and served three distinct periods on 
electronic monitoring. Period I ended when Bell was taken into custody for allegedly violated the 
terms of his release. Period II ended when Bell was arrested for third-degree theft to which he later 
plead guilty. Period III ended when Bell’s appeal concluded. The superior court gave Bell credit 
for all of the time he spent on electronic monitoring, with the exception of the day he was arrested, 
ending Period II. All parties agreed Bell should get credit for Period III. The State argued that Bell 
should not get any credit for Period II because he committed a crime while on electronic 
monitoring. Bell responded that the trial court had statutory discretion to determine how much 
credit would be lost because of a new offense. The court of appeals agreed with the State, reasoning 
that Bell forfeited all credit for Period II when he committed a new crime. The court relied on a 
broad consensus around this interpretation revealed in the legislative history of the statute. The 
court of appeals decided to remand the question of Period I to the superior court for factual findings 
as to whether Bell had actually violated the terms of his release, causing him to lose credit for that 
period. Affirming, reversing, and vacating the superior court in part, the court of appeals held that 
a defendant loses all credit for a period of electronic monitoring when they commit a new offense. 
 
State v. Groppel 
In State v. Groppel,70 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that experts appointed under section 
12.47.070 of the Alaska Statutes are the court’s experts, that the superior court must appoint 
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qualified experts from the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) unless there is a legitimate reason not 
to, and that if it appoints non-API experts, the court system must bear their costs.  If a defendant’s 
mental capacity is in issue, section 12.47.070 of the Alaska Statutes directs the court to appoint at 
least two qualified psychiatrists or psychologists certified by the American Board of Forensic 
Psychology to determine the mental condition of the defendant.  Groppel was charged with first 
and second-degree murder, along with a plethora of other charges, and subsequently notified the 
court that he might rely on a diminished capacity defense.  The superior court discovered that API 
did not have any psychiatrists statutorily qualified to conduct the examination.  The superior court 
therefore ruled that it would appoint two non-API statutorily qualified experts, one for each party, 
and that each party was to bear the cost of its own expert.  Both the State and Groppel appealed.  
The Alaska Supreme Court found that legislative history revealed the legislature intended to 
provide non-partisan experts and that the Model Penal Code further supported that conclusion.  It 
also determined that trial courts have historically appointed API to perform the psychiatric 
evaluations and that that historical practice was sound.  Further, it reasoned that because experts 
appointed under section 12.47.070 of the Alaska Statutes are supervised by and report directly to 
the court they are the court’s experts and must be funded by it if not from API.  Vacating the 
superior court’s order, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that experts appointed under section 
12.47.070 of the Alaska Statutes are the court’s experts, that the superior court must appoint 
qualified experts from API unless there is a legitimate reason not to, and that if the court appoints 
non-API experts, the court system must bear their costs. 
 
State v. Ranstead 
In State v. Ranstead,71 the supreme court held that a sentencing court need not make particularized 
findings to support uncontested conditions of probation, and that a defendant must object to a 
proposed condition of probation to preserve it for appeal. Defendant Ranstead plead guilty to 
second-degree sexual assault. His presentence report recommended imprisonment followed by 
probation with 11 general conditions and 26 special conditions.  Ranstead objected to 10 
conditions. The superior court overruled his objections and imposed all recommendations. In doing 
so it did not make findings as to the uncontested conditions though it reviewed the record. Ranstead 
appealed, challenging a general condition he had not objected to in the superior court, as well as 
10 special conditions, one of which he had also not objected to in the superior court. The court of 
appeals rejected Ranstead’s challenge to the general condition, but it vacated the ten special 
conditions, and struck down two more that Ranstead had not objected to or challenged on appeal. 
Finally, it vacated all remaining conditions, even though Ranstead had not objected to them or 
raised them on appeal either. In doing so, the court of appeals relied on Beasley v. State, which 
precluded a sentencing judge from adopting conditions proposed in the presentence report without 
reviewing them critically. The supreme court reversed, holding that a superior court need not make 
findings as to the uncontested probation conditions. It emphasized that nothing in the Alaska Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, particularly Rule 32, requires a court to do such, and that counsels’ role in 
calling attention to proposed conditions is integral to assisting a trial court in imposing a sentence. 
As to preserving issues for appeal, the court did not deem it necessary to depart from the procedural 
principle that a party forfeits its right to appeal an issue when the party fails to timely object to it. 
The court highlighted the importance of the rule in focusing litigation at the trial level, and the role 
this principle plays in developing a robust record for appellate review. The supreme court therefore 
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overruled Beasley, reversing the court of appeals’ decision to vacate conditions to which Ranstead 
did not object, holding that: (1) the superior court need not affirmatively review uncontested 
conditions of probation; and (2) the defendant must object to probation conditions at the superior 
court level, or else he forfeits his right to appeal those issues. 
 
State v. Thompson 
In State v. Thompson,72 the court of appeals held that bail violations during a certain period were 
not per se criminal offenses and so do not disqualify defendants from getting credit for time served 
while under electronic monitoring. In February 2016, Thompson was arrested for driving under 
the influence and released on pre-trial bail with electronic monitoring. In July of 206, while being 
monitored, Thompson allegedly violated his bail conditions by consuming alcohol and testing 
positive for several illicit substances. Thompson eventually plead guilty to several charges and at 
sentencing requested the superior court give him credit for time served on electronic monitoring, 
the state opposed this. Under 12.55.027 of the Alaska Statutes, trial courts have the authority to 
grant credit to a defendant for time served while released on bail subject to electronic monitoring, 
provided the person has not committed a criminal offense while being monitored. Between July 
2016 and November 2017, the violation of a bail condition was not a crime in Alaska. Because of 
this, the superior court held that Thompson was still eligible to receive credit for time served 
because his bail violations were non-criminal; the state appealed. The court of appeals affirmed 
applying Alaska’s sliding scale approach to statutory interpretation that eschews reliance on just 
the plain meaning. The court of appeals explained that before November 2017, the statute’s later 
legislative history reflected a desire make bail violations civil violations rather than criminal 
misdemeanors, even if earlier legislative history had indicated a desire for bail violations to 
constitute a crime. As the legislative history was susceptible to two reasonably constructions, the 
court of appeals determined that the plain meaning of the statutory text controls. The court of 
appeals affirmed, holding that non-criminal bail violations were not considered criminal offenses 
between July 2016 and November 2017, and therefore bail violations during that period do not 
disqualify defendants from getting credit for time served on bail while under electronic monitoring. 
 
Tanner v. State 
In Tanner v. State,73 the court of appeals held that an Alaska Statute,74 governing credit for time 
served while subject to electronic monitoring, did not authorize credit to be awarded if a person is 
allowed to go grocery shopping because grocery shopping is not an implicitly authorized exception 
to the statute’s required restraints, and it also does not qualify as a rehabilitative activity.75  After 
serving time in prison, Tanner was placed on probation.  But when his probation was revoked, and 
he was subsequently released on bail, Tanner was subjected to electronic monitoring.  The terms 
of his contract with the monitoring company, adopted by the court, allowed Tanner to leave home 
for a variety of reasons, including grocery shopping.  Tanner eventually filed a motion seeking 
credit for the 212 days he served subject to electronic monitoring. The superior court denied his 
motion because the electronic monitoring agreement allowed Tanner to go grocery shopping, 
finding this was not sufficiently restrictive to satisfy the statutory requirements for awarding time 
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served.  Tanner appealed arguing that because grocery shopping is an essential activity the statute 
should be construed to implicitly authorize it, or that in the alternative it constituted “rehabilitative 
activity” which is explicitly authorized by the statute.  The court of appeals affirmed the ruling of 
the superior court, reasoning that while it would be reasonable for the legislature to allow for 
occasional grocery shopping, it was not ridiculous to distinguish it from activities that the statute 
chose to authorize.  The court noted that unlike the statute’s other exceptions, in which a separate 
party would notice if the defendant failed to show up, no one would notice if the defendant did not 
actually go grocery shopping when he claimed to do so.  Further, the court reasoned that grocery 
shopping does not qualify as attending a rehabilitative activity, as grocery shopping does not 
normally fit into a plain understanding of “rehabilitation,” and one does not normally “attend” a 
grocery trip.  In affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that an Alaska Statute, 
governing credit for time served while subject to electronic monitoring, did not authorize credit to 
be awarded if a person is allowed to go grocery shopping because grocery shopping is not an 
implicitly authorized exception to the statute’s required restraints, and it also does not qualify as a 
rehabilitative activity. 
 
Thomas v. State 
In Thomas v. State,76 the court of appeals held that a sentencing judge must engage in case-specific 
analysis of the circumstances and facts of the specific case and the particular defendant when 
determining a need for a special restriction on the defendant’s eligibility for discretionary parole. 
Thomas pled guilty to second-degree murder for the death of his girlfriend and agreed to receive 
a sentence of 75 years imprisonment with 25 years suspended (50 years to serve). The superior 
court judge rejected the negotiated sentence as too lenient, but did not provide specific reasons to 
support the decision. Instead, the superior court judge made broad statements regarding individuals 
convicted of murder and their general eligibility for parole. Thomas and the State appealed and 
argued that the superior court failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the negotiated 
sentence. The court of appeals held that a judge cannot impose a more severe parole restriction on 
a defendant solely because it believes that the discretionary parole statutes are not sufficiently 
harsh for the category of crime the defendant committed. It explained that since discretionary 
parole is difficult to obtain, a sentencing judge cannot consider the defendant’s eligibility for 
discretionary parole as a factor likely to reduce the jail time that the defendant will serve. Vacating 
the superior court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a sentencing judge must engage in case-
specific analysis of the circumstances and facts of the particular case and the specific defendant 
when determining a need for a special restriction on the defendant’s eligibility for discretionary 
parole. 
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ELECTION LAW 
 
Mallot v. Stand for Salmon 
In Mallott v. Stand for Salmon,77 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a ballot initiative effects an 
unconstitutional appropriation if it transfers state assets into private hand or if it infringes on the 
legislature’s ability to allocate resources among competing use.  In July 2017, Stand for Salmon 
submitted ballot initiative 17FSH2 to establish a permitting scheme for projects affecting 
anadromous fish habitats.  The governor declined to certify it concluding portions of it improperly 
constrained legislative authority to allocate state resources.  Stand for Salmon sued and won an 
injunction to circulate the initiative, arguing it did not infringe on the legislature’s authority 
because, though it prohibited some activities, the legislature retained discretion in how to 
implement the measure.  On appeal the supreme court first highlighted article XI, section 7 of the 
Alaska Constitution, under which “‘[t]he initiative shall not be used to . . . make or repeal 
appropriations.’”78   Reviewing the legal precedent, the court identified two ways in which a ballot 
initiative could create an unconstitutional appropriation:  
 
An initiative is an impermissible give-away program if it transfers state 
assets into private hands. An initiative also effects an appropriation if it 
infringes on the legislature’s ability to allocate resources among competing 
uses—that is, if it fails “to ensure that the legislature, and only the 
legislature, retains control over the allocation of state assets among 
competing needs”—by forcing the legislature to make a particular 
allocation decision in the future or by removing certain allocation decisions 
from the legislature’s range of discretion.79 
 
Applying this standard to the initiative, the court noted restrictive language that allowed 
the commissioner to issue a major permit only if the activity would not cause 
substantial damage to the fish habitat.  Finding that this  “would completely prevent 
the legislature from permitting projects that result in the permanent destruction of 
anadromous fish habitat,” the court conclude the initiative was an unconstitutional 
appropriation.80  Instead of declaring the entire initiative unconstitutional, the court 
chose to sever the offending language, proposed AS 16.05.885(e)(3) and the third 
sentence of proposed AS 16.05.887(a).  Reversing and remanded to place the amended 
initiative on the ballot, the court held that a ballot initiative effects an unconstitutional 
appropriation if it transfers state assets into private hand or if it infringes on the 
legislature’s ability to allocate resources among competing uses. 
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Marcy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough 
In Marcy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough,81 the supreme court held that the public interest in 
reviewing a suit similar to other potential upcoming litigation did not override the claim’s 
mootness.  In 2014, Alaska passed a statewide ballot initiative to legalize marijuana, enacting 
section 17.38 of the Alaska Statutes.  It legalized marijuana, but allows local governments to 
“prohibit the operation of marijuana cultivation facilities, marijuana product manufacturing 
facilities, marijuana testing facilities, or retail marijuana stores through the enactment of an 
ordinance or by a voter initiative.”  Shortly after the law went into effect, a municipal initiative 
petition titled “Application for Ballot Initiative to Prohibit Marijuana Business Except Those 
Involving Industrial Hemp in the Matanuska-Susitna Borough” (the Proposed Initiative) was 
certified for the October 2016 local ballot.  Ronda Marcy, a Borough resident who had purchased 
and outfitted greenhouses to open a marijuana business after passage of section 17.38, filed a 
complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief 32 days prior to the October election.  In 
late September, the superior court ordered the case held in abeyance pending the election, 
explaining that absentee voting had already begun, making relief before the election “inherently 
disruptive and prejudicial to the ordinary voting process.”  After the Proposed Initiative was 
rejected in the election, Marcy’s moved to stay the execution of judgment, but the court denied her 
motion finding the issue moot, and dismissed the case without findings of fact or conclusions of 
law.  Marcy appealed on several grounds.  The supreme court held that the lower court’s abeyance 
order, issuance of notice of intent to dismiss the case as moot, and dismissal without findings of 
fact and conclusions of law were not abuses of discretion.  In considering Marcy’s assertion that 
the public interest exception override the mootness issue, the court evaluated three issues: “(1) 
whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition, (2) whether the mootness doctrine, if applied 
may repeatedly circumvent review of the issues, and (3) whether the issues presented are so 
important to the public interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine.”  The court dismissed 
Marcy’s argument that review would prevent needless litigation repetition over similar initiatives, 
finding that that an opinion on such similar initiatives’ constitutionality would be purely advisory 
and potentially inapplicable because they were not actually before the court.  Preferring to wait for 
a challenge to one of the proposed or actual laws grounded in facts and therefore avoiding 
unintended consequences, the court held that the public interest in preventing the opening of a 
litigation floodgate was not persuasive enough to require review of Marcy’s moot constitutional 
and statutory claims.   
 
Nageak v. Mallott 
In Nageak v. Mallott,82 the Supreme Court held that (1) election challengers must bring an election 
contest complaint, rather than a recount appeal, if they are alleging only misconduct, fraud, or 
corruption in the conduct of an election, and (2) the misconduct must be sufficient to change the 
result of the election before a new election will be ordered.  After a recount Dean Westlake 
defeated Benjamin Nageak for the Alaska Democratic Party’s nomination for representative of 
Alaska House District 40 in the 2016 primary election by eight votes.  Nageak filed an election 
contest complaint, asserting that, among other errors, various election officials erred by giving 50 
voters both the ADL and Republican ballots in violation of the rules of each party.  Per these rules, 
registered Alaskan Independence, Democratic, and Libertarian voters may vote only on the “ADL” 
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ballot, and Republican, Undeclared, and Non-Partisan voters may choose to vote either the ADL 
or the Republican ballot.  The trial court found this error changed the results of the election and so 
it certified Nageak the winner; on appeal the supreme court disagreed.  The supreme court first 
explained that a claim is properly brought as an election contest complaint rather than as a recount 
appeal when the underlying issue is misconduct, typically by election officials, rather than a 
disagreement over vote counting.  It then reasoned that a new election should only be ordered if a 
challenger has shown sufficient misconduct to change the result with every reasonable 
presumption in favor of the validity of the election.  The court found that the election error was 
the result of misconduct, but was not enough to change the results of the election as Westlake won 
by eight votes.  Consequently, it concluded that the misconduct was not sufficient to trigger a new 
election.  Reversing the trial court and reinstating Westlake as the winner, the supreme court held 
that (1) election challengers must bring an election contest case, rather than a recount appeal, if 
they are alleging only misconduct, fraud, or corruption by an election official, and (2) election 
officials’ misconduct must be sufficient to change the result of the election before a new election 
will be ordered. 
 
State v. Alaska Democratic Party 
In State v. Alaska Democratic Party,83 the supreme court held the Alaska Constitution’s right of 
free association allows a political party to open its primaries to registered independent candidates.  
Alaska requires candidates to either win a party primary or secure a certain number of petition 
signatures to appear on the general election ballot.  In order to run in a primary, a candidate must 
meet certain qualifications, one of which is the “party affiliation rule,” which requires that a 
candidate be registered as a member of the party from which he or she seeks nomination.  The 
Democratic Party amended its bylaws to allow registered independents to run in its primaries.  The 
State Division of Elections refused to allow these candidacies because they violated the party 
affiliation rule, prompting a constitutional challenge by the party.  The superior court granted the 
Democratic Party’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the party had an associational 
right to allow independent primary candidates.  The supreme court affirmed, finding the party 
affiliation rule violated Alaska’s right of free association in pursuit of political goals provided to 
both individuals and political parties by article 1, section 5 of Alaska’s constitution.  The court 
initially determined that a party’s associational rights include the right to choose its general 
election candidates regardless of their party registration.  It explained that because that the party 
affiliation rule prevents a party from determining the “ideological caste” of its candidates, the rule 
imposes a substantial burden on the right of association.  The court noted that while this burden is 
only moderate under the federal constitution, Alaska’s constitution is more protective.  The court 
explained that because the rule imposes a substantial burden it may only be justified if it serves a 
sufficiently compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to that interest.  It determined that the rule 
did not advance the state’s interest in confirming public support exists for the party and similarly 
was not necessary to ensure the stability of the political system, or to prevent confusion.  Finally, 
the court further found the rule was not narrowly tailored to advance theses interests.  Affirming 
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held the Alaska Constitution’s right of free 
association allows a political party to open its primaries to registered independent candidates. 
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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
Alaska State Comm’n for Human Rights v. Anderson 
In Alaska State Comm’n for Human Rights v. Anderson,84 the supreme court held that a statute 
mandating confidentiality in investigations permits an agency to exclude third-parties from 
investigative interviews.  An employee of Alaska’s Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) filed a discrimination complaint with the Commission for Human Rights, which enforces 
Alaska’s anti-discrimination laws.  The Commission subpoenaed the employee’s supervisor, Dori 
Anderson, as part of its investigation of the complaint under section 18.80.115 of the Alaska 
Statutes.  Anderson refused to comply unless DHHS’s Equal Opportunity Employment Manager, 
Greta Jones, was present for “support.”  The investigator, Patricia Watts, explained multiple times 
that Jones could not be present as this violated the Commission’s unwritten policy of excluding 
third parties from investigative interviews, with limited exceptions, to maintain confidentiality.  
She also warned Anderson that refusal could result in contempt proceedings.  Nonetheless, 
Anderson refused to be interviewed and so the Commission initiated contempt proceedings against 
her.  Anderson moved to dismiss, and the superior court granted her motion.  It concluded that the 
Commission lacked authority to require Anderson appear alone pursuant to an unwritten policy 
because § 18.80.115 did not explicitly grant this authority unlike some other statutes.  On appeal, 
the supreme court reversed the superior court’s order, finding the statute implicitly authorized 
exclusion of third parties at interviews.  The court focused on the statute’s requirement that 
investigations be confidential both to the public and to the respondent.  It explained that this 
purpose would be frustrated, and that a witness’s candor could be chilled, by allowing the presence 
of third parties.  Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that a statute mandating 
confidentiality in investigations permits an agency to exclude third-parties from investigative 
interviews. 
 
Atkins v. Intel Transportation & Taxi Service, Inc.   
In Atkins v. Intel Transportation & Taxi Service, Inc.,85 the supreme court held a claimant who 
fails to obtain written approval from his employer or the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Benefits 
Guaranty Fund (“The Fund”) before settling a personal-injury claim against a third party, as 
required by Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act, cannot seek workers’ compensation.  In 2009, 
Atkins, a taxi driver, was in route to pick up a customer when another car hit his taxi head on.  The 
driver of the other car was killed and Atkins was severely injured.  Soon after the accident, Atkins 
obtained an attorney to investigate possible sources of compensation, including through tort suit 
and claims under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act (“The Act”).  For a variety of reasons, 
the workers’ compensation claim was delayed while Atkins sued the estate of the other driver, 
which ultimately led to a policy-limited settlement against the estate’s automobile insurance.  
Critically, Atkins did not receive written approval from his alleged employer, Inlet, or the Fund, 
for the settlement before accepting it; approval is required under the Act in order to receiver 
workers’ compensation.  As a result, the Workers’ Compensation Board (“The Board”) dismissed 
Atkins’ claim because he had not obtained the written approval of the Fund or his employer before 
the settlement.  Atkins appealed arguing his employer’s approval was not necessary because (1) 
the settlement was not a “compromise” under the act, and (2) the settlement did not prejudice his 
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employer.  The supreme court reject his arguments.  First, relying on Black’s Law Diction, the 
court held that an agreement between two parties constitutes a “compromise” for purposes of the 
Act, and so Atkins’ settlement was a compromise.  Next, the court concluded that even though 
Atkins’ settlement did not prejudice his employer or the Fund, allowing his claim would violate 
the clear command of the statute and undermine its protections.  The court explained that by 
settling before a judicial decision was reached Atkins’ had violated this clear rule and risked 
prejudice even though prejudice did not actually result.  Additionally, the court distinguished past 
exceptions to this rule as the result of independent judicial determinations after a trial, not 
settlements at a third-party’s policy limit beforehand.  Ultimately, affirming the result below, the 
supreme court held a claimant who fails to obtain written approval from his employer or the Fund 
before settling a personal-injury claim cannot seek claims for workers compensations even when 
the failure of the claimant to get prior approval does not prejudice the employer or the Fund. 
 
Burke v. Raven Electric, Inc. 
In Burke v. Raven Electric, Inc.86 the court held that the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) (1) does not violate the due process or equal protection 
clauses and (2) bars relief under the Defective Machinery Act. The mother of an employee killed 
at work sought workers’ compensation death benefits, arguing that the Act was unconstitutional 
because it did not sufficiently compensate the loss her daughter’s life, and because it failed to 
account for the mother’s future dependency on her daughter. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation 
Board denied the claim, and the Appeals Commission affirmed the decision and ordered the mother 
to pay for the employer’s attorney’s fees. Affirming the Appeals Commission’s decision, the 
supreme court rejected the claim that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision violates the due process 
and equal protection clauses.  It explained this provision bars parents from bringing suit “on 
account of [an] injury or death” covered by the Act, and that parents are only entitled to benefits 
under the Act itself if they are dependent on the child at the time of the child’s death. The court 
concluded that because the mother was not dependent at the time of her daughter’s death, she 
lacked a substantive due process right under the Act. Further, the court dismissed the argument 
that the Act violates the equal protection clause. It explained that parents who currently depend on 
their children for income are differently situated from those who might later depend on their 
children, so the two groups may be treated differently.  Additionally, the court declined to overturn 
its precedent which had held that the Defective Machinery Act only applies to occupations not 
covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act, thereby barring the mother from suing under the 
Defective Machinery Act. Finally, the court reversed the award of attorney’s fees to the employer, 
reasoning that because the mother was self-represented, and because only the court had jurisdiction 
to decide the constitutional questions, the appeal was neither unreasonable nor frivolous. 
Otherwise affirming the judgment below, the court held that the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) (1) does not violate the due process or equal protection 
clauses and (2) bars relief under the Defective Machinery Act. 
 
Kang v. Mullins 
In Kang v. Mullins87 the supreme court reversed the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals 
Commission, deciding that a woman was not her neighbor’s employer when she hired him to 
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complete repairs on a home she rented to use as a residence and place of business. Yong Kang 
rented a home in North Pole from her son. She lived in the home and used it to operate her business, 
Lee’s Massage. In early 2015, Kang hired her neighbor Alexander Mullins to repair the home’s 
roof. As the work progressed, it became clear that the house also needed to be leveled, and Mullins 
agreed to take on that job as well. Mullins injured his wrist while working on the leveling project. 
Soon after, he had a dispute with Kang about compensation and stopped working on the house. 
When Mullins went to the emergency room for treatment on his wrist, he filed a report of injury 
with the Workers’ Compensation Board, listing Lee’s Massage as his employer. After a hearing, 
the board found that Lee’s Massage was Mullins’ employer and required the business to 
compensate him. On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the 
board’s decision, finding that based on the “totality of the circumstances” Mullins was employed 
by Lee’s Massage “in connection with a business or industry.” Reviewing the commission’s 
decision, the supreme court chose not to focus on the nature of the agreement between Kang and 
Mullins, opting to analyze Kang’s role as a tenant at the property. Because Kang was a tenant, 
neither she nor her business was obligated to arrange for the repairs to the home that Mullins 
performed. The supreme court emphasized that Kang was therefore a consumer of rental and repair 
services, not a producer. Relying on this distinction, the supreme court found that Mullins had not 
proved he entered into an employment contract with Lee’s Massage. Reversing the commission, 
the supreme court held that for purposes of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act, a person or 
entity is not an employer when they hire someone in their capacity as a consumer rather than in 
connection with their business.  
 
Moody v. Lodge 
In Moody v. Lodge,88 the Alaska Supreme Court held that whether time not spent actively 
performing duties should be counted towards overtime under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act 
(AWHA) is determined by applying the standard of Hutka v. Sisters of Providence in Washington.  
From 2002 to 2007, Jeff Moody worked as a pilot for Royal Wolf Lodge.  While working at the 
lodge he resided there, waiting to be called to his duties.  In 2008, Moody sued the lodge seeking 
unpaid overtime under AWHA.  The superior court found that when not actively carrying out his 
duties Moody was “waiting to be engaged,” rather than “engaged to wait” and was therefore only 
entitled to 6.4 hours of overtime.  The supreme court affirmed.  It explained that because the 
AWHA mandates overtime pay if an employee works over eight hours in a day, the analysis of 
whether overtime pay is owed centers on how much time was spent “‘actually working.’”  The 
supreme court concluded that the superior court had correctly assessed this by applying the 
standard from Hutka: “‘(1) the degree to which the employee is free to engage in personal 
activities; and (2) the agreements between the parties.’”  Noting that no agreement appeared to 
exist, the supreme court explained it was proper for the superior court to use the non-exhaustive 
list of illustrative factors from Owens v. Local No. 169, Association of Western Pulp & Paper 
Workers to determine how free Moody had been when not actively performing his duties.  As the 
superior court’s factual findings were not challenged, the supreme court held that the lower court 
had appropriately applied the facts to the tests delineated in Hutka and Owens.  Affirming, the 
supreme court held that whether time not spent actively performing duties should be counted 
towards overtime under the AWHA is determined by applying the standard of Hutka. 
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Public Safety Employees Ass’n, AFSCME Local 803, AFL-CIO v. City of Fairbanks 
In Public Safety Employees Ass’n, AFSCME Local 803, AFL-CIO v. City of Fairbanks,89 the 
supreme court held that a city council’s politically motivated rejection of a collective bargaining 
agreement is not a violation of Alaska’s Public Employer Relations Act (the Act). In 2013, the 
City of Fairbanks began negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement with the Public Safety 
Employees Association (PSEA). The mayor negotiated an agreement which received tentative 
approval by the city council. In August 2014, after public input, the agreement was formally 
passed, but a council member filed a notice of reconsideration. The notice was initially rejected as 
untimely, but at the next council meeting the rules were suspended to allow for reconsideration. 
After reconsideration, where a number of constituents voiced concerns about the city’s ability to 
pay, the council unanimously rejected the agreement. PSEA filed a charge with the Alaska Labor 
Relations Agency (ALRA), alleging that the council had not bargained in good faith. The union 
further argued that the suspension of the rules and reconsideration of the agreement was an unfair 
labor practice. An ALRA panel found that the council had acted in bad faith by “stringing out” 
negotiations, and a superior court affirmed this result. On appeal, the supreme court reasoned the 
council had acted within its procedures to reconsider and ultimately reject the agreement. Further, 
the supreme court concluded that there was no evidence of intent to “string out” negotiations in 
bad faith. The court reached this conclusion based on four considerations: 1) the council’s 
directives in the bargaining process were tentative, 2) the council was unaware of higher cost 
estimates when it tentatively approved parts of the agreement, 3) there was no evidence the council 
voted to reconsider based on any consideration other than finances, and 4) there was no evidence 
the council postponed for any reason other than reassessment. The supreme court found that the 
council voted to reject the agreement based on the political process alone; the court explained that 
without more this does not evidence a lack of “present intention to find a basis for agreement,” 
and therefore no violation of the Act occurred. Reversing the superior court’s decision in favor of 
PSEA, the supreme court held that a city council’s politically motivated rejection of a collective 
bargaining agreement is not a violation of Alaska’s Public Employer Relations Act. 
 
Sleeper v. URS Midwest 
In Sleeper v. URS Midwest,90 the district court held that the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) 
is not preempted by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  Sleeper was employed by URS as a 
truck driver.  Sleeper claimed that during his employment, URS failed to pay him overtime and 
illegally deducted pay he earned.  As part of their defense, URS asserted that Sleeper’s claim under 
the state law AWHA was preempted by the federal law FLSA.  Rejecting this claim, the district 
court explained that they were bound by Ninth Circuit precedent holding otherwise.  The court 
reasoned that creating an exception to the Ninth Circuit’s holding was unwarranted because  the 
record keeping requirements of the AWHA are not inconsistent, and therefore not preempted, by 
a federal statute which serves the purpose of promoting highway safety.  Finally, the court reasoned 
that no other provision of the AWHA was in direct conflict with the FLSA or otherwise an obstacle 
to Congressional intent.  Consequently, the district court held that the AWHA is not preempted by 
the FLSA. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
League of Conservation Voters v. Trump 
In League of Conservation Voters v. Trump,91 the district court held that the potential harm to the 
oceans from an executive order was sufficiently imminent, geographically specific, and 
particularized to establish standing under Article III. Using power granted by Congress in the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), President Obama withdrew 128 million acres of the 
Arctic and Atlantic Oceans from future oil and gas leasing over the course of 2015 and 2016. In 
April 2017, President Trump issued an executive order reversing these decisions. The League of 
Conservation Voters, and others, sued the President and members of his administration, claiming 
they lacked statutory authority to reverse the withdrawal. The Defendants moved to dismiss on 
grounds of sovereign immunity, the Plaintiffs’ lack of a private right of action, the inability of the 
court to issue declaratory relief against the President, and the Plaintiffs’ lack of Article III standing. 
The district court rejected all grounds for dismissal, focusing particularly on the question of 
standing under Article III. It rejected the sovereign immunity argument on the basis of precedential 
exceptions for officers unconstitutional actions taken in the sovereign’s name or in excess of 
statutory authority. It also rejected the need for a statutorily authorized cause of action because 
Plaintiffs’ suit challenged action in excess of the President’s constitutional or statutory authority 
rather than for enforcement of a federal law.  The district court sidestepped the questionable 
constitutionality of an injunction against the president on the grounds that the Plaintiffs ultimately 
sought an injunction against subordinate officials, not the President. With respect to Article III 
standing, the district court concluded that the Plaintiffs were able to demonstrate injury in fact by 
establishing imminent harm, geographic specificity of the threat, and particularity of harm. It 
determined that the alleged threat of harm to ocean wildlife from  seismic research was imminent 
based on the government’s clear intent to expedite energy production and the oil industry’s 
eagerness to pursue this production. Despite the large area covered by the suit, because it was 
discrete and defined, the court concluded the threat was geographically specific. And Plaintiffs’ 
loss of enjoyment of the wildlife in these areas established the particularity of harm. In rejecting 
the motions to dismiss, the district court held that the potential harm to the oceans was sufficiently 
imminent, geographically specific, and particularized to establish standing under Article III and 
allowed the lawsuit to proceed. 
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EVIDENCE LAW 
 
Wassillie v. State 
In Wassillie v. State,92 the supreme court held that an incident report prepared by a staff member 
at a halfway house was inadmissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 
Wassillie, who was serving out the remainder of a felony sentence at the Parkview Center halfway 
house, was found guilty of second-degree escape. His indictment was based on an incident report 
prepared by a staff member that relayed the statements of another resident. Wassillie appealed, 
arguing that the incident report was inadmissible hearsay, and without it the evidence was 
insufficient to support his indictment. The state argued that the incident report was admissible 
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court concluded that the 
incident report was not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 
Business records are exempt from the hearsay rule because they typically reflect the routine 
operations of a business. To qualify for this exemption, the record must be of a regularly conducted 
business activity, must be regularly kept, the source must have personal knowledge, the 
information must have been recorded contemporaneously, and foundation testimony must be 
provided. The court found that this incident report was not prepared as part of a regularly 
conducted business activity and was prepared in anticipation of litigation, undermining its 
trustworthiness. The court analogized this incident report to investigative reports prepared by a 
participant or observer to an incident, such as a police report, which are less objective and are 
ordinarily inadmissible. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the incident report was 
inadmissible under the business records exception. 
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FAMILY LAW 
 
Brennan v. Brennan 
In Brennan v. Brennan,93 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that to determine whether separate 
property has been transmuted into marital property through an implied inter-spousal gift, a court 
must determine whether the owning spouse intended “to donate or convey separate property to the 
marital unit or marital estate.”  Kelly Brennan formed a fishing business with his first wife Mary.  
Through his work, he acquired Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs) from the federal government to 
harvest halibut and sablefish.  Following Kelly’s divorce from Mary, he married Rachael in July 
1994.  Kelly and Rachael filed for divorce in May 2012, and the two disputed their contributions 
to the fishing business.  Supposedly, Kelly fished and maintained the vessel, while Rachael ran 
errands for the business, cleaned the boat, and engaged in bookkeeping for almost 20 years.  The 
superior court found that the IFQs were all acquired through work performed before Kelly married 
Rachael, so they constituted separate property when Kelly entered into the marriage.  However, 
considering that Kelly made payments for the IFQs to his ex-wife Mary using marital income from 
the business and sold several IFQs to pay for his marital home with Rachael, the superior court 
found that after the marriage Kelly and Rachael had together transmuted the IFQs into marital 
property by exhibiting “intent” to treat them as such.  Kelly appealed challenging both the superior 
court’s finding of facts and its application of law on this issue.  The Supreme Court of Alaska 
found that the payments to Marry and toward the marital home were irrelevant and held that only 
the owning spouse’s intent is relevant to determining whether a transmutation has occurred through 
an implied inter-spousal gift.  The Court explained that in order to consider the non-owning 
spouse’s intent, “the non-owning spouse’s participating must be significant and evidence an intent 
to operate jointly.”  The court concluded that though the superior court found that Rachael had 
such an intent, and had made a “significant” contribution, the court failed to analyze whether Kelly, 
the separate owner, had such an intent to operate the business jointly.  Reversing and remanding 
for reconsideration of the issue, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that in order to determine 
whether separate property may “transmute” into marital property through an implied inter-spousal 
gift, the court must determine whether the owning spouse intended “to donate or convey separate 
property to the marital unit or marital estate.” 
 
Dara S. v. State 
In Dara S. v. State,94 the supreme court held that a court may set aside a termination of parental 
rights order where there is clear and convincing evidence both that the parent is sufficiently 
rehabilitated and that the parent is capable of providing the care and guidance that wills serve the 
moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the child.  Paxton, son of Dara S., was born with 
serious kidney problems requiring extensive medical care.  Shortly after her son’s birth, Dara 
sought mental health counseling for depression, and was subsequently diagnosed with various 
mental health disorders requiring medication.  The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed for 
emergency custody of Paxton after Dara was hospitalized for a possible suicide attempt and later 
diagnosed with psychosis brought on by her medications.  Over the next couple of years, Dara 
underwent treatment and worked toward regaining custody of Paxton.  Two and a half years after 
the emergency removal, OCS’s petition to terminate Dara’s parental rights was granted.  After the 
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oral termination decision but prior to the written termination order, Dara moved for a review 
hearing.  Following the review hearing, the judge reinstated Dara’s parental rights, which OSC 
appealed.  The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s termination order, holding that the 
lower court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, and that all the necessary findings required for 
the termination of parental rights were made.  The court then affirmed the validity of relevant 
caselaw, including Rita T. v. State,95 which established a limited opportunity to reinstate parental 
rights post-termination.96  The court concluded that although statutory law was amended since the 
Rita T. decision, the replacement of “review hearings” with “permanency hearings” did not prevent 
parents from applying, with good cause shown, for a hearing regarding disposition orders, as was 
done under the previous law.97  The court rejected the argument that Rita T. hearings do not have 
a statutory basis, holding that such hearings fit within the statutory framework allowing courts to 
stay, grant a new hearing, modify, or set aside any order or judgment entered in a Child In Need 
of Aid matter. Finally, the court determined that in a Rita T. hearing, a parent must show by clear 
and convincing evidence that reinstatement is in the best interests of the child and that the parent 
“is rehabilitated and [] is currently capable of providing the care and guidance that will serve the 
moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the child.”  Concluding that it lacked a sufficient 
record to determine Paxton’s best interests, the court affirmed the initial termination of Dara’s 
parental rights and remanded for further findings holding that that a court may set aside a 
termination of parental rights order where there is clear and convincing evidence both that the 
parent is sufficiently rehabilitated and that the parent is capable of providing the care and guidance 
that wills serve the moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of the child. 
 
Dean S. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Dean S. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services,98 the supreme court held that a superior 
court’s procedurally proper denial of a motion to withdraw consent to adoption will not be 
overturned absent clear error established by a “definite impression” of factual error in the record. 
Dean and Emily S. were investigated by the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) over a seven-
year period for mostly unsubstantiated claims of substance abuse and neglect; OCS took custody 
over their children twice in that period. Ultimately, OCS sought termination of their parental rights, 
and both parents executed valid consents to adoption by Dean’s sister. Dean subsequently moved 
to withdraw his consent, claiming a desire for full custody and arguing that he had worked to 
improve himself as a parent. Applying the best interests of the child standard, the superior court 
denied Dean’s motion, relying on the OCS caseworker’s testimony that the children were thriving 
in Dean’s sister’s custody. The supreme court held that where the record does not show a clear 
factual error by the superior court, the superior court’s decision to deny a motion for withdrawal 
of consent to adoption will not be overturned. The supreme court explained that ten days after 
consent to adoption is given, section 25.23.070 of the Alaska Statutes only allows it to be 
withdrawn if doing so is in the best interest of the child as determined by a hearing including the 
petitioner, the person seeking withdrawal, and the agency placing the child up for adoption. The 
supreme court determined that the record did not give a “definite impression” that the superior 
court’s conclusion was in error as Dean’s testimony could be understood to say that withdrawing 
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consent was in his best interest, not the children’s. Affirming the superior court, the supreme court 
held that a superior court decision to deny a motion to withdraw consent to adoption will not be 
overturned absent clear error established by a “definite impression” of factual error in the record. 
 
Diego K. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Diego K. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services,99 the supreme court held that, when a court 
is making factual findings and legal conclusions in a child in need of aid (CINA) hearing, it is error 
to rely upon substantial information not in evidence. Between March 2014 and April 2016, a series 
of status and removal hearings were held regarding a teenager named Mary, who was an Indian 
child as defined by the Indian Child’s Welfare Act (ICWA). During these hearings, testimony was 
offered regarding Mary’s living conditions, family affairs, school attendance, and behavioral 
issues. Based on this information, the superior court ordered Mary to be removed from her parents’ 
custody. On appeal, the parents argued that it was reversible error for the superior court to consider 
unsworn statements due to the requirements of CINA Rule 3(h) and Alaska Evidence Rule 603. 
The supreme court agreed, reasoning that child custody cases such as Mary’s involve issues of 
fundamental importance which deserve great care. The court further reasoned that the parents’ 
lacked notice and opportunity to be heard, as they were denied the opportunity to object to the 
unsworn statements. Remanding the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that, when 
a court is making factual findings and legal conclusions in a CINA hearing, it is error to rely upon 
substantial information not in evidence. 
 
Dunmore v. Dunmore 
In Dunmore v. Dunmore100, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that while a court cannot lawfully 
divide social security benefits belonging to either spouse, courts have discretion to consider them 
as evidence of the parties’ respective financial positions when equitably dividing marital property. 
Gloria and Richard Dunmore were married in 1975, separated in July 2007, and Richard filed for 
divorce in July of 2015. At the time of the trial to divide their property, Richard was nearly 64 and 
Gloria was 61. Richard received Veterans Administration (VA) disability benefits of $133 per 
month, Social Security disability benefits of $2,081 per month, and a Federal Employees 
Retirement System (FERS) pension of approximately $360 per month. Gloria received $5,762 in 
monthly benefits from the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). The superior court 
equally divided the parties’ pensions and the benefits from the FERS and PERS plans for the dates 
between their marriage and separation. The superior court noted that it had not considered the 
parties’ Social Security and VA benefits in making the equal division because caselaw prohibited 
it from dividing these benefits between the parties. It explained that this result unfairly favored 
Richard and it encouraged Gloria to appeal. The supreme court reversed, reasoning that though 
courts may not offset Social Security benefits with a larger award of marital property, a court may 
consider such benefits as one of several factors relevant to assessing the financial positions of each 
party because such assessment is necessary to making fair allocation of the marital estate. Vacating 
the superior court, and remanding for further consideration, the supreme court held that while a 
court cannot lawfully divide social security benefits belonging to either spouse, courts have 
discretion to consider them as evidence of the parties’ respective financial positions when 
equitably dividing marital property. 
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Edith A. v. Jonah A. 
In Edith A. v. Jonah A.,101 the Supreme Court held that a party is entitled to a hearing on a motion 
to modify legal custody if she has alleged specific facts which, if true, demonstrate a substantial 
change in circumstances.  Jonah and Edith were married in 2006 and had a son.  Jonah filed for 
divorce in 2008, and the two came to an agreement for joint legal custody.  In April 2015 Edith 
filed a motion to modify custody to obtain sole legal and primary physical custody.  The superior 
court denied the motion, though it found the parties were “remarkably unkind” and ordered them 
to minimize contact for the benefit of the child.  In July 2017, Edith filed a second motion once 
again seeking to give herself sole custody. She credibly alleged that the current arrangement was 
unworkable because Jonah failed to cooperate in getting the child to therapy, selecting a school, 
and in ensuring adequate medical care.  The superior court denied the second motion to modify 
custody without a hearing, finding no credible argument that there has been a material change of 
circumstances from the prior hearing.  The supreme court disagreed.  It found that Edith’s 
allegations, if true represented a material change of circumstances.  The court explained that joint 
legal custody is not appropriate if parents are unable to cooperate in a child’s best interest.  
Consequently, the court reasoned that a failure to cooperate can of justify a change in the custody 
arrangement.  The court concluded that Jonah’s alleged unwillingness to cooperate met this 
standard and so a hearing was required.  Reversing and remanding, the Supreme Court held that a 
party is entitled to a hearing on a motion to modify legal custody if she has alleged specific facts 
which, if true, demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances. 
 
Farr v. Little 
In Farr v. Little,102 the Supreme Court held that when a superior court uses its discretion to impute 
income to a parent for child support purposes, it must set forth its factual findings and explanation 
for the imputed income. Little was awarded custody of her and Farr’s children and filed a motion 
for child support. Questions were raised about Farr’s ability to work stemming from an injury 
sustained while serving in the Air Force. However, Farr claimed that he had received several offers 
from Boeing for positions paying six-figure salaries. Little also stated in her affidavit and brought 
up in her closing argument that Farr had been working for free as an HVAC mechanic. The trial 
court found that Farr had the ability to earn $40,000 annually for child support purposes. Little did 
not participate in the appeal, but Farr argues that a lack of evidence exists to support the $40,000 
figure. The supreme court agreed, reasoning that a court’s determination of imputed income must 
be supported by specific findings based on work history, qualifications, and job opportunities, and 
the calculations supporting such finding must also be disclosed. It found no evidence existed of 
Farr’s ability to work as an HVAC mechanic, or his ability to work for Boeing, and it determined 
that the lower court failed to describe how it arrived at the $40,000 estimate. Reversing the lower 
court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that when a superior court uses its discretion to impute 
income to a parent for child support purposes, it must set forth its factual findings and explanation 
for the imputed income. 
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Fletcher v. Fletcher 
In Fletcher v. Fletcher,103 the supreme court held that the trial court’s findings regarding the 
division of marital property should have been sufficient to overcome the presumption of an equal 
distribution of the property, and therefore the equal division was an abuse of the lower court’s 
discretion.  Married since 1990, Linda Fletcher filed for divorce from her husband David in 2014.  
The marital house was purchased in Linda’s name, and the loan was taken out under her name, but 
David had made substantial improvements.  In 2010 David moved out of the house and began 
living out of his truck.  In 2015, he still resided there, though he indicated that he would soon have 
the opportunity to begin living at a friend’s house for $600 per month.  At the time David was 62, 
ten years older than Linda, and in poor health.  He had previously been diagnosed with type II 
diabetes, and subsequently suffered two heart attacks (the first of which required surgery), and 
later a stroke.  David indicated that he would qualify for Medicare in 2017, but until then he would 
have to pay for medical care, and he had had few assets: his social security disability, $1,200 in 
savings, and two small pension accounts.  In contrast, Linda was in better health, employed and 
covered by her employer’s health insurance plan, had $6,000 in savings, and had two retirement 
accounts valued at approximately $87,000 and $178,000.  The superior court considered the 
property division factors under AS 25.24.160(a)(4) and made relevant findings, determining that 
the presumption of an equal division of the property was not overcome.  The court awarded Linda 
the marital home while ordering that she make an equalization payment of approximately $72,000 
to David.  Both parties appealed, the supreme court reversed.  The court explained that in 
determining an equitable division of marital property, the starting presumption is that the most just 
outcome is achieved by an equal division.  However, the court noted that the presumption may be 
overcome if, after considering the Merrill v. Merrill104 factors codified in section 25.24.160(a)(4) 
of the Alaska Statutes, a court finds an unequal division to be more equitable.105  The court 
elaborated that these factors are not exhaustive and that trial courts need not make a finding as to 
each factor.  However, the court concluded that the findings must be sufficient to establish a factual 
basis supporting the trial court’s conclusion.  Analogizing to precedent where the supreme court 
had vacated property divisions due to a court’s failure to consider parties’ health expenses in 
conjunction with their reduced income, the court found that the equities weighed heavily in 
David’s favor consider his age, health, and income disparity.  The court concluded that a small 
post-division payment did not justify the equal division of the marital estate.  Reversing and 
remanding on the issue, the court held that, based on the superior court’s findings, the property 
division was clearly unjust and therefore an abuse of the superior court’s discretion in dividing the 
marital estate. 
 
Fox v. Grace 
In Fox v. Grace,106 the supreme court held that an Alaskan court can modify an out-of-state custody 
order if it determines that the child, the parent, and all persons acting as parents live outside the 
issuing state.  In early 2018, the Graces filed motions in an Oregon court to modify their custody 
arrangement with Fox, the father of their grandchildren, and to hold Fox in contempt for missed 
visitation.  The court did not modify custody, but did add alternative visitation days to make up 
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for those missed.  Fox responded by filing a motion in an Alaskan superior court to modify the 
Oregon court’s visitation order and terminate the Graces’ mandatory visitation rights.  The superior 
court held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction under section 25.30.320 of the Alaska 
Statutes to modify the order unless Oregon released jurisdiction.  Fox appealed.  The supreme 
court held that according to section 25.30.320 of the Alaska Statutes, an Alaska court can modify 
an out-of-state custody order if that court has released its jurisdiction or if neither the child, a 
parent, or a person acting as a parent resides in the state whose courts issued the order.  The court 
explained that a court must consider both sources of jurisdiction under the statute before it finds 
that it lacks it.  It noted that while the superior court correctly recognized that the Oregon court 
had not given up jurisdiction, the superior court had failed to consider section 25.30.320(2).  The 
court continued, concluding that the Oregon court’s finding that the Graces had a child-parent 
relationship with the children was not dispositive as that finding did not make them a person acting 
as a parent under Alaska law.  The supreme court vacated the superior court’s order and remanded 
the case for further consideration, holding that if neither the child, a parent, or someone acting as 
a parent resides in the state whose courts gave a custody order, then an Alaska court may modify 
that state’s custody order.  
 
Geldermann v. Geldermann 
In Geldermann v. Geldermann,107 the supreme court held that a superior court may sua sponte 
modify child support and custody agreements without a formal motion on the matter so long as 
both parties have sufficient opportunity to be heard and actual notice that modification may be at 
issue.  After divorcing in 2011, Darcy and Matthew Geldermann agreed that their son would live 
primarily with Darcey during the school year.  In 2014, in response to a series of behavioral issues, 
both parents agreed to have Matthew, who had since settled in California, temporarily take over 
primary parenting during the school year, though they did not file this agreement with the court.  
In late 2015, the arrangement fell apart, and both filed custody actions—Darcey in Alaska seeking 
to enforce the 2011 agreement and Matthew in California seeking a transfer of jurisdiction and 
codification of the informal 2014 agreement.  The courts conferred and ultimately decided to keep 
jurisdiction in Alaska.  Although Matthew did not file a motion in Alaska to modify the 2011 
agreement, the superior court denied Darcey’s motion and awarded Matthew primary physical 
custody; Darcey appealed.  The supreme court held that the superior court has authority to decide 
both custody issues sua sponte and to retroactively modify child support arrangements after the 
initial filing for modification of custody.  The supreme court explained that as long as a party has 
raised the issue of custody, and both sides are sufficiently informed going in that there is a possible 
custody modification forthcoming, due process requirements are satisfied even if the court initiates 
the modification of custody arrangements on its own.  The supreme court also held that changes 
in child support can be made effective without violating Alaska’s retroactive modification bar any 
time after a petition to modify custody is filed as long as both parties have sufficient notice, 
overruling its previous decision in Millette v. Millette that no change could be dated before an 
actual motion to modify child support.  The supreme court affirmed, holding that a superior court 
may sua sponte modify child support and custody agreements without a formal motion on the 
matter so long as both parties have sufficient opportunity to be heard and actual notice that 
modification may be at issue. 
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Holmes v. Holmes 
In Holmes v. Holmes,108 the supreme court held that a two-week change in custody time by a 
parent, and a change in a parent’s salary and employment status, constitute material changes which 
justify a court’s decision to modify a child support order. Branlund Holmes and Tamara Holmes 
shared custody of their two minor children. The superior court averaged the total amount of time 
that the children spent with each parent for purposes of determining which had primary physical 
custody. Branlund alleged that the superior court had also, in a prior year, allowed him to deduct 
his travel expenses when calculating his income for child support purposes. The superior court 
modified these orders awarding Tamara primary custody based on a  two week change in the 
children’s summer vacation schedule, and denying Branlund the ability to deduct travel expenses 
based on a change in his income and employment status. On appeal, Branlund argued that neither 
of these circumstances constituted a material change sufficient to allow modification to the child 
support order. The supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the diminished time Branlund spent 
with his children as a result of the change in summer vacation was material to his custody 
determination. The supreme court further reasoned that Branlund’s salary decrease and change in 
the fact that he no longer earned money from self-employment were material facts relating to the 
issue of travel expenses and so allowed the court to modify how Branlund’s child support payments 
were calculated. Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that a two-week 
change in custody time by one parent, and a change in a parent’s salary and employment status, 
constitute material changes which justify a court’s decision to modify a child support order. 
 
In re the Adoption of E.H. and J.H. 
In re the Adoption of E.H. and J.H.109 the supreme court held that an adoption decree is voidable 
when based on material misrepresentation.  Two young siblings, Simon and Ellie,110 were removed 
from their parents’ home and placed with a foster family, but maintained a relationship with their 
maternal grandparents.  While Simon and Ellie lived with the foster family, the grandparents and 
foster family often disagreed.  After about two years, the state terminated the children’s parents’ 
parental rights.  Both the foster family and grandparents sought to adopt the children.  The 
grandparents withdrew their request to adopt in exchange for an agreement with the foster family 
that incorporated visitation rights.  Soon after the adoption became official, the foster family 
violated the terms of agreement by refusing to allow the grandparents to see Simon and Ellie.  The 
grandparents moved to reopen the adoption case; following an evidentiary hearing, the superior 
court vacated the adoption.  The foster family appealed.  The foster family argued that enforcement 
of the agreement, rather than vacating the adoption was the grandparents’ only available remedy.  
The supreme court held that a fraudulent or material misrepresentation can be grounds for vacating 
an adoption if the misrepresentation induces the consent of a party necessary to the adoption, or 
causes assent to a settlement agreement incorporated in the adoption decree.  Because the foster 
family did not dispute the fact that they had no intention of abiding by the terms of the settlement, 
the supreme court upheld the superior court’s decision to vacate the adoption.  The court found 
that the foster family’s misrepresentation and their conduct undermining the relationship terms in 
the agreement invalidated the grandparents’ assent.  Affirming the superior court’s decision, the 
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supreme court held that a material misrepresentation used to obtain consent to an adoption, or to a 
settlement agreement incorporated into an adoption decree, is grounds for vacating that adoption. 
 
Jensen D. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Jensen D. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services,111 the supreme court held that it is not 
an abuse of discretion to deny a request for self-representation at a parental custody termination 
trial where the parent is either (1) incapable of presenting allegations in a rational and coherent 
manner, (2) unable to understand what they are giving up by declining counsel, or (3) unwilling to 
conduct herself with a modicum of courtroom decorum.  Jensen D. was the mother of a seven-
year-old child who had been in the custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) since 2016 
as a result of Jensen’s struggles with substance abuse and mental health.  During proceedings 
where OCS petitioned to terminate her parental rights, Jensen requested a different attorney, which 
was denied in part because she seemed to be exhibiting the effects of methamphetamine.  During 
the termination trial, she appeared again to be under the influence of methamphetamine and was 
denied a request to represent herself after she claimed her lawyer was not doing an effective enough 
job.  The superior court ultimately terminated her parental rights, and Jensen appealed the denial 
of her request to represent herself.  The supreme court held that although self-representation is an 
established right, it is not absolute, and the superior court does not abuse its discretion in denying 
a parent’s request for self-representation at a termination trial where the parent does not satisfy all 
parts of the three-pronged test.  Based on Jensen’s suspected drug abuse during the proceedings 
and her inability to remain quiet during other witnesses’ testimony the Court determined that it 
was not an abuse of discretion for the superior court to find Jensen had violated the third prong of 
the test.  The supreme court affirmed, holding that it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a request 
for self-representation at a termination trial where the parent is either (1) incapable of presenting 
allegations in a rational and coherent manner, (2) unable to understand what they are giving up by 
declining counsel, or (3) unwilling to conduct herself with a modicum of courtroom decorum. 
 
Kailyn S. v. Alaska Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Kailyn S. v Alaska Dep’t of Health & Social Services,112 the supreme court held that it is not an 
abuse of discretion to deny a motion for a continuance in a termination of parental rights hearing 
when the motion is only supported by a speculative assertion that it is necessary.  Kailyn, a mother, 
filed for a continuance five days before her termination of parental rights hearing in a Child in 
Need of Aid (CINA) case. Kailyn argued that the continuance was necessary because she had been 
offered a job on a fishing vessel that was scheduled to leave immediately, and because she needed 
more time to speak with her attorney, so the attorney could provide effective assistance. The 
superior court denied her motion, and at the subsequent hearing terminated Kailyn’s parental rights 
for two of her children. Kailyn appealed arguing the superior court had abused its discretion.  On 
appeal, the supreme court emphasized the broad discretion exercised by the superior court when 
granting or denying a continuance. It noted that Kailyn failed to explain how she would receive 
more effective legal assistance should the continuance have been granted, that her motion was not 
supported by evidence, and that she had not proposed a definite length for the continuance. The 
supreme court explained that a court’s decision to deny a continuance is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, and that because CINA cases are time-sensitive it was reasonable for the superior court 
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to prioritize the children’s interest in permanency over granting a request for a continuance 
supported only by speculation. Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held denying a 
motion for a continuance in a termination of parental rights hearing is not an abuse of discretion 
when the motion is only supported by a speculative assertion that it is necessary for effective legal 
assistance. 
 
Kessler v. Kessler 
In Kessler v. Kessler,113 the supreme court held the mere use of separate property for marital 
purposes, without a donative intent, does not transform separate property into marital property. In 
2010, Kenneth Kessler and Dianna Kessler were married; Dianna filed for divorce in 2015. Prior 
to their marriage, in 1999, Kenneth bought a condominium. The couple began living in it in 2000 
and continued living there for the majority of their marriage. During the divorce proceeding, the 
superior court found that the condominium, which was originally Kenneth’s separate property, had 
transmuted into marital property. That court reasoned that a change from separate property 
(property acquired before the marriage) to marital property (property acquired during the marriage) 
had occurred because the couple used the condominium as their marital home, Dianna contributed 
to the management and maintenance of the property, and Kenneth would not have been able to 
afford the condominium without Dianna’s financial contributions in other areas of their marriage. 
The supreme court reversed the superior court’s decision, reasoning a donative intent must be 
present for property brought into a marriage as separate property to change into marital property. 
In the supreme court’s view, Kenneth never demonstrated that he desired to treat the condominium 
as marital property, as Kenneth and Dianna did not both maintain and manage the property, 
Kenneth was the sole title-holder of the property, and he did not present the property as a gift to 
Dianna. Reversing the lower courts decision, the supreme court held the mere use of separate 
property for marital purposes, without a donative intent, does not transform separate property into 
marital property. 
 
Laura B. v. Wade B. 
In Laura B. v. Wade B.,114 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that substantially modifying a custody 
agreement without holding a hearing to address the child’s best interests violates procedural due 
process.  Laura and Wade share legal custody and physical custody of their 17-year-old daughter.  
In April of 2017, Wade moved for full custody.  After an initial hearing, the superior court 
determined that there had been a substantial change in circumstances from the initial agreement, 
but it left the issue of the child’s best interests and the ultimate custody disposition unresolved, 
instead directing further investigation.  After the investigation, but without further hearing, the 
superior court granted Wade’s motion.  Laura appealed arguing that her due process rights were 
violated by the failure to hold a second hearing.  The supreme court overturned the custody 
modification, explaining that a further hearing was required to comply with procedural due 
process.  The court stated that when making a material and substantial modification to a custody 
agreement due process requires a hearing to make a findings on two issues.  First, whether a 
substantial change in circumstances has taken place since the initial agreement; and second, if so, 
whether modification is in the best interests of the child.  The court concluded that Laura was 
denied due process because the initial hearing only determined that there was a substantial change 
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in circumstances.  It elaborated that at such a hearing she could have presented evidence that 
despite the change in circumstances it was in their daughters’ best interest that Laura retain 
custody, and Laura could have also rebutted the findings of the investigation.  Thus, the supreme 
court vacated and remanded the superior court’s decision, holding that in order to comport with 
the Alaska Constitution’s procedural due process requirements, a hearing that substantially 
modifies a custody agreement must address both whether a substantial change in circumstances 
has taken place and whether an alteration is in the best interests of the child. 
 
Maxwell v. Sosnowski 
In Maxwell v. Sosnowski,115 the supreme court held that a court may only award credit for post-
separation mortgage payments for those payments made after the date of separation. Jill Maxwell 
and William Sosnowski permanently separated on May 31, 2013, and were later divorced. During 
their marriage, they had purchased a triplex in Anchorage together. Sosnowski sought credit for 
$134,041.02 in mortgage payments that he had made from October 2011 to April 2016. The 
superior court granted Sosnowski this credit in a disbursement order. On appeal, Maxwell argued 
that the disbursement order was inconsistent with the superior court’s finding that she and 
Sosnowski had separated on May 31, 2013. The supreme court agreed, reasoning that the 
separation date was not contested, and that Alaskan case law only allows for credits to be granted 
for payments made from post-separation income. It explained that any payments made before the 
legal separation were made with marital funds and so could not be credited. Vacating the 
disbursement order, the supreme court held that a court may only award credit for post-separation 
mortgage payments for those payments made after the date of separation. 
 
Mengisteab v. Oates 
In Mengisteab v. Oates,116 the supreme court held that, in deciding child custody when a parent 
decides to physically relocate, a court must consider the effect the move may have on stability and 
continuity in a child’s life.  Mengisteab and Oates were the separated mother and father of a young 
child.  Mengisteab had primary custody of the child, and Oates had visitation rights.  Both parents 
resided in Alaska until Mengisteab abruptly relocated to Washington without informing the court 
or Oates.  The lower court found that Mengisteab’s motivation for moving was to make visitation 
more difficult, and it ordered that the child be returned to Alaska or Mengisteab would lose primary 
custody.  On appeal, Mengisteab argued that the lower court failed to consider the potential 
consequences to the child from separation should Mengisteab choose to remain in Washington.  
The supreme court agreed, reasoning that in the parent relocation context a lower court must 
explicitly discuss whether it would be in the best interest of the child to go with the moving parent 
or stay with the remaining parent.  Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held 
that, in deciding child custody when a parent decides to physically relocate, a court must consider 
the effect the move may have on stability and continuity in a child’s life.  
 
Michael W. v. Brown 
In Michael W. v. Brown,117 the supreme court held that that while section 13.26.132 of the Alaska 
statutes allows for parental rights to be “suspended by circumstances,” that phrase focuses on 
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parents’ ability to assume the responsibilities of parenthood, that custody will be harmful to a 
child’s welfare for other reasons is not alone enough to terminate custodial rights.  Following his 
mother’s admittance to an alcohol rehabilitation center, the twelve-year-old son of separated 
parents stayed with his grandparents in Alaska.  Six months later, when the grandparents sought 
appointment as the child’s guardians pursuant to section 13.26.132 of the Alaska Statutes, the 
boy’s father, who lived in New York, opposed the grandparents’ petition.  The father appealed the 
superior court’s ruling that the son’s best interests weigh in favor of him staying with his 
grandparents in Alaska.  On appeal, the grandparents argued that it would be emotionally and 
psychologically devasting for the son to leave his caretaker grandparents in Alaska to move to his 
father in New York.  Vacating the lower court’s order, the supreme court found that the father did 
not lose his custodial rights solely because the son might be better off with different guardians.  
Following the rationales of another state supreme court with an identical guardianship statute, the 
court reasoned that parental rights of custody can be suspended by circumstances when their 
conduct – broadly: abandonment, unfitness, or consent to guardianship by another – deprives them 
of their rights and responsibilities as parents.  Because the grandparents had not proved the father’s 
unfitness or abandonment of the son in the lower court, they had not overcome the biological-
parent preference for custody rights.  Vacating the lower court’s order, the supreme court held that 
while section 13.26.132 of the Alaska statutes allows for parental rights to be “suspended by 
circumstances,” that phrase focuses on parents’ ability to assume the responsibilities of 
parenthood, that custody will be harmful to a child’s welfare for other reasons is not alone enough 
to terminate custodial rights. 
 
 
Miller v. Fowler 
In Miller v. Fowler,118 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that summary judgment will rarely be 
proper when the discovery rule is used to determine the accrual date of a statute of limitations as 
determining that date is a fact intensive analysis.  In September 2009, Miller purchased an 
apartment building from Fowler with a promissory note.  Miller was on notice that the building 
had sewer line problems, but had been told that current problems were only caused by tenant 
misuse as underlying issues had been fixed.  Despite this, the sewer continued to back-up, and in 
2012 Miller learned the line hade structural problems that needed correction.  Fowler agreed to 
three separate modifications of the note to help finance the repairs, the third of which allowed 
Miller to defer on payments until June 2013 and to deduct $80,000 from the balance upon 
completion of repairs.  However, in February 2013, Fowler declared all modifications of the note 
“null and void,” and in May began foreclosure proceedings.  When Miller sued to stop the 
foreclosure, enforce the agreed upon modifications, and for damages, Fowler moved for summary 
judgment.  The trial court granted Fowler’s motion, concluding that Miller’s claims were barred 
by the two-year statute of limitations as Miller’s claims were based on misrepresentations from 
four years beforehand.  The supreme court reversed.  The court explained that under the discovery 
rule, the accrual date (the time at which the statute of limitation’s begins to run) for a claimant 
occurs  when that person has enough information to recognize a potential claim thereby prompting 
them to begin an inquiry; the claimant does not need to possess enough information to establish 
each of the elements of this potential claim.  The court continued that while this date can be 
resolved as a question of law, it is typically an intensive question of fact.  And the court further 
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noted that Fowler, as the movant, had the burden to show that no question of fact existed as to 
when the statute of limitations began to run.  From this the court reasoned that because Fowler 
simply assumed the accrual date was the date of purchase, and offered no evidence on that point, 
Fowler had failed to meet this burden.  Reversing the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court 
of Alaska held that summary judgment will rarely be proper when the discovery rule is used to 
determine the accrual date of a statute of limitations as determining that date is a fact intensive 
analysis. 
 
Moore v. McGillis 
In Moore v. McGillis, 119 the supreme court held the following: (1) a “substantial” change in a 
custodial parent’s circumstances, which affects a child’s welfare, is necessary to warrant a 
modification of child custody; (2) the intervention of a child’s biological parent constitutes a 
change in circumstances that requires a trial court to reconsider the child’s best interest for custody 
purposes; and (3) an individual’s child support obligation is not relinquished merely because a 
child’s biological father or mother has intervened. In 2006, Moore and McGillis were married in 
Ketchikan, Alaska. Prior to this marriage, Moore had a son from a previous relationship. The son’s 
biological father had been absent since the son’s birth. In 2007, Moore and McGillis had another 
child, a daughter. After several years of marriage, Moore and McGillis decided to get a divorce.  
During the divorce proceedings, the court awarded Moore and McGillis shared legal custody of 
both children. McGillis received primary custody of their daughter and Moore received primary 
custody of her son (McGillis’s stepson). In 2013, Moore filed a motion to modify custody and 
child support, asking for primary custody of their daughter and sole custody of her son. As a basis 
for this modification request, Moore asserted that McGillis’s “chaotic” living environment and the 
intervention of her son’s biological father constituted a changed circumstance warranting a 
modification. The trial court denied Moore’s motion and terminated McGillis’s obligation to pay 
child support for his stepson. In regards to the daughter, the supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, finding that the changes in McGillis’s circumstances were not “substantial” and 
insufficient to warrant a modification of custody. In regard to McGillis’s stepson, the supreme 
court reversed and remanded the lower courts decision, holding that the intervention of a 
previously absent biological parent is a changed circumstance that requires the court to reassess 
the child’s best interest and determine custody in light of the change. Furthermore, the supreme 
court found McGillis had an obligation to pay child support for his stepson, as McGillis still had 
legal custody of the child. Affirming in part, reversing in part and remanding, the supreme court 
held: (1) a “substantial” change in a custodial parent’s circumstances is required to warrant a 
modification of child custody; (2) the intervention of a child’s biological parent constitutes a 
changed circumstance that requires a trial court to reconsider the child’s best interest for custody 
purposes; and (3) an individual’s child support obligation is not relinquished merely because a 
child’s biological parent has intervened. 
 
Ruerup v. Ruerup 
In Ruerup v. Ruerup,120 the supreme court held that while the superior court may modify or 
dissolve a long-term protective order, it may not modify the factual findings on which the order is 
based. In January 2015, Crystal Ruerup sought a protective order against her husband, Charles, 
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alleging numerous incidents of domestic violence between 2007 and 2015. The magistrate judge 
heard testimony from numerous friends and family members from both sides and ultimately issued 
a long-term protective order after finding that, by a preponderance of the evidence, Charles had 
committed three acts of domestic violence against Crystal. Charles filed for divorce in 2015, and, 
when Crystal attempted to use Charles’ history of domestic violence to disfavor his ability to gain 
custody of their oldest child, the superior court determined that it was not bound by the magistrate’s 
findings on domestic violence. After hearing evidence from only the Ruerups, a friend of Crystal’s, 
and Charles’s mother, the court rejected all of Crystal’s allegations while still affirming the 
protective order (and uncontroversially amending it to allow Charles to take their son to school). 
The supreme court held that parties should be able to easily modify a protective order to reflect 
changed circumstances without carrying the risk that the underlying factual findings of domestic 
violence will be relitigated. The supreme court reasoned that the statutory structure allows for 
courts to issue subsequent orders modifying implementation provisions but leaving factual 
considerations untouched. The supreme court vacated the superior court order, holding that while 
the superior court may modify or dissolve a long-term protective order, it may not modify the 
factual findings on which the order is based. 
 
Solomon v. Solomon 
In Solomon v. Solomon121, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a trial court must make sufficient 
factual findings to allow review of its legal conclusion an individual has a history of domestic 
violence. Terrace and Wendy Solomon married in 1999 and had four children; the two separated 
in 2014, and in January 2015 Wendy filed for divorce. Terrace’s attorney had continuous difficulty 
getting in touch with his client because Terrace had been arrested and was being held by the army. 
As Terrace could not be contacted on the day of the trial Wendy was the only witness; she testified 
to violent acts Terrace allegedly committed. The parties agreed Wendy should have sole physical 
custody but disagreed on whether she should have sole legal custody. Though the superior court 
did not specify the particular facts supporting its determination, it concluded that Terrace had a 
history of domestic violence based on Wendy’s description of multiple incidents of low-level 
domestic violence.  This conclusion triggered a presumption that Terrace could not have any form 
of custody of the children that could only be rebutted if he complied with the mandates of section 
25.24.150(h) of the Alaska Statutes. On this basis the court awarded sole legal custody to Wendy. 
Terrace appealed arguing the superior court had made insufficient findings to support its 
conclusion. The Supreme Court of Alaska agreed and held a “superior court must make its findings 
with sufficient specificity” to allow a higher court to “review both the grounds for its decision and 
its application of the law to the facts.” The supreme court reasoned that for proper review of the 
trial court’s decision the record needed enough specificity for the supreme court to determine 
whether Wendy’s testimony established the elements of a domestic violence crime. The supreme 
court concluded the record was insufficient as it only said Terrace “went far beyond the minimum 
threshold of two” crimes. Vacating and remanding for further findings, the supreme court held that 
a trial court must make sufficient findings to allow an appellate court to review its determination 
that an individual has a history of domestic violence 
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State Dep’t of Health & Social Services v. Michelle P. 
In State Dep’t of Health & Social Services v. Michelle P.,122 the supreme court held that a court’s 
authority to hear and decide a Child in Need of Aid (CINA) petition derives not from a grant of 
custody or supervision to the Office of Children Services (OCS) but from the child’s status as a 
child in need of aid. In October 2014, OCS took emergency custody of a six-month old Native 
child, Natalie, and filed an emergency CINA petition. After an adjudication hearing in March 
2015, her parents stipulated in a disposition order that she was child was in need of aid due to 
neglect, that OCS would retain custody of her until her mother completed substance abuse 
treatment (her father was incarcerated), and that OCS would retain supervision for one year. OCS 
eventually returned Natalie to her parents, but one month later filed a motion for removal due to 
her mother’s relapse and her father’s arrest. No party responded to OCS’s motion, which was 
supported by an affidavit from a social worker. And on that basis the lower court authorized 
removal by OCS. In March 2016, OCS petitioned to extend its custody of Natalie for another year. 
Her father filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the disposition order had expired before OCS 
petitioned for extended custody. The superior court eventually granted his motion and dismissed. 
OCS appealed, and the father cross-appealed arguing that the superior court lacked jurisdiction 
once the disposition order expired. The supreme court held that a court’s authority in CINA 
proceedings derives from the child’s status as a child in need of aid rather than from the existence 
of a disposition order. It reasoned that a different interpretation would add a jurisdictional limit 
not present in the statutory text and would inconsistently require the courts ignore children’s best 
interests. The supreme court found that the superior court erred when it granted removal based on 
OCS’s unopposed motion and evidence to support such findings because the supporting affidavit 
did not include information about the social worker’s expertise or findings that Natalie’s return 
would result in serious emotional or physical damage. Thus, holding that a court’s authority to 
hear a CINA petition derives from a child’s status as a child in need of aid rather than from a grant 
of custody to OCS, the supreme court vacated the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and it also 
vacated the removal order, remanding to determine whether OCS has grounds for custody and 
whether removal is necessary. 
 
Tomal v. Anderson 
In Tomal v. Anderson,123 the supreme court held that in distributing property acquired during a 
domestic partnership courts must (1) determine when the partnership began and ended; (2) classify 
the property of that period as partnership or separate property (first according to statute or contract, 
and then by the partners’ intent); (3) determine partnership property’s market value; and (4) 
distribute the partnership property without reference to equity utilizing equalization payments if 
necessary.  In 1999, Tomal bought beachfront land where he and his domestic partner Anderson 
restored a cabin to serve as their home with Anderson’s float house docked on the beach.  Tomal 
and Anderson each deposited their earnings into a joint account which Anderson used to pay joint 
expenses until July 2011, when Tomal discovered Anderson’s money had been transferred into 
her personal account and he retaliated in kind.  In 2012, Anderson informed Tomal she would not 
sleep in the same house as him in.  For several years thereafter, she slept in the float house 
whenever Tomal was on the property until winter difficulties forced her moved back into the cabin.  
Despite this they rarely interacted, and they continued to take care of most necessities individually, 
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though Tomal continued to pay for the property while Anderson managed its upkeep.  In 2016, 
Tomal sued Anderson for misappropriation of his funds and a share of the property expenses.  
Anderson counterclaimed for a domestic partnership property division.  The superior court found 
Tomal had no valid misappropriation claims, that Anderson’s property maintenance was 
equivalent to Tomal’s expenses, and that the parties had been in a domestic partnership until 2012 
which required an equal division of property obtained prior to that point.  The court concluded 
Tomal’s pension, the property, and Anderson’s truck were partnership property and it accordingly 
distributed them using equalization payments.  Both Tomal and Anderson appealed.  The supreme 
court affirmed in part and remanded in part, concluding the superior court made minor errors.  
Specifically, the supreme court confirmed that a court may find a domestic partnership has 
terminated when partners take effective steps to cease cohabitation despite continuing to reside 
within the same piece of property as cotenants.  The court largely affirmed the superior court’s 
findings as to the classification of property, but determined that Anderson’s truck could not be 
partnership property, as Anderson acquired it after the partnership had terminated.  Similarly, the 
court largely affirmed the lower court’s valuation of the property, though it corrected the valuation 
of an excavator where the lower court had improperly ignored the only evidence of fair market 
value.   Finally, the court affirmed that requiring Tomal to make an equalization payment to 
Anderson for her share of Tomal’s pension was proper method of distributing the property as 
Tomal was left discretion on how to make the payment.  Ultimately, affirming in part and 
remanding in part, the supreme court held that in distributing property acquired during a domestic 
partnership courts must (1) determine when the partnership began and ended; (2) classify the 
property of that period as partnership or separate property (first according to statute or contract, 
and then by the partners’ intent); (3) determine partnership property’s market value; and (4) 
distribute the partnership property without reference to equity utilizing equalization payments if 
necessary.   
 
Vince B. v. Sarah B. 
In Vince B. v. Sarah B.,124 the supreme court held that the denial of an earlier petition for a 
protective order does not necessarily bar a court from considering the same conduct in deciding a 
later petition.  In September 2016, Vince and Sarah divorced and began sharing custody of their 
two sons.  They had separated 2 and ½ years before, and in April of that year Sarah had filed for a 
domestic violence protective order against Vince, testifying that he punched her boyfriend, made 
offensive hand gestures at her and on several occasions made crude comments to both of them.  In 
response, Vince asserted that Sarah was exaggerating and expressed worry that Sarah’s boyfriend 
was a dangerous influence on his children.  The superior court believed Sarah’s version of events 
but denied her petition concluding that Vince’s conduct did not yet rise to the level of harassment, 
assault or stalking.  However, the court put Vince on notice that another wrong move could make 
Sarah eligible for a domestic violence order.  In late December 2016, Sarah submitted another 
petition for a protective order alleging that since April Vince had continued to harass her by text, 
email, and phone and on one occasion that he had followed her to her boyfriend’s house causing 
her to fear that violence would reoccur.  Ultimately, the superior court found stalking in the second 
degree and granted the domestic violence protective order.  On appeal, Vince asserted that the trial 
court violated the doctrine of res judicata by considering accusations raised in the first petition 
when deciding on the second petition.  The supreme court rejected his argument, affirming the 
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superior court’s decision.  The court explained that the superior court’s order was based on a 
finding of stalking, and that the statutory definition of stalking entails a course of conduct.  The 
court elaborated that determining whether a course of conduct exists necessitates examining past 
conduct.  Reasoning from this the supreme court concluded that in deciding whether a course of 
conduct exists res judicata does not prohibit reconsideration of prior conduct when this occurs in 
conjunction with consideration of new conduct.  Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme 
court held that the denial of an earlier petition for a protective order does not necessarily bar a 
court from considering the same conduct in deciding a later petition. 
 
Wiegers v. Richards-Wiegers 
In Wiegers v. Richards-Wiegers,125 the supreme court reviewed the lower court’s division of a 
marital estate and held that a court can rely on an expert witness’s valuation method when 
recognized as valid and adequately supported by the expert’s testimony. Additionally, the court 
held that retirement health benefits vested before marriage can be marital assets if they continue 
to be funded during the marriage. Amy and Charles married in 1987, separated in 2014, and 
finalized their divorce in 2016. During their marriage, Charles obtained shares in his company that 
the company valued at $179 per share. Amy, who’s retirement benefits with the Alaska Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) had vested in 1985, continued to work, accruing 11.7 
years of her 18.7 years of PERS service during the marriage. The superior court rejected the $179 
valuation of Charles’ shares, adopting Amy’s expert’s method of valuation which put them at 
$217, and it found that Amy’s retirement benefits were premarital assets as they had vested before 
the marriage. Charles appealed, arguing that the court relied on unsupported expert testimony to 
reach the valuation and that it incorrectly applied Sparks v. Sparks to determine whether Amy’s 
retirement benefits were marital assets. As to the valuation method, the supreme court ruled it was 
not clear error for the superior court to make findings using Amy’s expert’s valuation method 
because the expert’s testimony provided an adequate basis for the court’s valuation finding, and 
because the expert used a recognized valuation method. As to Amy’s PERS retirement health 
benefits, the supreme court explained that some portion of Amy’s retirement benefits were marital 
property. It explained that the superior court should have applied Engstrom v. Engstrom which 
held that when retirement benefits have vested before a marriage, the portion constituting marital 
property is equal to the fraction of the years a spouse contributed to funding the benefits during 
the marriage divided by the total years worked.126 Holding that retirement benefits vested prior to 
marriage but funded after it may be marital property, and that a court may rely on a recognized 
valuation method sufficiently supported by expert testimony, the supreme court reversed the 
characterization of Amy’s PERS benefits as non-marital, affirmed the valuation of Charles’s 
shares, and remanded for valuation of Amy’s PERS benefits. 
 
Wyman v. Whitson 
In Wyman v. Whitson,127 the supreme court held that because fishing permits and quota shares are 
perpetual intangible assets with an indefinite useful life, an amortization of those assets is not 
deductible from income for child support purposes. Wyman, a self-employed commercial 
fisherman, owned several fishing permits and individual fishing quota shares as part of his 
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business. Each year, Wyman made a deduction on his federal income tax return for amortization 
of those intangible assets. Wyman argued that those deductions should also apply to his income 
for purposes of calculating child support, as they reflected ordinary and necessary expenses 
required to produce income and were no different than depreciation deductions allowed under 
Eagley v. Eagley. The supreme court disagreed, explaining that deductions are not automatically 
permitted for child support purposes merely because they are allowed by the IRS. The court 
explained that in Eagley and other cases, the court had permitted depreciation deductions from 
income for child support purposes so long as the deduction in question was demonstrated to reflect 
an ordinary and necessary business expense. It explained that in Eagley the supreme court focused 
on the depreciation of buildings, fixtures, and other improvements in a restaurant, which were 
considered equivalent to other business equipment. The supreme court elaborated that depreciation 
expenses are deductible because the depreciation itself represents a real, tangible, and necessary 
cost.  While Wyman’s fishing permits and quota shares were capital assets necessary to produce 
income, they were perpetual intangible assets. They did not expire or wear out and required no 
capital to preserve. Thus, the supreme court affirmed and held that because fishing permits and 
quota shares are perpetual intangible assets with an indefinite useful life, amortization of those 
assets is not deductible from income for child support purposes. 
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HEALTH LAW 
 
Alaska Ass’n. of Naturopathic Physicians v. State Dep’t of Commerce 
In Alaska Ass’n. of Naturopathic Physicians v. State Dep’t of Commerce,128 the supreme court held 
that new regulations prohibiting naturopathic physicians from using or prescribing all prescription 
medicines are consistent with the enabling statute. Alaska established a statutory licensing 
structure for naturopathy129 in 1986, and conferred regulatory authority to the Department of 
Commerce in 1992.130 In 2012, the Department amended its regulatory definitions, so that the 
definition of prescription drugs was expanded to include all prescription medicine and it explicitly 
excluded prescription drugs from the regulatory definitions of dietetics, herbal medicines, and 
homeopathic remedies. The effect was to prevent naturopaths from using or prescribing any 
prescription medicines, including injectable vitamins and minerals and herbal or homeopathic 
remedies. In 2014, the Alaska Association of Naturopathic Physicians sought declaratory judgment 
that the amended regulations were invalid to the extent that they conflicted with the enabling 
statute. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. On appeal, the 
Association argued that the new regulatory definitions were inconsistent with the definitions of 
and restrictions on naturopathy in the enabling statute; in particular it argued the statute merely 
prohibits naturopaths from using prescription drugs as opposed to all prescription medicine. The 
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the statutory text and structure 
do not point to a broad conferral of prescribing power upon naturopathic physicians, especially 
when compared to other regulated health professions. The court also found that the statute’s 
drafting process winnowed away at naturopaths’ prescribing power, further suggesting that the 
statute did not convey any prescribing authority to naturopaths. Affirming the lower court’s 
summary judgment in favor of the Department, the supreme court held that new regulations 
prohibiting naturopathic physicians from using or prescribing all prescription medicines are 
consistent with the enabling statute. 
 
Harrold-Jones v. Drury 
In Harrold-Jones v. Drury,131 the supreme court held that a defendant may only make ex parte 
contact with a plaintiff’s treating physicians with the plaintiff’s consent or a court order, the latter 
of which is to be issued only in extraordinary circumstances.  In 2014, Harrold-Jones received 
treatment for a fractured clavicle from Dr. Drury and Dr. Pace at Denali Orthopedic Surgery.  After 
transferring to a new facility and a third doctor, Harrold-Jones sent a draft malpractice complaint 
against Drury and Pace to Denali; despite several requests by Denali’s counsel that she authorize 
the release of her medical records, Harrold-Jones repeatedly refused. When Harrold-Jones sought 
a protective order to prevent Denali’s counsel from having ex parte contact with her new physician 
the superior court denied her request and authorized such contact on the basis of Langdon v. 
Champion.  The supreme court held that although the federal Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) does not preempt Alaska’s law allowing ex parte contact, it 
was time to overrule Langdon as HIPAA represented changes in the culture of medical privacy 
that made Langdon obsolete. The court explained that Langdon allowed ex parte contact because 
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at the time filing a medical malpractice suit waived physician-patient privilege.  This meant that 
ex parte contact facilitated cost-effective discovery without infringing on expectations of privacy.  
Contrasting Langdon with HIPAA, the court noted that HIPAA represented a shift in cultural and 
legal barriers to discovery in a medical malpractice suits.  The court explained that HIPAA’s 
restrictions make lawful ex parte contact effectively identical to court-ordered discovery and 
supervision, and that this is a cumbersome process at odds with HIPAA’s court order-based 
discovery rules. On this basis, the supreme court reasoned that it would be more in line with current 
views on medical privacy to limit medical discovery methods to formal procedures.  Reversing 
and remanding for further proceedings, the supreme court held that a defendant may only contact 
a plaintiff’s treating physicians after getting either the plaintiff’s permission or a court order, the 
latter of which is to be issued only in extraordinary conditions. 
 
In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M. 
In the In re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Darren M.,132 the supreme court held that, under 
section 47.40.655 of the Alaska Statutes, to involuntarily commit someone who is gravely disabled 
by mental illness but not a danger to others, the state must show that commitment provides a 
reasonable possibility of improvement by clear and convincing evidence.  Darren M. was 
involuntarily committed to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) after a mental health evaluation 
prompted by his family’s concerns about his mental health and safety.  Darren suffers from 
Korsakoff syndrome133 and bipolar disorder.134  API sought to extend Darren’s commitment for 
ninety days on the grounds that he was gravely disabled because of his mental illness.  The superior 
court granted API’s request and Darren appealed.  Among other issues, Darren claimed that the 
superior court failed to find sufficient evidence that his commitment “would: improve with 
treatment as it only required the state to prove that he “could” improve.  Darren contended that 
this lesser standard violated the governing statute.  The supreme court disagreed.  It noted that the 
statute’s language only required the state allege a “reasonable expectation” of improvement with 
an implicit requirement that the state actually prove its allegations.  The court reasoned that 
statutory language did not compel either standard.  Ultimately, the court determined that requiring 
the state to prove a person “will” improve from commitment is too high burden, so the court held 
that the “reasonable expectation” requirement only means the state must prove a “reasonable 
possibility” of improvement before commitment.  Additionally, noting the importance of the 
liberty interest in question and the severity of involuntary commitment, the court required the state 
to meet this burden through clear and convincing evidence.  Applying this standard to the case at 
hand, the court found that the state’s expert’s testimony met the burden.  Affirming the superior 
court’s commitment order, the supreme court held that, under section 47.40.655 of the Alaska 
Statutes, to involuntarily commit someone who is gravely disabled by mental illness but not a 
danger to others, the state must show that commitment provides a reasonable possibility of 
improvement by clear and convincing evidence. 
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In re the Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M. 
In In re the Necessity for the Hospitalization of Paige M.,135 the supreme court held that a court 
must conduct a post-petition screening investigation, or appoint a mental health professional to 
conduct one, before granting a petition for involuntary hospitalization under section 47.30.700 of 
the Alaska Statutes.  A psychologist at a mental health clinic petitioned to have a patient 
involuntarily hospitalized.  The superior court held a hearing on the petition at which only the 
psychologist gave substantive testimony.  The court granted the petition, and the patient was 
hospitalized.  The patient appealed, arguing that the trial court violated section 47.30.700 of the 
Alaska Statutes by not ensuring that a full screening investigation was conducted before it issued 
the order for her involuntary hospitalization.  The supreme court agreed, explaining that three key 
events must occur before an individual may be involuntary hospitalized: first, an adult must 
petition a superior court for the respondent’s involuntary hospitalization; second, a judge or mental 
health professional must conduct a screening investigation to evaluate the allegations in the 
petition; third, the court must find probable cause that the respondent is mentally ill and that this 
mental illness causes the respondent to be gravely disabled or to present a likelihood of serious 
harm to self or others.  Finally, the court explained that the required screening investigation should 
take place after a petition has been filed, and the screening investigation should, if possible, include 
an interview with the respondent.  Thus, the supreme court concluded that the superior court 
violated section 47.30.700 of the Alaska Statutes by not conducting a post-petition interview with 
the respondent or attempting to determine whether one would be reasonably possible.  Reversing, 
the supreme held that a court must conduct a post-petition screening investigation, or appoint a 
mental health professional to conduct one, before granting a petition for involuntary 
hospitalization. 
 
Kiva O. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Kiva O. v. State Dep’t of Health & Social Services,136 the supreme court held that the standard 
of Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute137 governs whether the Office of Children’s Services 
(OCS) may medicate a child against a parent’s wishes.138 The mother of a ten-year-old child in 
OCS custody refused to allow her son to be medicated by a psychiatrist to treat his behavioral 
problems and depressive symptoms. OCS sought, and the superior court issued, an order granting 
OCS the authority to consent to the psychiatrist’s recommended administration of a particular 
antidepressant and additional mood stabilizer, and the mother appealed. On appeal, the mother 
argued that the superior court’s findings of fact did not satisfy the Myers standard, which the 
superior court had refused to apply. The Myers test balances the importance of a fundamental 
constitutional right with the state’s interest in limiting that right, requiring the state to show a 
compelling state interest and the absence of less restrictive means to advance the state’s 
objective.139 The supreme court agreed with the mother that the Myers standard protected her 
constitutional right as a parent to determine her child’s medical treatments.140 Nevertheless, 
applying Myers, the supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision to allow OCS to consent to 
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the administration of the antidepressant drug to the son. While the court found that medicating the 
son without his mother’s consent substantially burdened the mother’s constitutional rights, the 
court concluded that OCS had a compelling interest and that the antidepressant was the least 
intrusive available treatment. However, the supreme court reversed the superior court’s 
authorization of the mood stabilizer, reasoning that, without observing the reaction and progress 
of the child to the antidepressant, it was too early to conclude that the mood stabilizer was the 
least-intrusive treatment available. Lastly, the court was unpersuaded by the mother’s contention 
that finding she lacked capacity to consent, or that her refusal to consent was unreasonable, was 
necessary to overcome her parental rights.  The court concluded that the Myers standard alone 
adequately those rights. Accordingly, in affirming the authorization of the antidepressant but 
reversing the authorization of the mood stabilizer, the supreme court held that the Myers standard 
applies to a court’s decision to authorize medication for a child in the custody of OCS over a 
parent’s objection. 
 
Mat-Su Valley Medical Center, LLC v. Bolinger 
In Mat-Su Valley Medical Center, LLC v. Bolinger,141 the Supreme Court held that the medical 
peer review privilege of section 18.23.030 of the Alaska Statutes protects complaint-related 
materials contained in peer review committee files, even if the materials originated outside the 
peer review process.142  A hospital invoked the peer review privilege in two separate actions, one 
involving a wrongful death suit against a physician at the hospital, and the other involving both a 
medical malpractice claim against the same physician and a negligent credentialing claim against 
the hospital.143  In each case the superior court compelled the hospital to disclose materials related 
to complaints about the physician’s conduct and the hospital’s decision to grant the physician 
medical staff membership.144  The superior court reasoned that materials regarding such 
complaints fell outside the peer review privilege because although they may later become evidence 
in a peer review proceeding, they are based on observations occurring in the normal course of 
rendering medical care and preceding the commencement of peer review.145  The supreme court 
disagreed, finding that complaint-related materials contained in peer review committee files, the 
identities of the individuals reporting and reviewing the complaints, and any internal action taken 
in response satisfy the requirements for the privilege to apply.146  For the privilege to apply, the 
materials must be acquired by a peer review committee in the exercise of its duties and functions, 
which includes evaluating and improving the quality of health care rendered in the hospital.147  
Here, Mat-Su employees are instructed to report concerns about physicians that implicate patient 
care to the committees.148  Therefore, these complaints were acquired by a peer review committee 
in the exercise of its duties and functions.149  Thus, the supreme court reversed the superior court’s 
order compelling disclosure and held that the medical peer review privilege in section 18.23.030 
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of the Alaska Statutes protects complaint-related materials contained in peer review committee 
files, even if the materials originated outside the peer review process.150 
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INSURANCE LAW 
 
Hahn v. Geico Choice Ins. Co. 
In Hahn v. Geico Choice Ins. Co.,151 the supreme court held that the “reasonable” interpretation of 
an insurance policy involves an examination of  “(1) the language of the disputed provisions in the 
policy, (2) other provisions in the policy, (3) extrinsic evidence, and (4) case law interpreting 
similar provisions.” Hahn was stopped at a red light when Townsend struck the Hahn’s 
motorcycle, causing Hahn to momentarily landed on the hood, windshield, and roof of Townsend’s 
vehicle. Hahn believed that he was entitled to underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage because he 
“occupied,” as defined by GEICO’s policy, Townsend’s vehicle at the time of the collision. 
GEICO disagreed and filed suit against Hahn seeking a declaratory judgment that there was no 
UIM coverage available to Hahn because he was not in fact “occupying,” Townsend’s vehicle at 
the time of the collision.  The superior court granted GEICO summary judgment. Hahn appealed. 
The supreme court stated that under Alaska law, insurance contracts are interpreted according to 
the “reasonable expectations” of the insured. Affirming the superior court’s summary judgment, 
the supreme court held that Hahn’s construction of “occupying” was not “reasonable” because of 
“(1) the language of the disputed provisions in the policy, (2) other provisions in the policy, (3) 
extrinsic evidence, and (4) case law interpreting similar provisions.” 
 
Levi v. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Development  
In Levi v. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Development,152 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that it 
is fraudulent for an individual to knowingly fail to report earnings over 50 dollars per week when 
collecting unemployment insurance benefits under section 23.20.360 of the Alaska Statutes.  Levi 
received unemployment insurance benefits intermittently between 2010 and 2014.  While 
receiving those benefits, he was also working part time in various teaching positions.  To receive 
the benefits Levi filed a biweekly certification form, prepared according to a Department handbook 
he possessed which contained specific instructions.  Despite being employed, Levi improperly 
stated he was not and so avoided reporting wages he had received for more than 50 weeks.  Wages 
must be reported because the benefits received are reduced by 75 cents for every dollar earned 
over 50 dollars each week.  The Department sent Levi a notice of determination on December 21, 
2016 concluding that Levi had failed to report and had “grossly underreported” his work and 
earnings for the 50 weeks spanning from 2010 to 2014.  It required Levi pay back the benefits, a 
total of $25,122, and barred him from receiving further benefits for 52 weeks.  Levi appealed the 
Department’s determination arguing, among other things, that he had reasonably interpreted the 
handbook to only require he report earnings greater than 50 dollars per day (instead of per week) 
due to its allegedly ambiguous wording.  The Supreme Court of Alaska rejected this argument.  It 
explained that regardless of whether the handbook was ambiguous, Levi had a duty to read the 
statute which was plain that the reporting requirement was based on weekly, not daily, earnings 
above 50 dollars.  The court further found that even if failure to read the statute was excusable, the 
handbook was not ambiguous.  Finally, the court concluded that even if the statute and the 
handbook had been ambiguous, Levi had acted fraudulently because under his interpretation of the 
reporting requirements he still failed to report wages for nine continuous weeks where he earned 
wages greater than $50 per day.  Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that it is 
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fraudulent for an individual to knowingly fail to report earnings over 50 dollars per week when 
collecting unemployment insurance benefits under section 23.20.360 of the Alaska Statutes. 
Ray Klein, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Alaska Electrical Health & Welfare Fund 
In Ray Klein, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Alaska Electrical Health & Welfare Fund,153 the 
district court held that state law insurance claims are preempted by ERISA when they are rooted 
in an ERISA plan’s definition of the scope of covered charges. The Alaska Electrical Health and 
Welfare Fund (“Fund”) was created under the Labor Management Relations Act and ERISA and 
provides healthcare benefits to Alaska’s electrical workers and their dependents. The Fund entered 
into an agreement with several healthcare providers, including Providence Health and Services 
(“Providence”). After the premature birth of a pair of twins covered by the Fund, Providence billed 
the Fund for just over $4 million on the basis of the agreement; the Fund refused to pay $1.1 
million of the bill. Providence, through Ray Klein, Inc. (“PCS”), brought a common law claim for 
breach of contract, but the Fund argued that the claim was preempted by ERISA. The district court 
explained that ERISA preempts state law claims related to an employee benefit plan (“Plan”) 
provided under that title. The district court explained that a “relationship test” should be applied 
to determine if a claim relates to a Plan. This test focuses on whether the claims references and 
depends on an ERISA-regulated relationship. Under this test, the district court explained that the 
Fund’s ERISA plan dictates the services the Fund covers for beneficiaries, so claims about the 
scope of that coverage necessarily relate to the existence of an ERISA regulated-relationship. 
Granting the Fund’s motion for summary judgment, the district court held that claims regarding 
coverage are preempted where they are rooted in an ERISA plan’s definition of the scope of 
covered charges. 
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LEGAL ETHICS 
 
In re Albertsen 
In In re Albertsen,154 the supreme court held that, as a result of an attorney’s six ethical violations 
including failure to act with due diligence, failure to maintain adequate communication with a 
client, and failure to adequately communicate with the disciplinary committee, a two-year-and-
one-day suspension was appropriate. Albertsen, an attorney in Alaska, represented a client seeking 
to foreclose on real estate properties. Albertsen represented this client from 2008 until 2016, during 
which time he failed to inform the client of significant changes to his client’s matters, including 
fee increases and settlements. Albertsen’s client obtained new counsel and in 2016 submitted a 
complaint to the Alaska Bar Association. Albertsen failed to adequately respond. As a result of 
these and other complaints, the disciplinary board, working with Albertsen’s cooperation and 
consent, recommended he be suspended for two years and one day suspension, that he be ordered 
to pay costs, and that he be received continuing legal education and a psychological evaluation 
prior to reinstatement. The supreme affirmed the disciplinary board’s finding of facts and analysis 
and ordered its recommended penalties be put into effect. Affirming the disciplinary board’s 
recommendation, the supreme court held that, as a result of an attorney’s six ethical violations 
including failure to act with due diligence, maintain adequate communication with a client, and 
adequately communicate with the disciplinary committee, a two-year-and-one-day suspension was 
appropriate. 
 
In re Reger 
In In re Reger155, the supreme court adopted the recommendations of the bar association’s 
disciplinary board, holding that violations of the ethics rules are properly attributed to an attorney 
when the violations occurr due to improper delegation of authority to a non-attorney assistant, and 
inadequate supervision of that assistant. Lawrence Reger hired KW, a non-attorney, as a legal 
assistant. Over time, KW became a key part of Reger’s practice, taking on responsibility for client 
communication. Reger also entrusted KW with filing documents at the court in a timely manner. 
When cash flow issues threatened the practice, Reger took a loan from KW, agreeing to share 
future profits with her 50-50. Eventually, Reger realized that communication with his clients was 
breaking down. He failed to appear in court on at least one occasion, and missed critical filing 
deadlines. These problems led two clients to file bar grievances against Reger. After reviewing 
those complaints, the disciplinary board found six violations of the rules: 1) Reger violated Rule 
1.3 by missing deadlines and failing to appear. 2) Reger violated Rule 1.4 by turning over 
communication to KW, failing to notify clients of pending proceedings, and failing to tell one 
client his case had been dismissed. 3) Reger violated Rule 5.3 by failing to supervise KW to ensure 
her conduct conformed with the rules. 4) Reger violated Rule 5.4 by sharing profits with KW, a 
non-lawyer. 5) Reger violated Rule 1.15 by failing to account to a client upon request and failing 
to deliver funds to the client’s new lawyer. 6) Reger violated Rule 1.16 when he failed to surrender 
client files and return unearned fees upon termination of representation. The disciplinary board 
recommended he be suspended for six months, ordered to complete nine hours of CLE, and 
required to pay $1,000 in costs to the board. The supreme court adopted the board’s analysis and 
ordered the recommended discipline be imposed, holding that violations of the ethics rules are 
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properly attributed to an attorney when the violations occur due to improper delegation of authority 
to a non-attorney assistant, and inadequate supervision of that assistant. 
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PROPERTY LAW 
 
Beecher v. City of Cordova  
In Beecher v. City of Cordova,156 the supreme court held that, upon the grant of a motion for an 
accounting, the burden falls on the nonmoving party to provide a proper accounting, even if there 
is a significant burden to do so. In 1997, the Beechers entered into a lease with the City of Cordova 
to operate a fueling facility on City-owned land. The Beechers fell behind on rent, eventually 
leading to their eviction in 2003. Upon vacating the premises, the Beechers left behind personal 
property, including vehicles, fuel tanks, and trailers. The City filed a creditor’s affidavit stating 
that it would attempt to satisfy the judgment by selling some of the abandoned property. After two 
years, the City ceased collection efforts. Eight years passed, and when the City obtained a renewal 
judgment, the Beechers filed a motion in superior court seeking an accounting of the City’s 
collection efforts, specifically, what had become of their personal property. The City responded 
that it had sold certain improvements from the fueling facility, and additionally that some of the 
property identified in the creditor’s affidavit had been foreclosed upon and sold at auctions.  The 
Beechers responded by providing a full list of personal property, most of which was not included 
in the City’s initial accounting, that they valued at nearly three-quarters of the entire judgment. 
The superior court ruled that the original accounting was proper, and the supreme court heard the 
appeal. The supreme court agreed with the Beechers that the city’s accounting was inadequate. It 
explained that the moving party must show that a relationship exists between itself and the 
nonmoving party, that the relationship requires an accounting, that a balance is due, and that the 
balance can only be ascertained by an accounting. Upon showing such facts, the burden falls on 
the nonmoving party to make a proper accounting. The City argued that the burden was too great, 
considering the passage of time, to make an accounting of all the listed property.  The supreme 
court rejected this argument, reasoning that the Beechers had demonstrated facts necessary to 
establish the City’s duty to account, and that a significant burden to conduct a proper accounting 
does not eliminate this duty. The court reversed the superior court’s order denying the Beechers’ 
motion for an accounting, holding that the burden is on the City to render a proper accounting, 
even though a proper accounting involves a significant burden.  
 
Dickson v. State Dep’t of Natural Resources 
In Dickson v. State Dep’t of Natural Resources,157 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that RS 2477 
rights of travel allow for public access to federal land intended for non-public use.  In 1958, 
Benjamin Cowart homesteaded 160 acres, across the southern part of which his neighbor built 
Homestead Road without permission.  The public began using this road year-round for various 
purposes, also without permission.  Then, in 1983, the State notified Cowart that the Historic 
Iditarod Trail also crossed his property.  Cowart soon learned the Iditarod trail race was scheduled 
to cross his property along that path the following year; he objected to this and posted a private 
property no-trespassing sign at the point the trail entered his land.  In 2008, after inheriting the 
property from her father, Kelly Dickson also blocked off Homestead Road.  When the public 
ignored the signs and barriers and continued to use both paths, Dickson filed a complaint to quiet 
title to the trail and the road that crossed her property.  The lower court found the Historic Iditarod 
Trail followed an RS 2477 right of way because the trail had been established before Cowart 
                                                            
156 408 P.3d 1208 (Alaska 2018).  
157 433 P.3d 1075 (Alaska 2018). 
73 
 
acquired title to the land, and that Homestead Road was a public prescriptive easement.  The 
Supreme Court affirmed.  It explained that section 8 of the Lode Mining Act of 1866 (repealed in 
1976) allowed for the creation of RS 2477 right of ways on federal lands either through public 
acceptance, established through sufficient public use, or through manifestation of official intent, 
before the lands became privatized.  It further explained that RS 2477 right of ways were explicitly 
limited to federal land “not reserved for public uses,” including lands intended for settlement by 
private parties.  The court reasoned that the lower court had sufficient evidence to find that this 
had occurred for the sections of the Iditarod trail crossing the land before Cowart had converted it 
into private property.  The court further found that the lower court had sufficient evidence to find 
that Homestead Road had been used by the public continuously, year-round, for at least 10 years, 
thereby establishing a public prescriptive easement.  Because the supreme court found no clear 
error in the lower court’s factual findings, it affirmed, holding that RS 2477 rights of travel allow 
for public access to federal land intended for non-public use, and remanded only for further 
consideration of attorneys’ fees. 
 
Keenan v. Meyer 
In Keenan v. Meyer,158 the supreme court upheld the superior court’s award of compensatory 
damages and full attorneys’ fees in a dispute between neighbors over an access easement and water 
rights, holding that the superior court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and the district 
court did not abuse its discretion.  The Keegans and Meyers each owned part of a subdivided lot 
(Lot 3) in the Macdonald Spit community.  When the lots were subdivided, the original owners 
reached an agreement that created a ten foot access easement, which ran with the land, adjacent to 
the properties and granted the owners of both properties water rights to a well on the Keegans’ 
property.  The Meyers purchased the lot next to the Keegans and began renovating their cabin, 
eventually making improvements to the access easement and the well.  After bad feelings arose 
between the neighbors, the Keegans eventually blocked vehicle traffic from using the access 
easement and cut off the Meyers’ water.  In the ensuing litigation, the superior court ruled in favor 
of the Meyers, awarding them compensatory damages for the loss of use of the easement, their 
property for the time it was without water, and the full attorneys’ fees incurred by the Meyers.  The 
Keegans appealed claiming error in the calculation of damages and the award of all attorneys’ fees.  
The supreme court held that the calculation of damages was acceptable and that the award of 
damages for loss of use of both the easement and the property did not affect a double recovery, 
since the injuries were distinct.  Based on consideration of the Rule 82(b)(3) factors, the court 
found that awarding full attorneys’ fees was appropriate because the Keegans acted in bad faith by 
bringing improper pressure to bear on the Meyers during the litigation by cutting off their easement 
and water rights.  The superior court’s decision and award in favor of the Meyers was affirmed. 
 
Reeves v. Godspeed Properties, LLC 
In Reeves v. Godspeed Properties, LLC,159 the supreme court held that Alaska law recognizes 
partial extinguishment of easements through prescription. After a series of property transfers, 
Reeves owned an easement on a piece of Godspeed’s property. Reeves offered to sell the easement 
to Godspeed, but the parties were unable to come to an agreement. Godspeed sued Reeves for quiet 
title, claiming that Reeves’ easement was invalid. The superior court held that Reeves’ easement 
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was valid, but used the standard previously established in Hansen v. Davis160 to determine that the 
adverse presence of a gold plant terminated the easement by prescription.161 Reeves and Godspeed 
both appealed, with Godspeed arguing that the easement was not created because of ambiguities 
in the deed, and Reeves arguing that the easement was not extinguished by prescription, or 
alternatively that the easement should only be partially extinguished. The supreme court agreed 
that an easement existed, and agreed that the easement was extinguished on the location of the 
gold plant, but rejected the superior court’s holding that the remainder of the easement was 
extinguished, reasoning that allowing for partial extinguishment by prescription leads to legal 
outcomes that better reflect reality. Affirming in part and reversing in part the superior court’s 
decision, the supreme court held Alaska law recognizes partial extinguishment of easements 
through prescription. 
 
Riddle v. Lanser 
In Riddle v. Lanser,162 the supreme court held that the Right to Farm Act does not shield individuals 
from nuisance liability where the activity is not part of an “agricultural facility” or “agricultural 
operation at an agricultural facility” before becoming a nuisance. In 2005, Riddle acquired 
property covered by a farm conservation plan, and he used it to maintain some livestock, to produce 
some crops, and to store sewage in septage lagoons as part of his business pumping septic tanks. 
In 2007 Riddle obtained permits to spread septage on his fields, but he did not disclose he 
possessed septage lagoons so the permit was confined to sewage obtained elsewhere. In that same 
year, a real estate developer acquired adjacent property where it built and sold residences. In 2010, 
after Riddle began to accept sewage from septic companies beyond his own, residents of the 
adjacent property began complaining of the smell. In 2011 Riddle obtained an amended farm plan 
allowing him to maintain septage lagoons so long as the primary use of the property was 
agricultural and the septage lagoons were used for this agricultural use, and in December Lanser 
sued for nuisance. The superior court held in favor of the real estate developer, following a two-
step analysis that first found the septage lagoons to be a nuisance, and second found that the 
lagoons were not “an agricultural facility or an agricultural operation” protected under the Right 
to Farm Act. The supreme court affirmed the nuisance holding, finding that the superior court did 
not clearly err in its findings first that the septage lagoons constituted a private nuisance. Second, 
it explained that the Right to Farm Act did not protect Riddle from nuisance liability because the 
nuisance arose prior to the septage lagoons’ actual or intended use for commercial agricultural 
purposes. Further, it explained that the limited agricultural activity on the property did not 
transform the initial non-agricultural use of the septage lagoons into a protected agricultural action. 
Affirming-in-part and reversing-in-part (as to fees) the supreme court held that the Right to Farm 
Act does not shield individuals from nuisance liability where the activity is not part of an 
“agricultural facility” or “agricultural operation at an agricultural facility” before becoming a 
nuisance. 
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TORT LAW 
 
In re Angelette, LLC 
In In re Angelette, LLC,163 the United States District Court for the District of Alaska determined 
that maintenance and cure claims are not subject to the Limitation of Liability Act, making the 
shipowner’s duty to pay maintenance and cure virtually automatic.  Jay Thomassen is the sole 
member of Angelette, LLC; a corporation that owned a ship, the Kupreanof, which sank during a 
fishing expedition.  The Kupreanof’s captain said that three days after the voyage began all of the 
ship’s pumps were working, including the lazarette pump.  However, at some point fishing gear 
had been stowed on top of the lazarette pump preventing the crew from checking whether water 
was entering it.  When the vessel began to sink the captain was forced to make a Mayday call to 
the United States Coast Guard and abandon the vessel.  The captain and crew were rescued before 
the Kupreanof sank completely, and after Angelette, LLC sued for a declaration of no liability they 
counter-claimed for maintenance and cure.  Angelette, LLC then moved for summary judgment 
on those claims arguing that the Limitation of Liability Act does not require payment of 
maintenance and cure.  The district court explained that maintenance and cure damages provide 
seamen with lodging and food when they become ill or injured while serving upon a ship; and it 
elaborated that these damages continues until the seaman recovers as much as he is able. Adopting 
reasoning of the 5th Circuit, the district court concluded that maintenance and cure is a distinct 
remedy from negligence or unseaworthiness and that the Limitation of Liability Act only applies 
to the latter remedies.  As a result, recovery for maintenance and cure is virtually automatic.  
Rejecting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the court held that maintenance and cure 
claims are not subject to limitation on the Limitation of Liability Act. 
 
Lane v. City of Juneau 
In Lane v. City of Juneau,164 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a municipality and its 
employees do not share the same type of immunity for its decisions and actions.  The City of 
Juneau (“the City”) operated a campground that was normally closed for the winter. To 
accommodate the local homeless population, the City decided in the fall of 2009 to keep the 
campground open through the winter. A city official, Marlow, hired Gordon Valle as caretaker; 
his duties included administrative tasks and noise control but no law-enforcement. Though “the 
campground rules expressly prohibited alcohol,” Marlow had told Valle that he could drink in his 
own tent and that the rule would only be enforced against people who were disruptive. One 
evening, Valle joined some other camp residents, became heavily intoxicated, and passed two of 
his guns around. Among the residents present were Jon Lane and Chris Barrios, who got into an 
altercation that ended with Barrios shooting Lane in the face with one of Valle’s guns. Lane then 
sued the City, alleging it had been negligent in operating the campground and hiring Valle. Lane 
further alleged the City was vicariously liable for Valle’s conduct. In granting the City’s motions 
for summary judgment, the lower court held that the City was immune under the discretionary 
function doctrine and that the City was not vicariously liable for Valle’s actions as they were 
“outside the scope of his contractual duties.” The supreme court reversed explaining that while 
Marlow would be protected under official immunity, the discretionary function doctrine does not 
automatically apply the protection of an individual employee to the employing municipality. It 
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explained that though “municipal employees enjoy personal or ‘official’ immunity for any action 
involving ‘deliberation’ and ‘judgment,’ municipalities themselves enjoy immunity only for 
‘planning’ decisions; they remain potentially liable for ‘operational’ decisions. . . ." The Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment on the issues of negligent supervision 
and vicarious liability holding that a municipality and its employees do not share the same type of 
immunity for its decisions and actions; it otherwise affirmed the superior court’s judgment and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. 
 
Lindbo v. Colaska, Inc. 
In Lindbo v. Colaska, Inc.,165 the supreme court held that the trial court’s failure to give spoliation 
jury instructions was not plain error. On August 21, Lindbo, a truck driver who delivered asphalt 
from Colaska’s plant, arrived at the plant, stepped out of his truck, and turned his back to the 
machinery. The plant operator unsuccessfully attempted to get Lindbo’s attention over the sound 
of the machinery. To get his attention, the plant operator threw a can in Lindbo’s direction, but it 
struck Lindbo in the lower back. Lindbo went to the emergency room for medical treatment and 
later filed suit for battery and negligence. At trial, the jury awarded Lindbo over $2,500 for 
compensatory damages for negligence but rejected his battery claim. Lindbo appealed, arguing 
that the superior court’s failure to give an adverse inference (spoliation) jury instructions based on 
Colaska’s failure to preserve the can that hit Lindbo was plain error. The court disagreed, finding 
that it was not plain error. Plain error exists when an obvious mistake has been made that creates 
a high likelihood that injustice has resulted. There must be a reasonable probability that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceeding. Although the parties disagreed about the size and weight 
of the can thrown at Lindbo, the court found that the weight of the can would not have changed 
any of the jury’s findings. The only possible finding that the can could have changed was Lindbo’s 
noneconomic loss award. However, the jury had ample testimony to make a noneconomic loss 
award and still declined to award any amount for medical expenses. Adding an adverse inference 
instruction likely would not have changed the award’s final amount. Thus, the supreme court 
affirmed and held that the trial court’s failure to give spoliation jury instructions was not plain 
error. 
 
Shack v. Shack 
In Shack v. Shack, 166 the supreme court held that Alaska’s bystander theory of liability does not 
permit recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) when the tortfeasor and the 
injured relative are the same person.  In June 2014, Elizabeth Shack failed to yield the right-of-
way at a stop sign causing an accident with her car and an oncoming truck. Elizabeth’s mother, 
Rachel, and brother, Dylan, were nearby the accident and rushed to the scene, where they saw 
Elizabeth seriously injured as a result of the crash. These injuries later led to Elizabeth’s death. In 
February 2015, her family (“the Shacks”) filed a bystander claim against Elizabeth’s auto-
insurance policy through her estate for NIED, arguing that even though the deceased was also the 
tortfeasor, the family should still recover for its resulting emotional distress. The lower court 
denied this claim stating that NIED claims are invalid when the tortfeasor and the injured relative 
are the same individual. The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that 
bystander claims required the injury to be caused by a third party with no pre-existing relationship 
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to the bystander relatives of the injured party. Furthermore, the court found a new duty of care that 
would allow recovery should not be recognized. Affirming the lower courts ruling, the supreme 
court held that Alaska’s bystander theory of liability does not permit recovery when the tortfeasor 
and the injured relative are the same person. 
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TRUST & ESTATES LAW 
 
Boiko v. Kapolchok 
In Boiko v. Kapolchok,167 the supreme court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion 
in calculating attorneys’ fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82.  Boiko and Picarella filed legal 
malpractice claims against Kapolchok after he represented them in a dental malpractice suit. They 
contended that Kapolchok withheld information about a favorable summary judgment ruling to 
induce them to settle the case.  Kapolchok retained a second attorney to assist him in his defense.  
After a lengthy discovery process resulting in sanction of Boiko and Picarella, they dismissed their 
claims with prejudice while leaving the issue of attorney’s fees open.  After the superior court 
dismissed Kapolchok’s rule Rule 68 offer of judgment, it proceeded to calculate the fees due him 
under Rule 82.  Kapolchok argued that his fee award under Rule 82 should be enhanced from 20% 
to 50% based on the unreasonableness of Boiko’s and Picarella’s claims and “their vexatious and 
bad faith conduct throughout the litigation,” while Boiko and Picarella argued Kapolchok’s award 
should be reduced to zero for similar reasons.  The superior court ultimately awarded Kapolchok 
Rule 82 attorneys’ fees but reduced the award from 20% to 15% because it found Kapolchok acted 
unreasonably in paying two attorneys to defend an unremarkable legal malpractice suit, and to 
avoid deterring future plaintiffs.  Kapolchok appealed, challenging the superior court’s decision to 
reduce, rather than enhance attorneys’ fees under Rule 82(b)(3).  The supreme court affirmed.  It 
explained that under Rule 82(b)(2), when a prevailing party recovers no money judgment and the 
case is resolved without trial, the court shall award the prevailing party 20% of its attorneys’ fees.  
The court continued that this the award can be varied pursuant to Rule 82(b)(3) based on equitable 
factors, including the complexity of litigation and reasonableness of the number of attorneys used.  
Finally, the court noted that in reviewing Rule 82 awards it applies an abuse of discretion standard 
and so it will only reverse when the award is manifestly unreasonable.  Under this standard, the 
supreme court determined that the superior court engaged in a proper analysis.  The court noted 
that the superior court reviewed Kapolchok’s itemized billing and the complexity of the case, that 
it had a better perspective on those issues than did the supreme court itself, and that consideration 
of chilling future plaintiffs is permitted under the Rule 82.  Thus, the supreme court affirmed and 
held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in reducing attorneys’ fees from 20% to 
15% under Rule 82. 
 
Cottini v. Berggren 
In Cottini v. Berggren,168 the supreme court held that former agents may be entitled to attorney’s 
fees for defending against their former principal’s challenge to the agent’s accounting of costs of 
their former guardianship-relationship. Cottini acted as Berggren’s guardian after Berggren 
suffered a traumatic brain injury. After Berggren recovered, Berggren objected to Cottini’s 
accounting of fees and costs. Cottini hired an attorney to defend him from the objection, and the 
parties eventually settled. After settlement, Cottini filed a motion requesting attorney’s fees 
incurred during the defense. The superior court denied the motion, concluding that section 
13.26.291(d) of the Alaska Statutes governed fee-shifting in a guardianship case and that it only 
would only allow award of attorney’s fees if Berggren’s challenge to the accounting had been 
malicious or frivolous, which it was not.  The supreme court determined that section 13.26.291(d), 
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various other sections of the Alaska Statutes, and ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82 did not apply to the case 
so they neither prevented nor justified an award of attorney’s fees.  It elaborated that the under the 
common law of agency a principal has a duty to indemnify his agent for expenditures beneficial 
to the principal. The supreme court explained that accordingly equity and public policy weigh in 
favor of allowing a recovery of attorney’s fees if factors indicate the expenditures were beneficial 
to the principal. The supreme court specified these factors include the amount of attorney’s fees, 
the relative amount of assets in question, the merits of the parties’ arguments, the extent that the 
defense was related to the best interests of the principal, and the duration, extent, and expense of 
the defense. Reversing and remanding for consideration of these factors, the supreme court held 
that a former agent in a guardianship relationship may be entitled to attorney’s fees for defending 
against his former principal’s challenge to the agent’s accounting. 
 
Hester v. Landau 
In Hester v. Landau,169 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that only a personal representative of an 
estate has the power to appear in court on behalf of the estate.  Aurora Landau sued her former 
employer for unpaid compensation, naming the company and its two owners as defendants.  One 
of the owners died while the case was pending, and Landau substituted his estate in her complaint.  
After the lower court ultimately ruled in favor of Landau, Tracy Hester, the deceased’s widow and 
sole beneficiary of his estate, moved for relief from the judgment based on improper service.  She 
argued that as the sole-beneficiary of the estate her financial interest was identical to its interest 
and that she therefore possessed interest-injury standing.  On appeal, the supreme court rejected 
this argument and affirmed the lower court’s judgment.  The court found that though Hester was 
an interested person under Alaska’s probate law, she was not a personal representative of the estate 
and so lacked standing to sue on its behalf.  The court explained that the probate code is careful to 
ensure there is no lapse in coverage between different personal representatives of an estate, and 
that it also provides other remedies to interested persons short of authorizing them to act as legal 
representatives.  From this the court concluded that these provisions would not exist if someone 
other than a personal representative could take legal action on behalf of an estate.  Affirming the 
lower court’s judgment, the supreme court held that only a personal representative of an estate has 
the power to appear in court on behalf of the estate. 
 
In re Estate of Seward 
In the case In re Estate of Seward,170 the supreme court held that purported children of a decedent 
intervening in probate preceding are not required to bring a separate paternity cause of action.  
Seward died in May 2013 after executing a will in 2008 that declared he had no spouse or children.  
In an October 2013 probate proceeding Vincent Mock asserted that Seward was his father.  The 
superior court ruled that paternity determinations could not be made in probate proceedings and 
that Vincent was not interested parties, barring him from the proceedings.  In an earlier appeal, the 
supreme court determined that Vincent was not entitled to relief as a pretermitted heir, but it noted 
that, if he was Seward’s son, Vincent might be entitled to a statutory allowance.  After the supreme 
court ordered supplemental briefing on the issue, the superior court ruled that Vincent’s claim to 
parentage was distinct from his claim to a property allowance and that it was therefore barred by 
a statute of limitations.  The supreme court reversed, reasoning that, despite caselaw previously 
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referring to paternity determinations as “paternity actions,” paternity determinations are elements 
of other claims rather than separable causes of action.  The court elaborated that paternity 
determinations may be conducted as part of a claim on an estate and so are subject to the time 
constraints of the probate code rather than a separate statute of limitations.  Concluding that various 
time-limits on probate proceedings did not apply or had not run, the supreme court reversed and 
remanded, holding that paternity claims may be brought in conjunction with probate proceedings 
as they do not constitute a separate cause of action. 
 
 
 
 
